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ABSTRACT 
An evaluation of identification methods used in the investigation 
of counterfeit card fraud 
Today, the use of one‟s bank card to pay or withdraw money is common. Modern 
technology provides us with the convenience of instant transactions at the 
automated teller machine or point of sale but unfortunately, it has also brought the 
reality and risk of card skimming and counterfeit card fraud. Criminals have become 
very efficient and technologically advanced in skimming and counterfeiting cards, to 
such an extent that counterfeit card fraud has become a significant threat to the 
public, banking, retail and business in South Africa. 
Counterfeit card fraud is a complex, multi-faceted crime, requiring specific skills and 
knowledge of card counterfeiting methods from police and bank investigators. The 
scope of its investigation is wide. It includes different crime scenes and offenders, 
sophisticated equipment and various aspects that need to be identified positively. 
Investigators find it difficult to identify perpetrators and certain aspects unique to this 
crime and, as a result, many investigations are unsuccessful. This research 
endeavours to establish what identification methods are available to investigators 
and which are effective. 
KEYWORDS 
Card skimming; Commercial crime; Counterfeit card fraud; Evidence; Forensic 
investigation; Fraud; Identification method.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Modern technology has brought the convenience of advanced payment instruments 
and banking systems. Today, paying by bank card has become a popular and widely 
used method of payment. Carrying a card linked to a debit or credit account at a 
bank is common, and is regarded as a safe and convenient substitute for cash. 
People are more inclined to use bank cards as a form of payment, and paying by 
cash is becoming less prevalent (Visa South Africa, 2012:1). However, the use of 
bank cards has its shortcomings, namely their vulnerability to fraud, notably 
counterfeit card fraud.  
Counterfeit card fraud arises from the use of a counterfeit card to conduct fraudulent 
transactions. A counterfeit card is produced illegally by encoding the magnetic strip 
of a card with card data which is obtained from a valid, bank-issued card (South 
African Banking Risk Information Centre [Sabric], 2014:18). Card data is obtained 
through a process of card skimming. Skimming involves the use of an electronic card 
reader (skimming device) to copy the card data from a valid card without the 
cardholder‟s consent (Sabric, 2014:19; 2012:19 & 30). Card skimming and the 
possession, selling or distribution of skimming devices with criminal intent, are illegal. 
The number of cards in circulation and the volumes of transactions going through 
South African payment systems are significant. By 2011 there were 43 million bank 
cards in circulation in South Africa (SA) (Schulz & Ruse, 2012:1), while the number 
of card-based transactions for the period 1 October 2011 to 31 December 2011 
totalled 190 million, of which 87 million were automated teller machine (ATM) 
transactions (Payments Association of South Africa [PASA], 2012a:16-17). In 2013 
and 2014, the total losses resulting from counterfeit card fraud in South Africa 
relating to SA-issued cards were R254,3 million and R205,3 million respectively, and 
80%-85% of counterfeit card fraud manifested as cash withdrawals at ATMs (Sabric, 
2013c:1-20; 2014:11-18). In 2015, about R130 million was lost as a result of 
counterfeit card fraud. This figure excludes cards issued in other countries which 
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were used in South Africa (Sabric, 2015:12-20). On average, about 50% of all card 
fraud occurs in Gauteng province (Sabric, 2014:13; 2015:10 & 15).  
In addition, the recovery of skimming devices over the past number of years 
illustrates the magnitude and extent of counterfeit card fraud in South Africa (Sabric, 
2014:19-22; 2015:21-23). Between 1 January 2015 and 30 September 2015, 78 
skimming devices were recovered. It is, therefore, apparent that counterfeit card 
fraud is a real threat to banks, the business sector and the public. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Prior to 6 July 2009, the investigation of counterfeit card fraud was the sole 
responsibility of the Commercial Crime Unit (CCU) of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) (2010a:1-3). However, from 6 July 2009, when the CCU became 
part of the then newly established Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), 
the functions and responsibilities of the CCU are regulated by Chapter 6A, read with 
section 16, of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995).  
In 2011/12, the CCU received 5 322 counterfeit card fraud cases for investigation, 
involving a total actual loss of R144 million (SAPS Annual Report 2011/12). From 
2012, the focus of the CCU moved towards the investigation of serious and priority 
commercial crime, and not all commercial-related crimes. The mandate of the CCU 
was aligned with relevant statutory prescriptions, a process which included the 
transfer of the investigation responsibility in respect of single, unrelated counterfeit 
card fraud cases to station level detectives, while the investigation of serious, 
organised and syndicate-related counterfeit card fraud cases remained with the CCU 
(SAPS, 2012a; 2013b; 2013c). From 2012/13 onward, it was not possible to 
determine the real extent of counterfeit card fraud cases reported to the SAPS. In its 
annual reports, the SAPS only states the number of counterfeit card fraud cases 
investigated by the CCU (SAPS Annual Reports 2012/13 to 2014/15). The total 
number of reported counterfeit card fraud cases is not provided. The SAPS was 
unable to provide figures for the total number of counterfeit card fraud cases 
reported between 2013 and 2015.  
The responsibilities of the researcher, as an officer attached to the CCU, included 
docket inspections at CCU investigation units, the investigation of commercial-
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related crime, overseeing and managing investigations, and implementing policy and 
standards for commercial crime investigations. During docket inspections carried out 
during 2012/13 at the Commercial Crime Unit, Johannesburg, in terms of Standing 
Order 324, as well as SAPS Head Office directives with reference 26/13/3 dated 16 
May 2003 and 14 August 2006 (SAPS, 2003; 2006d; 2011d), the researcher has 
established that 95% of counterfeit card fraud cases remained unsolved and that the 
perpetrators were never identified.  
Furthermore, inspections showed that investigating officers have been unable to 
identify several pivotal aspects required to solve cases of counterfeit card fraud. 
These aspects include the point of compromise of the original card (i.e. the ATM or 
point of sale where the card had been skimmed and the card holder‟s personal 
identification number (PIN) obtained), the perpetrator who skimmed the card, the 
skimming device and PIN-capturing device used, the person(s) who manufactured 
and used the counterfeit card to commit fraud, the counterfeit card itself and the 
point of fraudulent spend (the ATM where the fraudulent cash withdrawal was made 
or merchant where the fraudulent purchase was made).  
An examination of the training material used to train SAPS investigators in the 
investigation of counterfeit card fraud has confirmed the above mentioned 
challenges. Relevant SAPS training courses include the Basic Crime Investigation 
Course, Resolving of Crime Course and the Commercial Crime Forensic Learning 
Programme Levels I, II and III (SAPS, 2006g:67-71 & 89-101; 2009a; 2009b:64-66; 
2009c:184-247; 2011c; 2012b). However, none of these courses address the 
investigation objective of identification in counterfeit card fraud cases. The 
researcher acknowledges the importance of this topic to be researched in order to 
enhance the understanding of investigating officers of the use of identification 
methods in the investigation of counterfeit card fraud.  
1.3 RESEARCH AIM 
The aim of a research project is the general intention or overall purpose of the 
research undertaken. It is a broad statement of what the research sets out to achieve 
and must be clear (Mouton, 2008:50-51). The aim of this study is to evaluate 
identification methods used to investigate counterfeit card fraud.  
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1.4 RESEARCH PURPOSE 
The purpose of research is to provide answers to questions, to gain knowledge, to 
solve a practical problem or to improve existing procedures (Dantzker & Hunter, 
2012:12; Denscombe, 2010:7; Badenhorst, 2007:23). Creswell (2009:111) 
underlines the importance of a clear, specific and concise purpose statement which 
will, from the outset, help to determine the focus and direction of the research, and 
provide an important criterion to evaluate the outcome of the research.  
The purpose of this study includes the following: 
 To explore the topic and the research problem which have been identified.  
 To examine and evaluate identification methods used to investigate 
counterfeit card fraud.  
 To empower investigating officers with knowledge on the use of 
identification methods in the investigation of counterfeit card fraud.  
The researcher has gathered as much information as possible in respect of the 
problem relating to identification, which was found to be unsuccessful during 
counterfeit card fraud investigations, resulting in a high rate of unsolved cases. 
During the study, the prevailing situation in the South African Police Service and the 
banking industry has been examined to determine how counterfeit card fraud is 
investigated, whether identification is pursued during investigations and, if so, 
whether the identification methods used, are effective.  
The researcher has examined and evaluated different identification methods that can 
be used to identify aspects specific to situations which an investigator may encounter 
in counterfeit card fraud cases. Furthermore, the study has been conducted to 
determine whether any good or effective practices exist in this regard and, if any, 
what they are and whether they can be used by investigating officers.  
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Good research begins with identifying a good question to ask, ideally a question that 
no one else has ever thought to ask before (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013:29). Research 
questions should elucidate exactly what is to be researched and deal with the 
specific issues that are to be researched, measured, observed and investigated 
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(Denscombe, 2002:31; Noak & Wincup, 2004:122). They are formulated to focus the 
study, and to give guidance in respect of a suitable research design and approach 
(Maxwell, 2005:67). 
The research questions that have been researched in this study are: 
 What are the objectives of forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud 
investigations? 
 What identification methods can be used to investigate counterfeit card 
fraud? 
1.6 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 Forensic investigation 1.6.1
Forensic investigation is described by Benson, Jones and Horne (2015:2 & 19-20) as 
a process of inquiry into criminal conduct, a civil or administrative matter, which is an 
in-depth, meticulous search for the truth through the use of specialised skills, expert 
knowledge, and scientific methods and techniques (also see Van Rooyen, 2008:7, 
14 & 77).  
 Evidence 1.6.2
Evidence is anything that is relevant to a case that can be used to prove or refute 
(disprove) a fact or allegation. It is anything with evidential (probative) or exculpatory 
value and includes, but is not limited to physical objects, documents, information and 
witness testimony (Dutelle, 2011:3; Gardner, 2012:7).  
 Fraud 1.6.3
Fraud is the unlawful, intentional making of a misrepresentation with the intent to 
defraud, causing actual or potential prejudice to another (Snyman, 2006:523; 
Burchell, 2005:833). The elements required to prove fraud are unlawfulness, intent, 
the making of a misrepresentation, the intent to defraud and a resulting actual or 
potential prejudice to another party. 
 Identification 1.6.4
Identification is the classification process by which an entity, person or object is 
placed in a predefined class or category, based on shared or similar features or 
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characteristics (i.e. class characteristics) (Osterburg & Ward, 2010:36). This forms 
the basis for individualisation, which relates to a unique (positive) identification (Van 
Graan & Budhram, 2015:47 & 64). 
 Individualisation 1.6.5
Individualisation is the process by which it is unequivocally established that physical 
evidence originates from a singular source or origin, exclusive of all others. This 
includes “… the demonstration that a particular sample is unique even among 
members of the same class” (Kaye, 2009:15; Marais, 1992:20-22).  
 Debit card 1.6.6
PASA (2012b:1) defines a debit card as a payment instrument issued by a financial 
institution and linked to a deposit account (such as a cheque, savings or 
transmission account) which, generally, is pre-funded and has a lower credit risk 
exposure than a credit card.  
 Credit card 1.6.7
A credit card is a payment instrument issued by a financial institution and linked to a 
credit card account with a pre-approved credit limit, which enables the cardholder to 
purchase goods and services from merchants who have agreed to accept the card 
(PASA, 2012b:1).  
 Card skimming 1.6.8
Card skimming involves the illegal copying of encoded information (data) from the 
magnetic strip of a legitimate card, making use of an electronic card reader 
(skimming device) with the intention of using the copied data for encoding and 
producing a counterfeit card for purposes of fraudulent transactions (Sabric, 
2012:30; 2014:19).  
 Counterfeit card fraud 1.6.9
Counterfeit card fraud entails fraud arising from the use of an illegally manufactured 
bank card using data that has been copied (skimmed) illegally from the magnetic 
strip of a genuinely bank-issued card (Sabric, 2012:28; 2014:18). Counterfeit card 
fraud requires the skimming of card data from a genuine bank card, obtaining the 
personal identification number linked to the card, encoding another card (i.e. the 
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counterfeit card) with the skimmed card data, and transacting with the counterfeit 
card using the cardholder‟s PIN. 
 Method 1.6.10
The Oxford Dictionary (2014) describes a method as a particular systematic, orderly, 
planned or established procedure or process to accomplish or approach something, 
or to achieve a goal or objective.  
1.7 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
The aim of this research has been to evaluate the use of identification methods to 
investigate counterfeit card fraud. The research may provide investigators with an 
understanding of the effective use of appropriate identification methods in the 
investigation of counterfeit card fraud. Research should be worthwhile, address 
specific, current practical needs and should contribute to the development of existing 
knowledge (Denscombe, 2002:43-44). The researcher believes that the outcome of 
this study will be of value in different spheres.  
Society, and more specifically cardholders, the banking industry and the business 
sector, will benefit from reduced levels in counterfeit card fraud. Counterfeit card 
fraud has a significant impact on the economy and finding solutions to prevent it or 
mitigate its impact will benefit everybody. An improved understanding of effective 
identification methods which can be used in counterfeit card fraud investigations may 
assist to increase the number of perpetrators who are identified positively. This 
should result in a higher detection rate and help to prevent the crime.  
The South African Police Service will benefit from the new knowledge that has been 
created in respect of the research problem. This could assist to improve and 
enhance current SAPS training curricula, to ensure that investigators are more 
knowledgeable and better equipped to investigate and combat counterfeit card fraud 
through the use of effective identification methods. From an academic perspective, 
the research can serve as a basis for further research and developing best practices 
on how to use identification methods to investigate counterfeit card fraud effectively. 
The intellectual stimulus proffered by this research, could develop into appropriate 
strategies to combat counterfeit card fraud more effectively and may inspire 
academic researchers to undertake further research on the topic. The outcome of 
8 
this study can also be used by the academic community as a guideline and source of 
reference for future research. 
1.8 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH  
Research involves a scientific investigation into a specific phenomenon (Dantzker & 
Hunter, 2012:9). A research design is a plan or strategy that includes the underlying 
philosophical assumptions, specific selection of participants, data collection and data 
analysis techniques that will be used (Maree, 2012:70). Maxwell (2005:36) and 
Creswell (2009:5) state that the researcher‟s paradigm (worldview) will dictate the 
research design and approach. This research has followed a pragmatic worldview, 
where a research problem has been identified from reality and contextualised, 
focusing on the research problem and using all approaches available to understand 
the problem (Creswell, 2009:10).  
The study is empirical in nature and is based on a qualitative research design, as 
explained by Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2012:8-9) (also see Creswell, 2009:4 & 
175). Empirical studies generate data from observation and experience (Maxfield & 
Babbie, 2012:5). A qualitative research design is intended to explore and understand 
the perception, interpretation and understanding of persons of a social or human 
problem or phenomenon. It deals with subjective data which is produced in the 
minds of participants.  
A qualitative research process involves research questions that need to be 
answered, inductive data analysis and the researcher making interpretations of the 
meaning of data. It uses a wide array of data sources, including documents, records, 
observations, interviews and case studies. A qualitative research design has best 
suited the aim and purpose of this study, which required the collection of in-depth 
information in order to explore and understand the knowledge, interpretation, 
experiences and perceptions of counterfeit card fraud investigators and persons 
knowledgeable on the topic and research problem.  
Data was collected from multiple sources, including relevant SAPS and Sabric 
records, participant interviews, national and international literature, and persons 
knowledgeable in the field of counterfeit card fraud. Data was collected from 
participants through semi-structured interviews, using an interview schedule. 
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Interviews with participants were conducted at their offices, and SAPS case files 
(dockets) were studied and analysed at the relevant police stations.  
1.9 TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
A population is the entire group or class of potential participants from which 
information is to be gathered (Dantzker & Hunter, 2012:198). The target population is 
the entire collection of units of analysis on which the research problem has bearing, 
while a sample is a group chosen from within the target population to provide the 
information required (Welman et al, 2012:52-53; Easton & McColl, [sa]: 1). Sampling 
is done when a population is large and it is impractical or uneconomical to study all 
the members of a population. A representative subset (i.e. sample) of the population 
is selected, making it realistic and feasible to study the participants included in the 
sample (Welman et al, 2012:55).  
The target population for this study would include all SAPS and bank investigators 
investigating counterfeit card fraud. However, it was not possible to include all of 
them, because it would take a significant amount of time and resources to interview 
them all, and it would also be unrealistic and impractical. Therefore, a suitable 
sample had to be drawn. When selecting the sample, the researcher took into 
account the aspect of transferability of the research findings. This aspect is important 
during sampling and relates to the imaginative application of findings to other similar 
settings (Denscombe, 2002:150).  
The research problem which the researcher set out to study was identified during 
docket inspections at the Commercial Crime Unit, Johannesburg. It was established 
from the unit commander that the unit functioned in different groups relating to 
different types of crimes investigated by the unit. A name list of all the investigators 
at the unit (which was divided into six groups) was obtained. By April 2013 there 
were 64 investigators working at the unit. Counterfeit card fraud cases were 
investigated by a specific group, namely the Banking Group (Group 3), which 
consisted of 15 investigating officers. The other groups did not investigate counterfeit 
card fraud and did not have the same practical experience or exposure to counterfeit 
card fraud cases. Investigators from the Banking Group were the most 
knowledgeable on the subject of counterfeit card fraud. For this reason, it was 
decided to include only the Banking Group in the study. Taking into consideration the 
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size of this group, it was decided to interview all 15 investigators and not to draw a 
sample from the group.  
A sample which consisted of bank card fraud investigators was then selected, using 
the simple random sampling technique. The sampling was done for each bank 
independently, using its population of card fraud investigators, because they were 
the most knowledgeable on the topic of counterfeit card fraud and were exposed to 
counterfeit card fraud investigations on a daily basis. With simple random sampling, 
each member of the population has the same chance of being included in the 
sample (Welman et al, 2012:59). Firstly a name list of bank investigators who 
investigate counterfeit card fraud cases in Gauteng province was obtained from each 
of the following banks (the number of investigators is given in brackets): ABSA (9), 
Standard Bank (7), First National Bank (7), Nedbank (6), Capitec Bank (3), Postbank 
(3) and Ubank (3). The bank card fraud investigators totalled 38.  
In determining the sample size of participants for interviewing, the researcher 
considered the five factors as discussed by Baker and Edwards (2012:18-19), 
namely data saturation, the minimum requirement for sample size, the style or 
theoretical underpinnings of the study, the heterogeneity of the population, and the 
breadth and scope of the research questions. After considering these, as well as the 
guideline of 20 to 30 participants suggested by Bryman (2012:425) and Creswell 
(1998) (as cited in Mason, 2010:3), a total of 27 card fraud investigators was 
considered to be adequate for the study.  
For each bank, the names of the relevant card fraud investigators were recorded on 
pieces of paper of the same size, placed in a bowl and shuffled. A piece of paper 
was then drawn blindly. The remaining pieces of paper in the bowl were shuffled 
again and the process was repeated. The number of card fraud investigators for 
each bank, were drawn as follows: ABSA (3), Standard Bank (2), First National Bank 
(2), Nedbank (2), Capitec Bank (1), Postbank (1) and Ubank (1), totalling 12. The 
number of investigators drawn for each bank varied in accordance with the relative 
size of the bank‟s population of card fraud investigators compared to the other 
banks. A total of 27 card fraud investigators were selected for the study (15 from the 
SAPS and 12 from the banking industry).  
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In addition, two experts from Sabric were selected purposively, based on their 
applicable knowledge, experience, expertise and exposure to the field of counterfeit 
card fraud. Maxwell (2005:88) describes purposive sampling as choosing or 
selecting a particular group of participants in a particular setting with a particular 
purpose in mind, in order to obtain information that cannot be obtained from other 
participants equally well. It is important to choose a setting that offers the best 
opportunities and will yield the best data to learn about the research subject (Boeije, 
2010:34-35; Leedy & Ormrod, 2013:152).  
Sabric was chosen purposely, because the organisation collects, processes and 
disseminates information related to banking risks to the banking industry and 
relevant role players. It provides the industry with a national perspective of banking- 
related crime threats and trends, and facilitates a partnership approach to, inter alia, 
combat card fraud in cooperation with banks, merchants, the SAPS, the National 
Prosecuting Authority and other institutions (Sabric, 2013c:27). Sabric also provides 
investigative support to the SAPS and banks in respect of card fraud (SAPS, 2009d; 
2010b; 2014) and is considered to be an important role player in the fight against 
counterfeit card fraud. Interviews were conducted with two senior officials from the 
Sabric Commercial Crime Office. Based on their extensive knowledge, expertise and 
experience in the field of counterfeit card fraud, they were able to provide a 
comprehensive, in-depth perspective on the topic.   
1.10 DATA COLLECTION 
Data is any form or representation of information, meaning or knowledge which may 
have meaning or informative value (Maxwell, 2005:79). In qualitative research, data 
can include virtually anything that the researcher sees, hears or that is otherwise 
communicated or relayed to the researcher, bearing in mind the constraints of 
applicable ethical principles. Data collection methods in qualitative research include 
observation, surveys, interviews, documents and focus groups (Maree, 2012:82-92; 
Dantzker & Hunter, 2012:200; Bouma & Ling, 2010:172-180). The following data 
sources and data collection methods were used during this study: 
 Literature 1.10.1
A review of literature resources in respect of the research topic and research 
problem is very important. A literature review puts the research in context within the 
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existing body of knowledge in the field that is being investigated (Denscombe, 
2002:50). Welman et al (2012:38) emphasise the importance of a widespread review 
of literature in respect of the research problem and questions (also see Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2013:51).  
The most effective way of reviewing existing literature is to generate keywords and 
search terms that are directly related to and describe the research problem, research 
questions and the purpose of the research (Creswell, 2009:29; Welman et al, 
2012:40). This broadens the spectrum of literature resources with relevant data that 
could be used. Following this approach, various relevant keywords and terms were 
generated, based on discussions with colleagues and persons knowledgeable on the 
subject, including SAPS and bank counterfeit card fraud investigators and Sabric 
representatives. Keywords and search terms were also generated by consulting 
librarians from Unisa about the topic and the research problem, studying dictionaries, 
reading books on the subject and from the researcher‟s own experience in the field. 
Keywords and terms generated for this study were used in an extensive literature 
review. National and international sources on relevant topics were consulted, 
including criminal investigation, forensic investigation, counterfeit card fraud, card 
skimming and relevant legislation, enabling the researcher to collect as much 
information as possible in order to answer the research questions and address the 
research problem. Data was collected from subject-specific books, journals, the 
World Wide Web (WWW) (Internet), articles, previous research, the media, official 
SAPS sources and publications from relevant role players. Literature relating to 
research methods, designs and research methodology was also consulted 
extensively. Various search methods and aids were employed using keywords and 
search terms, including computerised library catalogue searches (e.g. Unisa Oasis), 
Unisa and SAPS librarians, physical searches for applicable literature in libraries, 
and Web-based search engines (Google, Yahoo, Search.com and Internet Explorer).  
The following keywords and terms were used to ensure a thorough literature review:  
ATM; ATM skimmer; ATM-mounted skimming device; ATM skimming; Automated 
teller machine; Bank card; Bank card skimming; Banking-related crime; Bezel; Card 
encoder; Card reader; Card skimming; Card slot; Card slot overlay; Card technology; 
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Chip-and-pin card; Commercial crime; Common point of fraudulent spend; Common 
point of purchase; Counterfeit bank card; Counterfeit card; Counterfeit credit card; 
Counterfeit debit card; Counterfeit card fraud; Counterfeit bank card fraud; 
Counterfeit payment card fraud; Counterfeit debit card fraud; Counterfeit credit card 
fraud; Credit card; Criminal investigation; Debit card; Encoder; Evidence; Forensic 
investigation; Fraud; Fraudulent purchase; Fraudulent spend; Fraudulent transaction; 
Fraudulent withdrawal; Handheld skimmer; Handheld skimming; Handheld skimming 
device; High-tech skimming; High-tech skimming device; Identification; Identification 
method; Individualisation; Keypad; Keypad overlay; Magnetic strip; Magnetic stripe; 
Micro-camera; Personal identification number; PIN; PIN capturing; Pinhole camera; 
PIN recording; Point of compromise; Point of fraudulent spend; Point of purchase; 
Point of sale; Point of sale skimming; Skimming; Skimming device; Smartcard.  
 Semi-structured interviews 1.10.2
Maree (2012:87) describes an interview as a two-way conversation in which the 
interviewer (researcher) asks the participant questions with the purpose of collecting 
data, and to learn about the ideas, beliefs, views, perceptions, opinions, 
understanding and behaviour of the participant. The aim of a qualitative interview is 
to see the world (and the research problem) through the eyes of the participant. 
Furthermore, to obtain rich descriptive data that will help the researcher understand 
the participant‟s construction of knowledge and social reality.  
In a semi-structured interview the participant is required to answer a set of 
predetermined questions, which are pre-recorded on an interview schedule to guide 
the line of inquiry. In addition to the predetermined questions, this type of interview 
allows the interviewer to use probing and exploring questions in order to obtain 
explanations and clarification from the participant (Blandford, 2013:23-25; Sewell, 
[sa]: 1-6). Probing and exploring questions help the interviewer to develop the topic, 
and explore ideas and avenues to obtain as much information as possible from the 
participant (Maree, 2012:87-88). The researcher used open-ended questions during 
semi-structured interviews to obtain as much information as possible in respect of 
the research problem and research questions. Open-ended questions provide no 
structure for an answer and are intended to invite a more comprehensive in-depth 
answer to a question (Bouma & Ling, 2010:65-66).  
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The interview schedule which has been used to interview participants from Sabric 
differed from the one used to interview card fraud investigators. The reason for this is 
that, although the two officials are very knowledgeable on the topic of counterfeit 
card fraud, work together closely with investigators and provide them with 
investigative support, their own responsibilities do not include the investigation of 
counterfeit card fraud.  
Before any participant was interviewed, the researcher obtained formal approval 
from the South African Police Service in terms of SAPS National Instruction 1 of 
2006 (Research in the Service) to conduct the research and interview SAPS 
investigators for purposes of the study (SAPS, 2006f). Approval from the SAPS is 
attached hereto as Annexure A. The interview schedule used during interviews with 
SAPS and bank investigators is attached hereto as Annexure B. The interview 
schedule used to interview the participants from Sabric is attached as Annexure C.  
Leedy and Ormrod (2013:154) provide a number of guidelines for interviewers to 
ensure effective and productive interviews, which were followed by the researcher. 
Prior to interviews, consent was obtained from each participant to be interviewed. 
Each participant was interviewed separately and in private. The researcher 
established and maintained rapport with the interviewee by introduction and 
explaining the background, purpose and scope of the interview. The researcher first 
asked a number of questions on the participant‟s background, interests and 
experience to allow the participant to get familiarised with the situation and invited 
the participant to speak freely and openly at all times. Participants were ensured of 
their privacy and the confidentiality of interviews, and encouraged to be open and 
forthcoming. Audio recordings were made of interviews, of which transcriptions were 
later made for analysis. Responses were also carefully recorded in writing and 
discussed with the participant afterwards to make sure that information had been 
captured correctly. 
 Personal experience 1.10.3
The researcher has 27 years‟ service in the South African Police Service, of which 
25 years as an investigating officer, having spent the last 14 years of his career as a 
commercial crime investigator and commander in the Commercial Crime Unit. The 
researcher was responsible for, inter alia, the investigation of counterfeit card fraud 
15 
and other commercial related crime. In addition, the researcher regularly conducted 
docket inspections at different commercial crime investigation units.  
The researcher was able to draw from extensive experience, training and exposure 
to the field of commercial crime and counterfeit card fraud investigations. Throughout 
the study this has added significant value to the data collection and analysis 
processes, the interpretation of data, the findings and recommendations. The 
background of the researcher has proven to be very useful when interviewing 
investigators, understanding and interpreting their responses, ideas and perceptions 
in context. The researcher has a thorough understanding of the banking crime 
environment and card fraud landscape, the subject-specific terminology and 
language used, as well as the contents of SAPS counterfeit card fraud dockets, 
relevant systems and records.  
 Case files 1.10.4
As part of the overall research design of the study, the researcher studied and 
analysed a sample of SAPS case dockets relating to counterfeit card fraud. This 
made it possible to establish how counterfeit card fraud cases were investigated in 
practice, as opposed to theory, ideal case situations and investigation methods 
which participants might describe during interviews. Case dockets, on the other 
hand, could also be used to corroborate the views and responses given by 
participants. This exercise provided useful insights into what happened in reality 
when these cases were investigated.  
The researcher studied and analysed the contents of 100 selected counterfeit card 
fraud dockets that were registered on the Crime Administration System (CAS) of the 
SAPS between 1 December 2012 and 31 March 2013 at SAPS stations located in 
Johannesburg. Since it would have been impractical to study counterfeit card fraud 
dockets from all the stations in Johannesburg, a number of them were selected by 
using cluster sampling. Cluster sampling is done by dividing a population into small, 
non-overlapping groups (i.e. clusters) using a simple random sampling technique 
(Maree et al, 2012:175-176). Cluster sampling was also used to include diversity that 
might exist in counterfeit card fraud dockets investigated by different investigation 
units.  
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A name list of all SAPS stations located in Johannesburg was obtained from the 
website of the South African Police Service. Stations in Johannesburg were chosen 
because these were serviced by the Commercial Crime Unit, Johannesburg, where 
the research problem was identified. The list consisted of 46 SAPS stations, which 
were confirmed by the unit commander of Johannesburg CCU as being stations 
falling in their service area. The names of the 46 stations were recorded on even-
sized pieces of paper and, using simple random sampling, a total of 15 stations were 
drawn. 
A list of all fraud cases that were registered at the selected stations during the period 
selected was obtained from the system manager of CAS at the Division Technology 
Management Services (Information Systems Management) of the SAPS. CAS does 
not distinguish between counterfeit card fraud cases and other fraud types. A fraud 
case can be registered on CAS under any of nine fraud types, distinguished by nine 
different crime codes. However, none of these relate to counterfeit card fraud 
specifically.  
There are two fraud crime codes relating to general fraud types on the system, 
namely codes: 61010(3400) and 64505(3506), but the possibility existed that 
counterfeit card fraud cases could have been registered under any of the nine fraud 
codes. Therefore, the researcher included all nine fraud codes in order to identify 
counterfeit card fraud cases. The researcher established whether the CCU 
Johannesburg or relevant station level investigation units had any counterfeit card 
fraud dockets on hand, which were registered during the selected period. However, 
neither the CCU nor any station level investigation unit had any of the dockets on 
hand. All counterfeit card fraud dockets registered during the selected period had 
already been finalised and archived.  
The researcher then visited each of the 15 stations with its list of fraud dockets that 
had been registered during the selected period, and identified all the counterfeit card 
fraud dockets by perusing the contents of the fraud dockets. At each station the case 
numbers of counterfeit card fraud dockets were recorded on even-sized pieces of 
paper. Using a simple random sampling technique as described above, a sample of 
counterfeit card fraud dockets was selected for each station independently. 
17 
The 100 counterfeit card fraud dockets selected at the various stations consisted of 
the following samples, indicated as sample/number of registered counterfeit card 
fraud dockets (see pages 104 to 107): Booysens (3/5); Bramley (4/8); Brixton (2/6); 
Carletonville (15/42); Douglasdale (9/23); Hillbrow (11/28); Jeppe (4/8); 
Johannesburg Central (13/36); Linden (3/9); Norwood (4/11); Randburg (6/14); 
Rosebank (4/9); Sandton (9/24); Westonaria (6/15) and Yeoville (7/9). The total 
number of registered counterfeit card fraud dockets for the 15 stations for the 
selected period was 247. The sample size drawn for each station varied in 
accordance with the size of the study population for each station relative to the entire 
study population of 247 dockets. 
Dockets were studied and analysed, not only to compare actual recorded counterfeit 
card fraud investigations with information collected during interviews, but also for the 
following reasons:  
 To establish whether identification methods were used to investigate the 
cases. 
 To establish what identification methods were used (if any). 
 To evaluate how effective the identification methods (if any) were in 
achieving a positive identification of the perpetrator(s).  
Data obtained during the docket content analysis was compared with information 
that was obtained during interviews from SAPS investigators. The docket analysis 
formed part of the study for which prior approval was obtained from the SAPS (see 
Annexure A as per attached). Access to the case files of banks relating to counterfeit 
card fraud investigations could not be obtained. Bank investigators indicated that 
their case files were confidential and could not be made available for the study. 
 Official records and documents 1.10.5
Official statistics relating to counterfeit card fraud reported to the South African 
Police Service were obtained from annual reports of the SAPS. Other official 
records, which were of importance for the study, included records from the Crime 
Administration System relating to fraud cases (see paragraph 1.10.4) and selected 
case dockets.  
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The Geographic Information System (GIS) of the SAPS was used to conduct crime 
pattern analyses and generate crime maps specifically relating to fraud (see 
paragraph 3.2.1.3 (a)). Relevant SAPS directives and policies, including the mandate 
of the CCU and the SAPS strategy and standard operating procedure in respect of 
counterfeit card fraud and card skimming cases, were also used as sources (SAPS, 
2009d; 2010a). Furthermore, the researcher studied a number of official SAPS 
reports relating to counterfeit card fraud cases, which were reported between 2010 
and 2014 in which the perpetrator(s) was/were identified positively either before or 
during the investigation phase (see Annexure F for a summary). Access to these 
reports was obtained with prior consent from the SAPS (see Annexure A as per 
attached). 
1.11 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis is a process of inspecting, cleaning, transforming and categorising or 
modelling data with the goal of interpreting and understanding it, as well as 
identifying patterns, critical events and irregularities, describing events and 
highlighting useful information (Taroni, Bozza, Biedermann, Garbolino & Aitken, 
2010:4; Levine, 1996:1).  
The researcher followed four primary steps to analyse data, as proposed by Creswell 
(2007) in Leedy and Ormrod (2013:158-159), as follows: 
 Organisation 
Data was organised using index cards, folders and Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. 
Data was broken into smaller units (paragraphs, sentences and words). Different 
categories were created and hard copy folders, computer folders and separate 
spreadsheets were opened for each. The categories related to relevant themes and 
key concepts, namely forensic investigation, the objectives of forensic investigation, 
counterfeit card fraud, counterfeit card fraud modus operandi (method of operating) 
(see paragraph 3.2.1.5), card skimming, counterfeit card fraud devices and 
equipment, and identification methods used to investigate counterfeit card fraud. The 
latter was divided into several sub-categories relating to, inter alia, methods to 
identify the point of compromise (skimming and PIN capturing) of a bank card, the 
point of fraudulent spend (fraudulent withdrawal or purchase using the counterfeit 
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card) and the perpetrators involved in the different stages of the crime. In practice a 
source often produced information in respect of more than one data category. The 
applicable information was then recorded under the appropriate categories, 
referenced with the source and cross-referenced with each other. 
 Perusal 
All sources of data were perused several times to get an overall sense (overview) of 
what the information as a collective entailed. Transcripts of individual interviews, 
relevant literature, official records and the content analysis of SAPS case dockets 
were perused thoroughly and in depth after categorisation. This was also done with 
the researcher‟s own research notes and comments made during the course of the 
study. 
 Classification 
The researcher identified subcategories, themes and subthemes, and classified 
them using a system of coding. Coding is a process where a numerical, alphabetical 
or alpha-numerical code is assigned to each keyword or key concept (Welman et al, 
2012:213). Coding was done inductively from data collected, as proposed by Given 
(2008:85-88). For example, a card skimming modus operandi using a false keypad 
overlay for PIN capturing was coded as KO under the subtheme „PIN-capturing 
methods‟ (PINCAP), under the theme „modus operandi‟ (MO), which resorted under 
the category „card skimming‟ (CARDSK). Coding is essentially labelling or tagging 
concepts, keywords and meanings that are identified from data. The researcher used 
IBM i2 Analyst‟s Notebook software to compile a free association chart depicting a 
„relationship tree‟ illustrating the parent-sibling relationships and links between 
categories, subcategories, classes, themes, subthemes, groups and subgroups of 
data. This helped to create a better understanding of relationships between concepts 
and themes in the study. 
 Synthesis 
The frequency of concepts and keywords was determined, using the sorting function 
of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and analysis functions of Analyst‟s Notebook. 
Appropriate indexes, tables, matrices, diagrams and visual representations were 
20 
generated, depicting the overall results of the data analysis process. The different 
sources were integrated at this stage. For example, interview transcripts that referred 
to specific issues and concepts, which also appear in previous research, an Internet 
source or a text book were cross-referenced and summarised together.  
1.12 METHODS TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS 
In order to ensure rigour and trustworthiness in qualitative research, specific 
strategies should be followed to meet five criteria, being credibility, transferability, 
dependability, confirmability and authenticity (Gray, 2014:185-186). The researcher 
applied various strategies to meet these criteria, as proposed by Savin-Baden and 
Major (2013:476-480), Shenton (2004:63-75) and Creswell (2013:249-253). 
 Credibility 1.12.1
Credibility is the extent to which a test or measuring instrument measures what it 
intends or claims to measure (i.e. the effectiveness, applicability and 
appropriateness of the data collection instrument). Strategies to ensure credibility 
include prolonged engagement, time spent in the field and persistent observation, 
triangulation, random sampling, peer review/debriefing, negative case analysis, 
clarifying researcher bias, member checking and using a rich, thick description for 
observations.  
The researcher‟s career spans 14 years as a commercial crime investigator, during 
which extensive knowledge and experience in respect of counterfeit card fraud 
investigations were acquired. This background knowledge was used to validate data 
which was collected during the study. The study was done over a period of three 
years, which afforded sufficient opportunity to engage in the field of counterfeit card 
fraud investigations and collect an adequate amount of information in respect of the 
research topic.  
During the study, triangulation was used to validate data from different sources. 
Information obtained from different sources was compared in order to verify its 
correctness and accuracy. Triangulation involves the use of multiple and different 
sources, methods, researchers and investigation strategies to corroborate evidence 
and findings (Creswell, 2013:251; Golafshani, 2003:603). The researcher used 
various sources to do this, including information collected from participants during 
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interviews, data obtained from subject-specific textbooks and literature, official 
reports and SAPS case dockets relating to counterfeit card fraud. Peer review was 
also applied by discussing the research process, data collection and analysis, and 
findings of the study with independent knowledgeable colleagues who did not form 
part of the group of participants. Their perspectives and ideas were also used to 
corroborate those of the participants. 
The researcher‟s past experiences, biases, prejudices and assumptions should be 
stated from the outset in order to provide an understanding of the researcher‟s 
position, approach and interpretations (Noble & Smith, 2015:34-35). There was no 
specific bias, prejudice or assumption relating to the research topic or research 
questions that could influence the approach, interpretations or findings of the 
researcher. The topic was approached in an objective manner, working with facts 
and information from the researcher‟s working environment as a commercial crime 
investigator, and the perspectives of participants. Member-checking was also used 
to ensure credibility of the findings of the study. Participants were provided with 
interview transcripts and the findings of the study, and feedback was obtained in 
respect of the accuracy and credibility thereof.  
 Transferability 1.12.2
Transferability relates to the extent to which the findings of a study can be applied to 
other situations (Shenton, 2004:69). A strategy to meet the requirement of 
transferability involves the use of such a detailed, abundant, in-depth description of 
themes, contextual factors impacting on the study, participants‟ views and 
observations, that it enables readers to transfer the information provided by the 
researcher to other settings and circumstances. The researcher must also clearly 
state any restrictions or inhibiting factors which have impacted on the study.  
The reader himself/herself must be able to determine the degree to which the 
findings of the study can be transferred and considered as relevant to other settings 
and circumstances. Throughout the study, the researcher placed emphasis on 
recording and describing data and observations using a rich, thick (dense) 
descriptive language, abundant in detail, description and meaning to ensure that the 
study would be transferable to the larger counterfeit card fraud environment. 
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In addition, Gray (2014:185) proposes the use of purposive sampling as a strategy to 
ensure transferability through pertinent and similar contextual factors. This was done 
by selecting and interviewing two specific knowledgeable participants from Sabric. 
 Dependability 1.12.3
Dependability concerns the stability and consistency over a period of time of the 
research design, data collection methods and instruments to produce consistent 
results under the same circumstances and in the same context (Dantzker & Hunter, 
2012:188; Bouma & Ling, 2010:83). Gray (2014:185) suggests the use of clear audit 
trails throughout the data to ensure dependability, while Shenton (2004:71) posits a 
thorough description by the researcher of the research design and all processes and 
methods used during the study to enable future replications of the study.  
A detailed description of the research design, data collection and data analysis 
methods was provided, including the sampling procedures which were followed. The 
researcher made use of standard interview schedules to guide interviews with 
selected card fraud investigators and Sabric participants. Interviews were recorded 
and participants‟ responses captured verbatim in writing. Furthermore, a detailed 
reference list of all sources used was compiled and sources were properly cited. 
 Confirmability 1.12.4
Confirmability involves objectivity in the study. Researcher bias should be 
neutralised by using strategies such as triangulation and clarifying preferences the 
researcher might have had. A detailed audit trail of the research process, data 
collected, data analysis and the researcher‟s interpretations and conclusions is 
critical to meet the requirement of confirmability (Shenton, 2004:72; Given, 2008:43-
44). In order to achieve this, the researcher used triangulation as a strategy, kept a 
research diary and maintained a proper audit trail of the entire research process. 
 Authenticity 1.12.5
Authenticity relates to the reassurance that the constructs and evaluation of research 
are genuine and credible, both in terms of the real-life experiences and perceptions 
of participants, and within the wider social and political context in which it is 
undertaken (Given, 2008:44). A study is authentic when it is fair towards participants, 
reflects the true viewpoints and ideas of participants, and endeavours to action 
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participants to cooperate in improving their social reality. Hence, authenticity is 
achieved by promoting fairness to participants, ontological authenticity (an 
understanding of the viewpoints and ideas of others), educative authenticity (the 
education of participants), catalytic authenticity (stimulating and actioning 
participants) and tactical authenticity (empowering participants to act).  
Gray (2014:186) and Morrow (2005:252-253) point out that data can be interpreted 
differently and that different explanations and conclusions are possible from the 
same set of data. The researcher must be aware that data can lead to contradicting 
findings, realities and conclusions, and also report these.  
The researcher used the study to educate and empower participants with knowledge 
on the topic of the use of identification methods in counterfeit card fraud 
investigations. A proper audit trail of the entire research process was kept to support 
the trustworthiness and authenticity of the study. The researcher also ensured that 
participants were treated fairly and that interpretations, inferences and conclusions 
made were rational and substantiated by actual data collected. 
1.13 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethics in research relates to doing what is morally and legally right when conducting 
research (Grix, 2010:143; Dantzker & Hunter, 2012:190). Throughout the study, the 
researcher maintained the highest ethical standards, as discussed by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2013:104-109), namely: 
 Protection from harm: No harm of a physical, psychological, social or 
emotional nature was caused to any participant. No stress, embarrassment 
or loss of self-esteem was caused during the research.  
 Right to privacy and confidentiality: No person‟s right to privacy or 
confidentiality was violated. The researcher treated the identities and 
responses of participants as strictly confidential. These have not and will 
not be revealed to anyone, unless written consent is given by a participant.  
 Voluntary, informed participation and obtaining prior consent: The 
researcher made sure that participation in the study was completely 
voluntary. Participants were informed prior to participation what the 
purpose of the study and the interview was, and what it entailed. Informed 
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written consent was obtained from each participant prior to any 
participation.  
 Consent to conduct research in the SAPS: Prior written consent was 
obtained by the researcher to gain access to and study official SAPS 
records, to conduct research in the SAPS in terms of its research policy 
and to interview SAPS investigators.  
 Honesty with professional colleagues: Findings were reported in a 
complete and honest manner without any misrepresentation. No data or 
findings were inflated, falsified or fabricated. 
 Maintain high standards, avoid plagiarism and acknowledge sources: The 
researcher strived towards maintaining high standards of research 
throughout the study. He avoided plagiarism at all times and did not intrude 
on anyone‟s intellectual property rights. Where data was unavailable or any 
aspect required further research, it was stated clearly. All sources were 
properly referenced, and the work of other authors was properly cited and 
acknowledged. 
 Professional codes of ethics: The researcher adhered to the Unisa Policy 
on Research Ethics, and applicable institutional policies and guidelines at 
all times (University of South Africa, 2012). Data collected during the 
research will be kept for a period of at least five years. The researcher is 
aware that copyright of the data collected and the research report belongs 
to the University of South Africa.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION IN COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD CASES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The application of scientific knowledge in criminal investigations has led to an 
inevitable symbiosis of the two, giving rise to the now widely recognised discipline of 
forensic investigation. Today, the thought of criminal investigation without the 
support of forensic science is largely unthinkable (Monckton-Smith, Adams, Hart & 
Webb, 2013:24-25). As scientific knowledge grew, so did its application in the field of 
investigation.  
The origin of forensic pathology can be traced as far back as 1250 when a book on 
post-mortem examinations was published in China (Becker & Dutelle, 2013:6-8). 
Coroners charged with determining the cause of death of a person existed in 
England by 1272. Early scientific advances included the anthropometry of Alphonse 
Bertillon in 1883 and a fingerprint classification system by Sir Francis Galton in 1892. 
Hans Gross, an Austrian prosecutor and judge, published a text in 1893 in which he 
advocated the application of scientific disciplines to the field of criminal investigation 
(Dutelle, 2011:9). Developments like these paved the way for a modern scientific 
approach in criminal investigation and gradually led to modern forensic investigation 
methods.  
Criminals who commit counterfeit card fraud have become very sophisticated and 
knowledgeable with regard to card skimming and card counterfeiting methods and 
technologies. If investigators want to investigate this crime successfully, they must 
not only be conversant with these methods and technologies, but stay a step ahead 
by applying forensic science effectively.  
In this chapter, forensic investigation, its objectives and application to counterfeit 
card fraud are discussed, while the methods and equipment used to commit the 
crime are explained. 
2.2 FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
Forensic investigation developed over many years in the field of criminal 
investigation. Criminal investigation can be described as a process of inquiry into a 
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criminal or unlawful act, which involves the identification, collection, preservation and 
evaluation of information and evidence (Van der Westhuizen, 1996:1-3; Dutelle, 
2011:4 & 17; Benson et al, 2015:19). It is an in-depth search for the truth with the 
main purpose of finding a solution to a crime by finding evidence that will prove who 
committed the crime, bringing the identified perpetrator before court, preparing a 
case for criminal prosecution and assisting to ensure a successful prosecution. The 
investigation process includes searching, reasoning, examination and analysis, 
which is conducted in a thorough, systematic, organised and thoughtful manner.  
Evidence gathered during criminal investigations is often supported and 
supplemented by scientific knowledge and evidence of a scientific nature, which are 
derived from a forensic science discipline, hence the application of forensic 
investigation to investigate crime (Monckton-Smith et al, 2013:23-25). The term 
„forensic‟ means characteristic of or suitable for a court of law (Nickell & Fischer, 
1999:1). Forensic investigation is a process of inquiry into criminal conduct, a civil or 
administrative matter, which is an in-depth, meticulous search for the truth through 
the use of specialised skills, expert knowledge, and scientific methods and 
techniques (Van Rooyen, 2008:7, 14 & 77-78; Benson et al, 2015:2 & 19-20).  
A key element of forensic investigation is the application of forensic science to 
enhance and support evidence. It is not only applicable to the investigation of crime 
but also applies in civil and administrative matters and questions arising from 
litigation. Van Rooyen (2008:78) argues that police investigators who investigate 
crime in a court-directed manner, while applying scientific knowledge and principles, 
should be seen as forensic investigators.  
Forensic science is the application of scientific knowledge and principles to legal 
disputes, whether criminal or civil (Chisum & Turvey, 2011:4-5). It includes different 
scientific disciplines, among which forensic medicine, ballistics, pathology, 
toxicology, serology, biology, psychology, psychiatry, dactyloscopy, forensic 
document examination, digital forensic examination and forensic tool mark 
examination. Becker (2009:12) and Dutelle (2011:6) emphasize the importance of 
applying forensic science to physical evidence in order to increase and enhance its 
evidential value. The forensic expert knows how to extract the meaning of physical 
evidence, while the investigator knows how to put its meaning into context.  
27 
During interviews, investigators were asked what forensic investigation is. Some 
included more than one key theme in their responses. A breakdown of the responses 
is as follows: 
 It involves the application of forensic science to solve crime (22 
participants). 
 It involves scientific methods used on crime scenes to detect forensic clues 
during crime scene investigations (18 participants). 
 It means investigating for purposes of the court (17 participants). 
 It is done by scientific experts in a forensic science laboratory and involves 
analysing exhibits in a laboratory (9 participants). 
 It involves auditing, accounting and financial transactions/ financial crimes 
(4 participants). 
The responses showed that, although participants differed to an extent, the majority 
understood forensic investigation in their environment as the application of forensic 
science to criminal investigations with the aim of presenting evidence in a court of 
law.  
2.3 RESPONSIBILITY, MANDATE AND POWERS TO INVESTIGATE 
In South Africa, investigators can be divided into two broad categories, namely 
SAPS investigators and non-SAPS investigators. Non-SAPS investigators include 
government departments and agencies, as well as private entities with investigative 
capacity (Benson et al, 2015:14-18). Different statutes confer powers of investigation 
on a number of institutions and persons. The extent and purpose of these powers 
vary, and can include one or more functions such as criminal investigation, 
questioning, inspecting, obtaining records and information, search and seizure, 
summoning, arrest, collecting evidence and hearing testimony. 
 South African Police Service 2.3.1
The SAPS is the primary crime investigation body in South Africa. Section 205(3) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996) places a 
legal obligation on the South African Police Service to, inter alia, investigate crime. In 
addition, the legal framework for the investigation of crime by the SAPS is 
established by the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995), the 
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Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977) (CPA) and different statutes 
which declare certain types of conduct as offences. The mandate for the 
investigation of counterfeit card fraud jointly rests with the Commercial Crime Unit of 
the DPCI and station level detectives of the SAPS (see paragraph 1.2).  
 Non-SAPS investigating institutions and persons 2.3.2
 Government-related institutions and agencies 2.3.2.1
Non-SAPS government-related institutions and agencies which have powers to 
investigate, include the Special Investigating Unit, the National Prosecuting 
Authority, the Public Protector, registered auditors, the South African Revenue 
Service, Military Police, Independent Police Investigative Directorate, Customs and 
Excise, and others. In terms of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964 (Act No. 91 of 
1964) customs officials can make arrests, search persons, premises, packages and 
containers. They can also detain prohibited and illicit goods, which include skimming 
devices and equipment intended for card skimming and/or card counterfeiting.  
 Bank, corporate and private investigators 2.3.2.2
Certain banks, companies and corporations have internal („in-house‟) investigators 
who conduct investigations in the course and scope of their normal business to 
safeguard their security, strategic, operational or business interests (Benson et al, 
2015:17-18). Investigations include employee misconduct, security breaches, loss 
and theft of assets, and offences specifically targeting the clients and/or systems, 
instruments, resources or products of the bank or business (Van Rooyen, 2008:59). 
The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act No. 56 of 2001) in section 1 
distinguishes between private investigators and internal investigators. In terms of the 
Act, a private investigator is a person who, in a private capacity and for the benefit of 
a third party, investigates the identity, actions, character, background or property of 
another person without his/her consent. Private investigators need to register with 
the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). Internal investigators do 
not have to register with PSIRA. 
Although internal bank and corporate investigators act on behalf of their employers, 
evidence collected during internal investigations is recognised and accepted by 
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South African courts1. Evidence obtained during private investigations is also 
accepted by South African courts2.  
During interviews, all the bank investigators described their functions and 
responsibilities as the investigation and combating of card-related fraud, including 
counterfeit card fraud, and protecting the interests of the bank and its clients. SAPS 
investigators are better equipped to investigate counterfeit card fraud through 
cooperation with bank investigators and the South African Banking Risk Information 
Centre. The reason being that they can provide SAPS investigators with information 
and intelligence in respect of banking-related crimes, including identified points of 
card skimming and PIN capturing, and points of fraudulent spend in counterfeit card 
fraud cases.  
Furthermore, bank investigators can provide court-directed evidence to SAPS 
investigators, including the particulars of account holders and copies of bank records 
(for example, account opening documents and account statements) in terms of 
sections 205 and 236 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Van Niekerk, Lochner, 
Naidoo & Zinn, 2015:233-234). Bank investigators have the power to arrest under 
certain circumstances. In terms of section 42(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 a private person may, without a warrant, arrest anyone who commits or 
attempts to commit in his/her presence, or is reasonably suspected of having 
committed an offence listed in Schedule 1 to the Act. This includes fraud, theft, 
forgery and uttering. Therefore, a bank investigator may without a warrant, on the 
basis of evidence gathered during his/her own investigation, which provides 
reasonable grounds to suspect a person of committing any of the crimes mentioned, 
arrest the suspect and hand him/her over to the police.  
2.4 THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
The purpose of forensic investigation is to investigate evidence in a scientific manner 
and to determine how evidence can be used to prosecute an offender or, said 
                                            
1
 In S v Dube 2000 1 SACR 53 (N) the court accepted the evidence of an investigator who conducted 
an internal investigation into thefts that were taking place at a motorcar manufacturer. The evidence 
related to photograph and tape recordings made by the investigator, acting as an agent of the 
employer during an undercover trap. 
2
 In Lachman v The State (432/09) [2010] ZASCA 14 the Supreme Court of Appeals admitted 
testimony relating to a search which was conducted by a police official assisted by a private 
investigator. 
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differently, to identify, collect and present all relevant evidence to enable a court of 
law or other presiding authority to establish the truth in respect of an alleged crime or 
issue under dispute (Benson et al, 2015:11-13). An investigation can be compared to 
a project, which has a predetermined goal and specific objectives aimed at achieving 
it. Objectives are specific deliverables or outcomes and provide clear, measurable 
milestones which the investigator must achieve.  
During interviews, investigators were asked what the purpose of forensic 
investigation is. The majority of participants (22) included in their responses the 
identification, tracing and charging of the suspect, collecting relevant evidence in the 
case, and making use of science and scientific methods to improve evidential value 
and the interpretation of evidence in order to prove the case. Five (5) participants 
viewed the purpose of forensic investigation only as the application of forensic 
science to improve evidential value during criminal investigations. One (1) participant 
also stated that an additional purpose is to determine the root causes and motives 
for committing crime, which will contribute towards managing future crime by 
addressing the root causes and implementing suitable preventive measures.  
Investigators were also asked what the purpose of forensic investigation is in 
counterfeit card fraud cases. The following is the result of the most prevalent 
responses received (certain participants provided more than one concept in their 
responses). The purpose of forensic investigation is to: 
 Identify the merchant(s) and/or ATM(s) where the fraudulent spend 
(negative spend) took place (24 participants). 
 Identify all persons involved in the commission of the crime, including the 
person responsible for skimming the card, the manufacturer of the 
counterfeit card and the person (runner) who withdraws money or makes 
purchases with the counterfeit card (23 participants). 
 Identify the merchant or ATM where the card was skimmed and PIN 
captured (22 participants). 
 Collect all relevant evidence and obtain statements from all witnesses (22 
participants).  
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Although the responses from participants illustrated a general understanding of the 
purpose of forensic investigation and in particular in counterfeit card fraud cases, 
responses also included a number of objectives of forensic investigation. Various 
authors agree on the objectives of investigation (Orthmann & Hess, 2013:11; Becker, 
2009:11-12; Swanson, Chamelin & Territo, 2003:28), which include:  
 Identification of the crime. 
 Identification of the perpetrator(s).  
 Individualisation of the crime. 
 The collecting and processing of evidence and information. 
 The evaluation of evidence and information. 
 Tracing the suspect(s) and ensuring court appearances. 
 Recovery of property and restitution. 
 Support and involvement during the prosecution/litigation phase. 
 Victim empowerment. 
Stelfox (2013:2-3) argues that, in addition to the above, criminal investigation also 
has other objectives, including community reassurance, intelligence gathering, 
disruption of criminal networks and managing crime risks (also see Benson et al, 
2015:13; Karagiozis & Sgaglio, 2005:112-122). In the private sector and other 
spheres outside the SAPS, the purpose and objectives of forensic investigation are 
not restricted to the investigation of crime, as investigation mandates may differ from 
that of the SAPS. Bank, corporate and private investigators conduct investigations to 
protect the interests of their clients or employers. Therefore, the scope and focus of 
their investigations may not necessarily include the investigation of crime (Benson et 
al, 2015:10-12 & 24-25).  
The following discussion deals specifically with the objectives of identification and 
individualisation in counterfeit card fraud investigations, as these two objectives have 
direct bearing on the research problem and research questions. 
 Identification  2.4.1
Identification is the classification process by which an entity, person or object is 
placed in a predefined class or category, based on shared or similar features or 
characteristics (i.e. class characteristics) (Osterburg & Ward, 2010:36; Fisher, 
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2004:5; Champod, 2015:95). During interviews, all the participants were able to 
provide a general explanation of the concept of identification. It was established from 
summarised responses of participants, official SAPS reports (see Annexure F as per 
attached), SAPS directives (SAPS, 2010b:1-3; 2011a; 2011b:1-16) and case dockets 
analysed that various aspects related to incidents of counterfeit card fraud need to 
be identified during investigation. These include the following (see paragraph 3.2.1 
for a detailed discussion):  
 The crime scene(s) (i.e. the scene where the original bank card was 
skimmed and the cardholder‟s PIN captured, and the scene(s) where the 
fraudulent transaction(s) took place, namely an ATM or point of sale at a 
merchant).  
 The victim(s) (often a fraudster is responsible for skimming and 
counterfeiting multiple cardholders‟ cards). 
 The suspect(s) (including the person who skimmed the original card(s) and 
obtained the PIN(s), the person responsible for producing the counterfeit 
card(s) and the person(s) responsible for the fraudulent transaction(s)). 
 Witnesses (including the victim, eyewitnesses, police officials, bank officials 
and the digital forensic expert). 
 Equipment used (all relevant equipment involved, including the skimming 
device, PIN-capturing device, card encoder, computer equipment and the 
counterfeit card(s)).  
In reality, counterfeit card fraud manifests in different case settings (see Annexure F 
and the list of SAPS dockets analysed). The circumstances and settings of cases 
often differ when a case is reported for investigation. In certain cases the identity of 
one or more aspects may already be known at the start of the investigation (e.g. the 
victim may be known, a suspect may already be in custody, the crime scene may be 
known and/or a skimming device may have been seized). Therefore, the aspects 
which need to be identified may differ from case to case and will depend on the 
specific circumstances of a case.  
Identification needs to be followed by a process of individualisation, during which the 
unique (positive/definite) identity of the suspect is established by means of relevant 
evidence linking him/her to the crime, distinguishing the suspect from all other 
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persons as the perpetrator of the crime (Van Graan & Budhram, 2015:47 & 64). 
Identification which is not followed by individualisation has no evidential value and 
can at best give direction to an investigation (Marais, 1992:20).  
 Individualisation 2.4.2
A primary objective of the investigator is to positively identify the individual who has 
committed the crime (Lee & Harris, 2000:14), hence the importance of identification 
and individualisation as investigation objectives. Individualisation involves activities 
aimed at collecting evidence that can prove that a crime has been the act of a 
particular person or persons, excluding all others beyond the required burden of 
proof (i.e. the crime is individualised) (Van Graan & Budhram, 2015:46-65). Marais 
(1992:1, 4 & 19) equates the individualisation of a crime with the positive 
identification of the offender.  
During interviews, eighteen (18) participants provided an accurate description of the 
concept of individualisation, but the remainder did not know its meaning. All the 
participants used the term „positive identification‟ of a suspect rather than 
„individualisation‟ of the crime. Identification methods which are recognised and 
accepted by South African courts to positively identify offenders and individualise 
crimes, include recognition based on a person‟s physical appearance and 
characteristics (i.e. direct witness observation, identity parades and photo 
identification), fingerprints, handwriting, video recordings and deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) profiling3 (Schwikkard & Van der Merwe, 2005:367-371).  
In Chapter 3 different identification methods related to specific aspects of counterfeit 
card fraud cases are discussed. Identification methods include:  
 A collective analysis of the transaction history of different compromised 
cards in order to identify the point(s) where the original cards had been 
compromised and the points where the counterfeit cards were used to 
commit fraud. 
                                            
3 In a SAPS counterfeit card fraud case, Mbuzini CAS 13/01/2012, a bank card which was found in a 
suspect‟s vehicle, was positively linked to him on the basis of a positive DNA analysis. The suspect‟s 
involvement in the crime could be proven by positively linking him to the card (also see Annexure F as 
per attached).  
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 Surveillance of common points of compromise and points of fraudulent 
spend. 
 Fingerprint and DNA examination of counterfeit cards, skimming devices 
and equipment used by perpetrators to skim and counterfeit cards.  
 A digital forensic examination and analysis of counterfeit cards, skimming 
devices, card encoders, cellphones, computer and related equipment, in 
order to identify unknown victims and compromised accounts. 
 The specific modus operandi, methods and components used to construct 
skimming devices and PIN-capturing devices. 
The discussion which follows focuses on the crime of counterfeit card fraud, its legal 
elements, modus operandi and the equipment used to commit the crime. 
2.5 COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD 
Counterfeit card fraud is a specific type of fraud involving specific modus operandi 
and advanced equipment. In order to investigate this crime, it is necessary to 
understand its legal elements in the context of South African law. 
 Fraud 2.5.1
Fraud is a crime as old as man. Reference to fraud can be found in various ancient 
writings. The Quran describes the destruction of Midian (a territory in the Sinai 
Peninsula neighbouring Canaan) by an earthquake as a result of the Midianites‟ 
refusal to cease with their fraudulent practices. Despite the Islam prophet Shoaib‟s 
warnings and prophecies (Quran VII, 85-93) the Midian people continued with their 
dishonest practices, and they were destroyed. In the Torah and the Bible (Genesis 
27:1-40) the history of Isaac, Rebecca, Esau and Jacob is told. Jacob (Esau‟s 
younger brother), motivated by their mother Rebecca, deceived his father Isaac to 
obtain the latter‟s blessing and the birthright that was meant for Esau.  
Fraud is defined as the unlawful, intentional making of a misrepresentation, which 
causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another (Snyman, 
2006:523). Burchell (2005:833-835) is in agreement and points out that a specific 
form of intent is required, namely the intent to defraud. The elements of fraud are 
unlawfulness, misrepresentation, prejudice and intention. Participants were asked to 
give their understanding of fraud and its elements. In response to this question, all 
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the participants were able to give an explanation of fraud and its elements. A 
discussion of the legal elements of fraud and how they apply to counterfeit card fraud 
follows. 
 Unlawfulness 2.5.1.1
The act committed must have been unlawful and no recognised ground of 
justification must have existed at the time. Although an act or omission may be 
prohibited by law, its unlawfulness may be excluded if a person can justify the act or 
omission in terms of recognised principles in law, known as grounds of justification 
(Burchell, 2005:226). Grounds of justification include self-defence, necessity, acting 
under orders, consent, supposed defence and public authority (Burchell, 2005:227; 
Snyman, 2006:36). When counterfeit card fraud is committed, there can be no 
question that the element of unlawfulness is present. Consent cannot be used as a 
ground of justification, since it would not have been necessary to counterfeit the 
original card, had there been consent from the cardholder in the first place. This is 
also the view of Ferreira (2012:28). 
 Misrepresentation 2.5.1.2
This element involves the act (conduct) and constitutes the essence of fraud 
(Burchell, 2005:836). The act can either be a physical action or a failure to act 
(omission) and must be deceiving or misleading. There must be some sort of untrue, 
misleading or incorrect statement or presentation of fact or law made to a person or 
his/her agent. A misrepresentation is a lie, and can be made by words (verbal or in 
writing), conduct or a combination of the two4.  
Withdrawing money from an ATM or merchant by using a counterfeit bank card, or 
presenting a counterfeit card to a cashier to pay for goods or services, constitutes a 
misrepresentation to the bank (by means of the ATM) or merchant in respect of the 
true identity of the user of the card, purported lawful consent and/or access to the 
funds in the account linked to the card (Burchell, 2005:840; Snyman, 2006:527)5. 
Therefore, in cases where a counterfeit card is used to commit fraud, the element of 
misrepresentation is present. 
                                            
4
 See R v Larkins 1934 AD 91 94 and S v Mbokazi 1998 1 SACR 438 (N) 445F-I. 
5
 This view is confirmed in S v Myeza 1985 (4) SA 30 (T), S v Van den Berg 1991 (1) SACR 104 (T) 
and S v Salcedo 2003 1 SACR 324 (SCA). 
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The prosecution will have to prove that the accused was using a counterfeit card and 
was acting without the cardholder‟s consent. Evidence that the card is counterfeit 
and that the physical appearance and features of the counterfeit card differ from that 
of a genuine card, will have to be tendered. It must be ascertained and proven, 
through the testimony of the cardholder, that the latter was in possession of his/her 
own bank-issued card at the time of the fraudulent transaction(s) and did not consent 
to the fraudulent transaction(s).  
An affidavit from the cardholder (account holder), a statement from the bank in terms 
of section 236 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, and account statements 
reflecting the fraudulent transactions, as well as the legitimate transactions prior to 
the fraudulent spend, will be required to prove the element of misrepresentation. A 
section 236 statement from the bank is also required to authenticate and provide 
evidence in respect of relevant bank records.  
Ferreira (2012:14-15) indicates that, when money or credit is withdrawn or otherwise 
removed from a bank account without the consent of the account holder by using a 
counterfeit card, both fraud and theft are committed. However, as Ferreira points out, 
the mere copying (skimming) or accessing of data encoded on a valid bank-issued 
card does not constitute fraud or theft, as South African law does not recognise data 
or information as property that can be stolen, despite its potential value. The 
prejudice must go further than the unlawful copying of data encoded on a bank card. 
 Prejudice 2.5.1.3
Prejudice must follow as a result of the conduct of the perpetrator. Merely lying, 
without any harmful consequences to anyone, is not punishable. Burchell (2005:841) 
explains that prejudice caused during the commission of fraud can be divided into 
two broad categories, being proprietary and non-proprietary, and may be actual or 
potential. Proprietary prejudice is present when the prejudice exists in respect of 
some sort of property or advantage. Non-proprietary prejudice can exist in relation to 
non-tangible interests such as reputation, dignity and public administration. If the 
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public administration is materially inconvenienced or frustrated, leading to potential 
prejudice, it may constitute fraud6.  
Prejudice must not be too remote or fanciful. Potential prejudice implies that the 
conduct must have involved a risk of prejudice and that it was reasonably possible 
that the prejudice would occur (Snyman, 2006:528). If a person‟s conduct, 
objectively measured, would reasonably result in prejudice, potential prejudice is 
present, which is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of prejudice. The prejudice 
need not be caused to or intended for the party to whom the misrepresentation is 
made; it could be suffered by a third party or the government.  
In counterfeit card fraud cases, the prejudice is actual if the fraudulent withdrawal or 
purchase is made successfully. If the withdrawal or purchase with the counterfeit 
card is declined, prejudice is still present but it is potential (this can also be 
prosecuted as attempted fraud).  
 Intention 2.5.1.4
The intention required to prove fraud consists of two elements that must both be 
present – the intent to deceive and the intent to defraud (Burchell, 2005:844; 
Snyman, 2006:531). Intent to deceive means that the accused must have made 
some representation knowing or foreseeing that it might be false, and it is his/her 
intention to make the other party believe something which is not really true7. 
However, intent to defraud goes further. The accused must have the intention to 
move or convince the party to whom the false representation is made, to act upon it 
so that the result will be an actual or potential prejudice to himself/herself or another 
party. To defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is to induce by deceit someone to act to 
his/her injury.  
Intention to deceive is clearly present in counterfeit card fraud, since the fraudster 
using the counterfeit card makes a misrepresentation to the bank or merchant. By 
presenting a counterfeit card as genuine and by using the illegally obtained PIN of 
the actual cardholder to have the transaction authenticated, the fraudster is 
                                            
6
 This approach was followed by the court in R v Heyne 1956 (3) SA 604 (A), where the court held 
that the failure by the owners of a liquor store to properly keep records of liquor sales, as stipulated by 
law, amounted to potential prejudice to the state. 
7
 In Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd 1903 1 Ch 728 the court held that to deceive is to 
induce someone to believe that something is true which is false. 
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misrepresenting his/her true identity and is purporting to have legal authority and 
access to the funds in the victim‟s account. The intention to defraud is also present, 
since the fraudster‟s misrepresentation to the bank or merchant by means of an ATM 
or point-of-sale (POS) device with regard to the counterfeit card, PIN, his/her identity, 
consent and legal standing in respect of access to the funds held in the account, is 
aimed at moving the bank or merchant to authenticate the transaction, which would 
result in prejudice to the victim, bank or merchant.  
 Statutory offences related to card skimming 2.5.2
In counterfeit card fraud cases the investigation generally focuses on common law 
fraud but, depending on the circumstances of a case, the investigator should keep in 
mind that there are a number of statutory offences related to card skimming which 
also need to be investigated. Counterfeit card fraud and card skimming 
investigations should include both fraud and the relevant statutory offences. These 
include contraventions of certain sections of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act, 2002 (Act No. 25 of 2002) (ECT Act), the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information 
Act, 2002 (Act No. 70 of 2002) (RICA), the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 
(Act No. 121 of 1998) and the Customs and Excise Act, 1964 (Act No. 91 of 1964).  
Section 86(1) of the ECT Act and section 49(1) of RICA prohibit the skimming 
(copying) of data encoded on the magnetic strip of a card. In terms of section 86(3) 
of the ECT Act the possession, producing, selling, offering for sale, procuring, 
designing, adapting or distributing of a skimming device with the intent to use it for 
unlawful purposes, is an offence, while section 86(4) prohibits the use of a skimming 
device. Section 86 and other provisions of the ECT Act are likely to be replaced by 
similar offences in future (sections 5 to 10 of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 
2015).  
In terms of section 49(1) of RICA it is illegal to intercept or use another person to 
intercept communication without the authority or consent of its author. Section 
51(1)(a)(i), read with section 45(1) of RICA, declares it an offence to possess, 
manufacture, assemble, sell, purchase or advertise any listed electronic, electro-
magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other instrument, device or equipment, which is 
primarily designed to intercept communications. This includes miniature cameras 
39 
and video cameras, keystroke recorders and computer software that can be used to 
access, record, monitor, retrieve or make available to a person communication-
related information without the consent of its author and which can be used as PIN-
capturing devices (Government Notice No. R. 1263, dated 29 December 2005, in 
Government Gazette No. 28371). It is, therefore, clear that it is illegal to possess, 
buy, sell, manufacture, design, distribute or advertise any card skimming device or 
PIN-capturing device, if it is meant for unlawful purposes (card skimming, PIN 
capturing and/or counterfeit card fraud).  
Ferreira (2012:55) explains that the import of skimming devices and PIN-capturing 
devices could be prosecuted in terms of section 81, read with section 15 of the 
Customs and Excise Act, 1964, for the non-declaration or import of goods prohibited, 
restricted or controlled by law (i.e. ECT Act and RICA). It must, however, be kept in 
mind that the intention for possessing the device must relate to an unlawful purpose. 
In addition, section 83(1)(a) of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964 prohibits a person 
to possess, have in his/her custody or under his/her control, purchase, sell or 
dispose of any goods which are illicit goods in terms of the Act (i.e. goods in respect 
of which any part of the Act is contravened). A person can also be prosecuted for 
making a false declaration in respect of imported goods (section 84, read with 
section 15). 
Other statutory offences that may have a bearing on counterfeit card fraud cases 
include contraventions of sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, 1998, respectively, racketeering, money laundering, assisting another to 
benefit from the proceeds of unlawful activities, and the acquisition, use and 
possession of the proceeds of unlawful activities.  
2.6 COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD MODUS OPERANDI AND EQUIPMENT 
It is evident from various sources that one can distinguish three stages or phases in 
counterfeit card fraud, the first two being preparatory and the third being the actual 
commission phase, collectively referred to by Divitt (2013:1) as a „lifecycle‟ (also see 
Hayes, 2014:8-20; Sabric, 2012:30). The preparatory phases consist of the 
skimming of an original bank-issued card and capturing/recording the cardholder‟s 
PIN, followed by the manufacturing of a counterfeit card by encoding another card 
with the skimmed card data. The actual commission of fraud (fraudulent spend) is 
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the third phase and takes place when the counterfeit card is used to withdraw cash 
from an ATM or merchant, and/or to make purchases from a merchant. These 
stages have been corroborated with information obtained from actual cases 
investigated by the South African Police Service (see Annexure F) and from 
participants during interviews.  
A bank card is issued with security features, which are designed to prevent 
fraudulent use of the card (Visa USA, 2012:1-2; MasterCard International, 2015:1-2; 
MasterCard South Africa, 2009:1-2). Security features which are designed to protect 
authentication data include a magnetic stripe (strip) on the back of the card, an 
embedded microchip on the front of the card (if it is a smartcard i.e. chip-and-pin 
card) and a secret PIN, which is linked to the specific card and issued only to the 
cardholder upon positive verification of identity. Annexure D provides illustrations of 
the card security features of Visa and MasterCard. During interviews, all the 
participants have been aware that counterfeit card fraud is made possible when 
criminals circumvent the security measures provided by the encoded magnetic strip 
of a card and the secret cardholder PIN.  
Smartcards are more secure than magnetic stripe cards in the sense that the 
embedded microchip (micro-processor) protects and authenticates card and PIN 
data more securely, thereby helping to prevent counterfeit card fraud (Europol, 
2012:5; Smart Card Alliance, 2015:4; Sabric, 2015:4; Heuker, 2013:10-11). 
However, the magnetic stripe has been retained on smartcards to ensure that they 
can still be used in countries which are not chip-and-pin (EMV8) compliant (Sabric, 
2013c:27; Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council [PCI SSC], 2013b:5-
7). Figure 1 and Figure 2 of Annexure E, respectively, show examples of magnetic 
stripe-based cards and chip-and-pin cards. Other visible card security features 
become relevant only when an exact copy of an entire card is made (whole-card 
                                            
8
 EMV is a global standard for credit and debit payment cards based on chip card technology, taking 
its name from the original developers, Europay, MasterCard and Visa. EMV specifications include, but 
is not limited to, card and terminal evaluation, security evaluation and management of interoperability 
issues (EMVCo, 2015). 
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counterfeiting/cloning), which a fraudster can present as payment for purchases at a 
merchant (see Annexure D as per attached)9.  
 Card skimming and PIN capturing 2.6.1
According to Hayes (2014:8) card skimming is performed using three methods, 
namely handheld skimming (at restaurants, retailers, toll booths and ATMs), overlay 
devices (ATM skimming, gas pump skimmers and ticket vending machine skimmers) 
and parasite devices (point-of-sale terminal skimming). Although all three methods 
are prevalent in South Africa, overlay devices are used mainly for ATM skimming 
(Sabric, 2015:19-23; Banking Association of South Africa, 2013:1). Between 1 
January 2010 and 30 September 2015 a total of 892 handheld skimming devices 
and 267 ATM-mounted skimming devices were seized nationally. A total of 93 POS 
skimming devices were seized from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2015 (Sabric, 
2015:23).  
During interviews, twenty (20) participants were able to describe all three methods of 
card skimming. All the participants were able to explain handheld skimming and ATM 
skimming in detail. Six (6) participants have heard of point-of-sale skimming but did 
not know how it was committed, while three (3) have never heard of it. As far as the 
investigation of different types of skimming is concerned, fourteen (14) investigators 
(five from SAPS and nine bank investigators) indicated that they have investigated 
all three types of skimming. Ten (10) investigators (five SAPS and two bank 
investigators) have investigated only handheld skimming and ATM skimming cases, 
while the remainder have investigated only handheld skimming cases. These figures 
show that a third of the SAPS investigators have not investigated ATM skimming 
before and that two-thirds have never investigated POS skimming. Furthermore, a 
quarter of the bank investigators have also not investigated POS skimming before.  
Several participants underlined the importance of an effective investigation in order 
to identify skimming devices which are recovered, in order to present evidence with 
regard to the possession and operation thereof. Any skimming device, encoder, 
                                            
9
 In the case of Kliptown CAS 348/03/2014 a total of 66 Visa and MasterCard hologram stickers were 
seized from a suspect, together with a handheld skimming device, two portable point-of-sale 
skimming devices, two card encoders, four laptops, 77 counterfeit cards, and 792 store and gift cards. 
In Milnerton CAS 733/03/2013 a suspect was arrested collecting a parcel containing a large number 
of Visa and MasterCard hologram stickers, while 648 counterfeit cards were seized at the suspect‟s 
residence. 
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counterfeit card, keypad overlay, pinhole (micro) camera, computer or any other 
related equipment used for card skimming, PIN capturing and/or card counterfeiting 
should, when found, be seized without a search-and-seizure warrant in terms of 
section 20, read with section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, or section 4 of 
the Customs and Excise Act, 1964.  
A summary of participants‟ responses indicated that any skimming device, card 
encoder, counterfeit card, keypad overlay, camera, computer or any related 
equipment, should upon seizure be examined and analysed by a digital forensic 
expert to ensure that all stored data is retrieved, and to examine and document the 
operation of the device or equipment. This is also prescribed by SAPS policy and 
directives (SAPS, 2010b:1-3; 2011a; 2011b:1-16). Data retrieved from devices and 
equipment should be followed up by the investigating officer.  
In addition, the investigation must include photographing the relevant 
device/equipment, documenting its physical appearance and fitment to the ATM 
(where applicable), a fingerprint examination of the device/equipment, the taking of 
DNA samples from it, a digital forensic examination of the device/equipment, and an 
analysis of available surveillance camera footage. An examination of the ATM by an 
installation/maintenance technician and a bank investigator might also be required. 
Investigators need to be knowledgeable with regard to the different types of 
skimming prevalent in South Africa. A counterfeit card fraud case cannot be 
investigated successfully if the investigator does not know how the fraud was 
committed, what equipment and technology were used, and what evidence to look 
for. The three methods of card skimming prevalent in South Africa will now be 
discussed. 
 Handheld skimming and PIN capturing  2.6.1.1
When handheld skimming takes place, a small card reader is held in the hand and 
the original card data is skimmed (copied) by unobtrusively swiping the magnetic 
stripe through the card reader slot (Hayes, 2014:7-10; Sabric, 2015:21-22). The 
skimming device is battery powered and has memory storage capacity. Handheld 
skimming devices vary in size; some are smaller than a bank card and can easily be 
hidden in a pocket (also see Annexure E as per attached). 
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Handheld skimming can be performed in venues where an original card is tendered 
as payment and a cashier or waiter discreetly swipes the card through the skimming 
device. Cardholders could be targeted at restaurants, toll booths, retail stores, shops 
and filling stations. The cardholder‟s PIN is observed when entered onto the point-of-
sale terminal. Handheld skimming also takes place at ATMs when a client is 
distracted or offered unsolicited help (Sabric, 2013a:1). The victim‟s card is skimmed 
with a handheld device and his/her PIN is obtained through observation when it is 
entered onto the keypad of the ATM („shoulder surfing‟) (see Annexure F for 
examples of such cases). Handheld skimming even takes place inside banks where 
bank officials have been found to skim clients‟ cards10.  
 ATM-mounted skimming and PIN capturing 2.6.1.2
ATM skimming involves a card reader and a PIN-capturing device which are 
attached to an ATM (Sabric, 2014:23; 2015:22-23; Krebs, 2010a:1-2; 2011b:1-3). 
The skimming device (card reader) is fixed onto or over the original card slot (bezel) 
of the ATM to enable the device to read the magnetic strip of a card that is inserted 
into the slot. The PIN-capturing device is either a miniature (pinhole) camera or a 
keypad overlay. A miniature (micro) camera is placed in a position to enable it to 
record keystrokes (the PIN) entered onto the keypad. The camera is often placed at 
the back of a tiny hole behind a fixed panel or inside a brochure rack.  
Alternatively, the PIN is recorded by means of a keypad overlay, which is essentially 
a false numeric keypad placed on top of the real keypad and fixed to the ATM 
(Hayes, 2014:9-13)11. Skimmed card data and captured PINs are retrieved when the 
skimming device and PIN-capturing device are removed from the ATM. 
Technologically advanced ATM skimming devices can transmit skimmed card and 
PIN data by means of bluetooth, wireless fidelity (wi-fi) or „global system for mobile 
communications‟ (GSM) networks to a fraudster‟s cellphone, making it available in 
real-time (Krebs, 2010b:2; 2015:1-3; Feinberg, 2014:1-7). Figures 4 to 6 in Annexure 
E portray ATM skimming devices and PIN-capturing devices. 
                                            
10
 Delmas CAS 43/01/2012, Wierdabrug CAS 205/03/2013, Hendrina CAS 68/04/2012 
11
 In Humewood CAS 64/11/2014 a battery powered false keypad overlay was seized, which had the 
capability to store data digitally. 
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Fraudsters often manufacture their own ATM skimming devices and PIN-capturing 
devices. Several „home factories‟ have been found which were used for the 
manufacturing of skimming devices, PIN-capturing devices and counterfeit cards12.  
 Point-of-sale skimming and PIN capturing  2.6.1.3
Point-of-sale skimming involves any of four methods, as described by Krebs 
(2011a:1; 2013a:2; 2013b:2) and the Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
Council (2009:15), namely: 
 A standard point-of-sale device that has been tampered with and converted 
into a skimming device. 
 A point-of-sale device of which the software has been infected and altered 
to transmit skimmed card and PIN data to the fraudster over a computer 
network, using bluetooth or wi-fi transmission.  
 A card and PIN data logger which is attached to a cash register.  
 Intercepting legitimate real-time wireless (mobile) data communications 
from POS devices at merchants via bluetooth or wi-fi transmission.  
In Figures 7 and 8 in Annexure E, examples are shown of point-of-sale skimming 
technology. According to Krebs (2012:1) a standard POS device can be adapted for 
skimming in such a manner that, once the card has been swiped and the PIN 
entered, the device prints a „connection error‟ or „offline‟ receipt (also see Sabric, 
2015:23). The customer is then informed that the POS device is offline or out of 
order and the card is swiped again, this time using a legitimate POS terminal. The 
card and PIN data is stored by the adapted POS device which was first used. This 
modus operandi has been confirmed in various cases13.  
MasterCard International (2009:11-12) explains that criminals obtain original point-of-
sale devices by stealing or purchasing one. The device is then disassembled and 
reverse engineered, adapted and returned to the merchant location or introduced at 
another location by replacing a legitimate POS device with the adapted one.  
                                            
12
 Including Umhlali CAS 6/10/2014, Norwood CAS 383/07/2012, Bedfordview CAS 162/10/2013, 
Sandton CAS 411/04/2013 and Randburg CAS 466/04/2013. 
13
 Including Garsfontein CAS 572/08/2013, Parkview CAS 84/10/2013, Wierdabrug CAS 644/10/2013 
and Witbank CAS 1045/10/2013. 
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Mobile POS devices communicate using cellphone networks and protocols (PCI 
SSC, 2009:15). However, they are normally also bluetooth and wi-fi enabled, and 
these data communications can be intercepted by criminals well beyond the walls of 
a building. A criminal in the vicinity of an altered mobile POS device can use a 
bluetooth or wi-fi enabled device, such as a cellphone, to receive skimmed card and 
PIN data which has been transmitted. 
 Counterfeiting the card 2.6.2
Once the card data has been copied from a genuine card and the cardholder‟s PIN 
obtained, a counterfeit card is produced by encoding the magnetic stripe of another 
card with the skimmed card data. Counterfeit cards are produced by encoding lost, 
stolen or other magnetic stripe cards, including white plastic cards, gift cards and 
store cards (Sabric, 2012:30; 2014:19). The card writer is connected to a computer 
and uses applicable software to transfer the skimmed card data (which is retrieved 
from the skimming device) to the counterfeit card. Figures 1, 9 and 10 in Annexure E 
show examples of magnetic stripe cards, card reader/writer combinations used to 
read and encode magnetic stripe cards, and counterfeit cards with PIN numbers. 
Card readers (skimming devices) and card writers (encoders) have been seized in 
various cases14.  
 Fraudulent spend 2.6.3
Up to 85% of fraudulent spend with counterfeit cards are cash withdrawals from 
ATMs (Sabric, 2013c:1-20; 2014:11-18). However, counterfeit cards can also be 
used to make fraudulent purchases. During interviews, bank investigators referred to 
fraudulent spend as „negative spend‟ and explained „positive spend‟ as legitimate 
transactions made by the cardholder prior to the fraudulent spend. All of the 
participants referred to the fraudster who makes the fraudulent withdrawals or 
purchases as a „runner‟.  
During discussions relating to fraudulent spend, ten (10) participants raised an issue, 
which related to the time of the day when fraudulent withdrawals are made. They 
indicated that fraudulent withdrawals often take place just before and after midnight, 
since the runner wants to withdraw the maximum daily amounts allowed on the 
                                            
14
 Including Pretoria West CAS 591/05/2013, Dunnottar CAS 44/07/2013, Daveyton CAS 240/09/2013 
and Humewood CAS 454/06/2011 (also see Annexure F as per attached). 
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victim‟s account in the shortest time possible. In this way, a runner can withdraw the 
maximum amount allowed for two consecutive days within a few minutes. During the 
docket analysis, this was found to be true in 12 of the 100 dockets analysed15. In 
other cases fraudsters used counterfeit cards to pay for goods and services at 
merchant venues16.  
One of the bank investigators interviewed commented that the point of compromise 
of the original card is often different from the point where the fraudulent spend takes 
place (i.e. two different crime scenes). Evidence for this was found during the docket 
analysis. In 35 out of the 100 dockets analysed it was clear that the original cards 
had been compromised in different geographical locations than where the fraudulent 
spend took place17.  
On the issue of fraudulent spend, fourteen (14) participants also pointed out that, 
while cards and PINs are compromised in South Africa, the fraudulent spend often 
takes place in other countries, which means that it is likely that the skimmed card 
data and PIN are forwarded to someone in another country, who counterfeits the 
card and commits fraud. During docket analysis, four (4) such cases were 
identified18. In one case19 a total of 17 fraudulent POS purchases were made over 
four days, using counterfeit cards in Spain, the United States and Hong Kong (also 
see Sabric, 2013b:1; 2014:8 & 12). In other cases20 arrests were made when 
suspects presented counterfeit international cards as payment. 
Evidence relating to fraudulent withdrawals and purchases with counterfeit cards can 
be obtained in terms of section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 and include 
the following (SAPS, 2010d; 2011b; 2013c): 
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 Including Hillbrow CAS 913/01/2013, Johannesburg Central CAS 1307/02/3013 and Norwood CAS 
202/03/2013). 
16
 Including Roodepoort CAS 856/10/2013, Bedfordview CAS 334/09/2013 and Sunnyside CAS 
490/11/2013. 
17
 Including Booysens CAS 353/02/2013, Brixton CAS 497/01/2013, Johannesburg Central CAS 
1359/01/2013 and Sandton CAS 762/01/2013. 
18
 Johannesburg Central CAS 520/12/2012, Rosebank CAS 31/02/2013, Sandton CAS 183/01/2013 
and Sandton CAS 560/01/2013. 
19
 Sandton CAS 183/01/2013. 
20
 Edenvale CAS 271/09/2013, Pretoria Central CAS 847/11/2013 and Pretoria Central CAS 
886/11/2013. 
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 Bank statements of the positive (prior to fraud) spend and negative 
(fraudulent) spend, accompanied by a section 236 (Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977) statement from the bank. The account holder must identify the 
fraudulent spend transactions.  
 Information from the bank relating to the unique identity of the ATM (where 
applicable) and the electronic journal of the ATM showing exact dates and 
times of fraudulent transactions. The electronic journal of an ATM is a 
computerised record (log files) of all transactions taking place at the ATM, 
including lawful spend and fraudulent spend (TestLink, 2014:1; CashCard, 
2012:4). Transaction-related information is saved to the ATM‟s hard drive 
and can be downloaded or printed by the bank. 
 Information from the bank relating to the identity, name and contact details 
of the merchant (if fraudulent purchases were made). 
 Information from the bank with regard to other bank accounts that have 
been compromised and in respect of which complaints of fraudulent 
transactions have been reported to the bank in the same area and over the 
same period. This information must be obtained with a view of determining 
a possible common point of compromise of the cards and common points 
of fraudulent spend.  
 In the case of fraudulent purchases, identifying information from the 
merchant relating to the specific point-of-sale terminal and particulars of the 
cashier involved, with proof that the cashier was on duty at the time at that 
terminal. The transaction slips and sales dockets relating to the fraudulent 
purchases can give an indication of the cashier‟s possible involvement and 
whether prescribed procedures were followed. 
 Surveillance footage. Surveillance cameras can provide recorded footage 
of activities taking place inside a merchant location on the specific date and 
time when the fraudulent purchase was made, including surveillance of the 
specific pay point. Surveillance footage recorded at an ATM where a 
fraudulent withdrawal was made or in shopping malls and around parking 
areas, should be obtained with a view of identifying suspects and vehicles 
used by suspects. 
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2.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the concepts of „forensic investigation‟ and „forensic science‟ were 
explained. The differences and interaction between them were discussed. The 
responsibility, powers and mandate to investigate crime and more specifically, 
counterfeit card fraud, as it relate to the South African Police Service and bank 
investigators were considered. The purpose and objectives of forensic investigation 
with reference to counterfeit card fraud, and the importance of the investigation 
objectives relating to identification and individualisation were discussed.  
This was followed by a discussion of fraud and its legal elements, counterfeit card 
fraud and related statutory offences. The three phases of counterfeit card fraud were 
explored, namely: the skimming (copying) of the card data of a valid, bank-issued 
card and capturing of the cardholder‟s PIN, the manufacturing of a counterfeit card 
by encoding another card with the skimmed card data, and the fraudulent spend 
phase where the counterfeit card is used to make withdrawals or purchases.  
The next chapter will take a closer look at the investigation objectives of identification 
and individualisation in counterfeit card fraud cases. Different identification methods 
relating to specific aspects will be examined and evaluated, including the victim, the 
perpetrators and the points of compromise and fraudulent spend.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
IDENTIFICATION IN COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD CASES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any crime can be seen as an event with four separate yet interconnected 
dimensions, being the law that defines the act to be criminal, the offender, the victim 
or target, and the simultaneous convergence of these three at a specific 
geographical (spatial) node (Breuer, Hursey, Stroman & Verma, 2008:2).  
The abilities to solve a crime and to develop preventive methods depend on whether 
the investigator is able to answer the six „W‟ questions with regard to the criminal 
incident: What happened (how did it take place)? Who was the victim? Where did it 
take place? When did it take place? Who did it? Why did it happen? These questions 
require the investigator to identify the crime, the victim, the crime scene, the date 
and time of the incident, the offender, and his/her modus operandi, equipment, 
actions, involvement and motive. Identification-related activities are, therefore, the 
key drivers which direct the investigator‟s quest to find answers. 
In this chapter, the use of different identification methods to investigate counterfeit 
card fraud will be examined more closely. There are various aspects related to any 
counterfeit card fraud incident, which may have to be identified in order to 
individualise the crime (see paragraph 2.4.1). Different identification methods may be 
necessary to identify certain aspects of the crime, depending on the particular case 
setting and background with which the investigator is dealing. The ultimate goal of 
the investigator is to collect sufficient evidence, which identifies relevant aspects of 
the crime positively, to enable the state prosecutor to prove the role which each 
accused played in the commission of the fraud. 
3.2 IDENTIFICATION IN COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD CASES 
Identification-related activities aimed at achieving the objectives of identification and 
individualisation are among the most critical to be completed successfully by the 
investigator and form the basis of any investigation (Marais, 1992:5 & 20; Van Graan 
& Budhram, 2015:46-47). Identification can generally be typed as direct or indirect 
identification and divided into eight categories, which are associated with specific 
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methods of identification. Investigators need to be knowledgeable as to what these 
categories and methods entail, and which will be appropriate and effective for the 
specific case under investigation.  
 Categories and aspects for identification in counterfeit card fraud 3.2.1
cases  
Identification can be divided into the following categories (Van Graan & Budhram, 
2015:48-63; Marais, 1992:2-4; Van der Westhuizen, 1996:6-7):  
 Situation identification. 
 Victim identification.  
 Witness identification. 
 Perpetrator (culprit) identification. 
 Imprint identification. 
 Origin identification. 
 Action identification. 
 Cumulative identification. 
During interviews, twenty-four (24) participants listed victim identification, suspect 
(perpetrator) identification, witness identification and imprint identification as 
categories of identification. Four (4) of the 24 participants also included origin 
identification. Three (3) participants only mentioned suspect identification. None of 
the participants mentioned situation identification, action identification or cumulative 
identification. It was evident from responses that participants were mainly conversant 
with identification categories relating to the victim, perpetrator, witnesses and 
imprints. In counterfeit card fraud cases, depending on the specific case situation, 
there are generally three main categories that need to be identified, namely the 
crime scenes, the role players (victims, criminals and witnesses) and the equipment 
used (Hayes, 2014:8-20; Sabric, 2012:30) (also see Annexure F as per attached).  
A number of aspects specific to counterfeit card fraud, which need to be identified 
positively during investigation, were established from responses received from 
participants (see in brackets below), various SAPS reports (see Annexure F) and 
case dockets analysed (also see SAPS, 2013c:1-6; Pillay, 2011:3; Hayes, 2014:1-
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20). Depending on the circumstances of a case, the following aspects would have to 
be identified positively during investigation: 
 The modus operandi, type of skimming, skimming device and PIN-
capturing device used (26 participants).  
 The person who used the skimming device and PIN-capturing device to 
illegally obtain the card and PIN data (25 participants). 
 The person(s) who performed the fraudulent transactions (25 participants). 
 The point(s) of fraudulent spend (merchant(s) and/or ATM(s)) (24 
participants). 
 The point of compromise of the original card or a common point of 
compromise of various compromised cards (i.e. common point of 
purchase) (23 participants). 
 The person who manufactured the counterfeit card(s) (22 participants). 
 The place where the counterfeit card(s) was/were produced (19 
participants). 
 The equipment used to manufacture the counterfeit card(s), including the 
card encoder, computer equipment and, where applicable, card embosser 
and tipper (18 participants). 
 The counterfeit card(s) which was/were used (18 participants). 
 The fraudulent (disputed) transactions (fraudulent/negative spend) (18 
participants). 
 The specific point-of-sale terminal and cashier at a merchant venue where 
the counterfeit card was presented (16 participants). 
 The person who supplied or manufactured the skimming device and PIN-
capturing device (16 participants).  
 The cellphone numbers of perpetrators and their communications with 
each other (16 participants).  
 The equipment and materials used to manufacture the skimming device 
and PIN-capturing device (14 participants). 
 The place where the skimming device and PIN-capturing device were 
manufactured (14 participants). 
 The prior to fraud transaction history (positive spend) (12 participants). 
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 The crime (identifying the crime as counterfeit card fraud) (10 participants). 
 Any other person who colluded to commit the crime, including those who 
shared in the proceeds (6 participants). 
As far as counterfeit card fraud cases is concerned, it was established that the DPCI 
follows a national strategy and standard operating procedure (SOP) in respect of the 
investigation of these cases, which focus more on skimming modus operandi and 
cooperation with other role players than on appropriate identification methods 
(SAPS, 2009d:1-12; 2011b:1-16). However, DPCI procedures do prescribe the use 
of surveillance and digital forensic analysis as possible identification methods (see 
paragraphs 3.2.1.2 (a) and 3.2.1.3 (c) in this regard). The following discussion will 
focus on different identification categories and methods in counterfeit card fraud 
cases relating to the aspects listed above.     
 Situation identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 3.2.1.1
Van Graan and Budhram (2015:49) describe situation identification as an evaluation 
of the circumstances and evidence found by the investigator in a specific situation 
and, based upon own observations, investigative knowledge and experience, firstly 
deciding whether an incident has taken place or a crime was committed and, if so, 
what type of incident or crime (also see Adams, Caddell & Krutsinger, 2004:10; Lee, 
Palmbach & Miller, 2003:27). Hence, knowledge of the crime and its elements, 
supported by practical experience of crime scenes and situations, are necessary for 
an accurate situation identification.  
From summarised responses of participants and an analysis of official SAPS reports 
and case dockets (see Annexure F and the list of dockets analysed as per attached), 
it was established that counterfeit card fraud cases manifest as any of the following 
situations or a combination of two or more:  
 A complaint from a cardholder who has suffered a loss on his/her bank 
account has been received by the bank or SAPS (in these cases, the 
suspect, method of skimming and point of compromise of the card are 
usually unknown). 
 Information relating to card skimming and/or counterfeit card fraud activities 
has been received or collected by the bank or SAPS. 
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 A counterfeit card, skimming device, and/or PIN-capturing device has/have 
been seized. 
 A suspect has been arrested on suspicion of card skimming and/or 
counterfeit card fraud.  
The initial circumstances of a case and the changing situation as the investigation 
progresses and develops will dictate the necessity and scope of identification-related 
activities. During interviews, 26 of the 29 participants (which included both Sabric 
participants) indicated that complaints from cardholders who have suffered losses on 
their accounts, where the perpetrator(s), method of skimming and point of 
compromise of their card are unknown, are the most common manifestation of 
counterfeit card fraud. The different stages of counterfeit card fraud, as discussed in 
paragraph 2.6.1, are likely to take place on different dates and at different 
geographical locations. Investigators should be able to identify the scene positively 
where the card and PIN were compromised, the scene where the counterfeit card 
was produced and the scene where the fraudulent spend took place.  
(a) Interviewing the victim 
The purpose of an interview with the victim/complainant in a counterfeit card fraud 
case is to collect evidence and relevant information with regard to the crime 
(Giacalone, 2015:1-2; American Institute of CPAs, [sa]: 2). The victim can make a 
valuable contribution to help identify the crime and situation with which the 
investigator is dealing and to provide a background of the sequence of events: the 
what, when, where, why, who and how of the crime. In support of this, both Sabric 
participants pointed out that a thorough interview with the complainant is the most 
effective method to assess the complaint and to achieve an accurate situation 
identification. During the interview, it should be confirmed that the complainant was 
in possession of a valid bank-issued card at the time of the fraudulent transaction(s), 
that no one had permission to perform the disputed transaction(s) and that no other 
person had lawful access to his/her PIN.  
It should be established whether the complainant had encountered any suspicious or 
out of the ordinary behaviour from someone when using an ATM or point-of-sale 
device prior to the fraud, or was offered unsolicited help at an ATM. Furthermore, it 
should be established whether, prior to the fraudulent transaction(s), an ATM had 
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retained his/her card, whether the complainant‟s card was removed from his/her 
sight or whether a cashier or waiter had exchanged POS devices during a 
transaction. These might all be indicative of card skimming and may help to identify 
the point of compromise of the card.  
During the interview, the complainant should be requested to identify the fraudulent 
transaction(s) on his/her bank statements and provide a transaction history of 
positive spend for analysis purposes, in order to identify a possible point of 
compromise (SAPS, 2011b:1-6; Pillay, 2011:3). During the docket analysis, it was 
found that in only nine (9) of the 100 counterfeit card fraud dockets the cardholder 
was interviewed by the investigating officer. 
 Victim identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 3.2.1.2
Victim identification includes activities and action steps to establish who the primary 
victim or target of a crime was (Marais, 1992:4 & 24-39). In counterfeit card fraud 
cases victim identification usually does not pose a problem to investigators. There 
was general consensus among participants that in practice victims contact their bank 
as a first point of entry to report fraudulent (disputed) transactions on their accounts, 
since the victim wants his/her card to be blocked and wants to be reimbursed for the 
loss. However, a counterfeit card or skimming device may be recovered and the 
cardholder(s) of the compromised card(s) might be unknown, in which case the 
investigator will have to identify the victim(s) (see Annexure F as per attached).  
During interviews, investigators were asked how they would identify unknown victims 
of counterfeit card fraud. The following responses were received: 
 A digital forensic analysis of counterfeit cards, skimming devices and/or 
related equipment which are recovered (20 participants). 
 With information and the assistance of the bank (18 participants). 
 An analysis of merchant transaction vouchers and/or the ATM electronic 
transaction journal (8 participants).  
(a) Digital forensic analysis 
A digital forensic analysis relates to the expert examination and analysis of digital 
(electronic) media with the object of identifying, recovering, preserving and 
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documenting digital evidence, which is stored as electronic or magnetically encoded 
data, and to present facts and expert opinions in court in this regard (United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 2008:1; Jordaan, 2015:364-392). Digital 
evidence includes any document, text, message, communication or presentation 
which is in electronic format, and which may exist on any electronic device or 
storage medium capable of storing or processing digital information, including bank 
cards, skimming devices, PIN-capturing devices, card writers, computers, 
cellphones, external hard drives, memory sticks (flash disks/drives), compact discs 
and memory cards.  
Both SAPS and bank investigators have access to private digital forensic analysis 
service providers (SAPS, 2010b:1-3; 2010c:1; 2011b:1-16; 2013c:1-4). Furthermore, 
SAPS investigators can make use of digital forensic analysts and services provided 
by the SAPS Cyber Crime Intelligence Support Section and trained digital crime 
scene first responders. Digital forensic analysis tools (e.g. XRY and Analyst 
Workstation) are available in the SAPS to extract and analyse cellphone data 
(Schmitz & Cooper, 2015:327-328).  
In terms of national SAPS directives a digital forensic analysis of all recovered 
skimming devices, PIN-capturing devices and related card counterfeiting equipment 
is compulsory, in order to identify victims and provide evidence of the operation and 
contents thereof (SAPS, 2010b:1-3; 2013c:1-4). Data retrieved from a skimming 
device, counterfeit card, card encoder or a suspect‟s computer, could be used to 
identify victims effectively by means of skimmed card data, which should include the 
primary account number (PAN) of the cardholder (see Annexure F as per attached). 
Furthermore, skimmed card data retrieved from a counterfeit card can confirm that 
the card is counterfeit. Noteworthy cases where skimmed card data was retrieved by 
means of a digital forensic analysis and used to identify victims and counterfeit cards 
successfully, include Mount Road CAS 387/04/201121 and Sandton CAS 
441/04/201322.  
Twelve (12) participants (which included both Sabric participants) emphasised the 
importance of following the correct procedures when seizing skimming and PIN-
                                            
21
 Skimmed data of 1 490 cards was retrieved from an ATM skimming device. 
22
 Skimmed data of 2 364 cards was retrieved from four ATM skimming devices. 
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capturing devices, counterfeit cards, card encoders, computers and related 
equipment. Exhibits must be photographed where they are found, documented, 
examined for fingerprints, and packaged and sealed correctly in exhibit bags for 
submission to the digital forensic analyst (also see Jordaan, 2015:386-388). 
(b) Analysis of merchant transaction vouchers and the ATM electronic 
transaction journal 
Eight (8) participants suggested an analysis of merchant transaction vouchers or the 
electronic journal of the ATM as a method to identify victims, depending on where 
the card(s) was/were compromised. In the case of Kareedouw CAS 49/08/2011 it 
was shown that compromised accounts and, therefore, victims could be identified 
successfully by using information which was retrieved from an ATM electronic 
transaction journal by the bank23.  
Once a common point of compromise at a merchant venue or ATM has been 
identified, details of all transactions performed and cash dispensed (including card 
numbers and account numbers linked to compromised cards) can be obtained from 
the merchant point-of-sale transaction vouchers or the electronic journal of the 
relevant ATM for the specific date(s) on which card skimming is suspected to have 
taken place. This information can be used to verify and follow up disputed 
(fraudulent) transactions (CashCard, 2012:4). With the assistance of the bank, card 
numbers and linked account numbers can be used to identify victims of card 
skimming at a common point of compromise. 
 Perpetrator (culprit) identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 3.2.1.3
Establishing the identity of the perpetrator is a decisive factor in solving a crime. 
Perpetrator identification involves collecting and evaluating information and facts 
aimed at positively determining the identity of the perpetrator, and includes direct 
and indirect methods (Marais, 1992:5 & 22; Lee et al, 2003:24; Van Graan & 
Budhram, 2015:55-63). Direct identification methods include direct recognition by the 
victim and/or eyewitnesses on the basis of physical appearance, race, gender and/or 
age, identification parades, photographic identification (including video camera 
surveillance footage and photo identification parades), voice identification, modus 
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 To this end, also see Uitenhage CAS 426/01/2012, Sea Point CAS 284/05/2013 and Kwazekele 
CAS 569/08/2010.    
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operandi and trademarks of the perpetrator. Indirect ways of perpetrator identification 
involves physical evidence which can be positively linked to the perpetrator 
(including handwriting, fingerprints, shoe prints, tyre tracks, tool marks, fibres, serial 
numbers and DNA from bodily fluids and tissue) (Van Graan & Budhram, 2015:63).  
It was established from participant interviews and various SAPS reports (see 
Annexure F as per attached) and directives (SAPS, 2009d; 2010b; 2013c:1-6), that a 
number of methods exist which can be used to identify perpetrators positively in 
counterfeit card fraud cases. These methods are supported by Sabric (2013d:1), 
Pillay (2011:3) and Verafin (2011:3-7) (also see Manamela, Smith & Mokwena, 
2015:110-115). Perpetrator identification methods include the following:  
 Identifying common points of fraudulent spend, supported by surveillance 
to identify previously known fraudsters and suspects acting suspiciously 
(e.g. making multiple withdrawals using different cards, withdrawing money 
around midnight or obscuring their faces from surveillance cameras) (16 
participants).  
 Identifying a common point of compromise of different cards, which have 
been compromised in the same geographical area over the same period, 
supported by surveillance to identify previously known suspects and 
suspects behaving suspiciously (including card skimming, shoulder surfing, 
loitering in the vicinity of an ATM or persistently offering unsolicited help to 
others) (16 participants). 
 The purposeful surveillance of popular and frequently used ATMs and 
merchant venues in order to identify previously known suspects, as well as 
suspicious actions related to card skimming and PIN capturing (15 
participants). 
 A thorough interview of all suspects arrested and obtaining information in 
order to identify other suspects (15 participants). 
 Call data and cellphone handset usage analysis of suspects in order to 
identify accomplices by means of contact details and communications (13 
participants). 
 Fingerprint examination and analysis in respect of recovered counterfeit 
cards, skimming and PIN-capturing devices, false panels and overlays, 
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components and related equipment in order to identify suspects from 
existing criminal databases (10 participants). 
 DNA profiling (3 participants). 
 Profiling of suspects (2 participants). 
(a) Identifying the point of fraudulent spend 
The point of fraudulent spend refers to any merchant venue or ATM where a 
fraudster uses a counterfeit card to purchase goods or withdraw cash (Esker, 
2013:1-3; Hayes, 2014:7-15). During interviews, participants were asked how one 
could identify the point(s) of fraudulent spend or a common point of fraudulent spend 
during the investigation of counterfeit card fraud cases. The following identification 
methods were provided by participants:  
 An interview with the victim (cardholder) during which negative spend 
(fraudulent transactions) should be identified from relevant bank 
statements. Information identifying the specific point(s) of fraudulent spend 
(merchant or ATM) should be obtained from the bank statements. Should 
the bank statements be inadequate to identify the point(s), additional 
information must be obtained from the bank (19 participants). 
 Surveillance of suspected points of fraudulent spend in order to identify 
suspects behaving suspiciously (e.g. making multiple withdrawals using 
different cards at the same ATM, making withdrawals at midnight or 
obscuring their faces from surveillance cameras) (16 participants). 
 A collective analysis of negative (fraudulent) spend transaction data 
relating to different cards which have been compromised in the same 
geographical area over the same period (12 participants). Sources, tools 
and aids which can be used to perform such an analysis, include bank 
statements, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, i2 Analyst‟s Notebook and 
Sabric analysts. 
 The thorough interviewing of suspects in custody in order to identify points 
of fraudulent spend (10 participants).  
 Identifying common points of fraudulent spend (fraud hotspots) from the 
Tactical Weekly Provincial Commercial Crime Risk Forecast, which is 
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compiled by Sabric and distributed to SAPS and bank investigators (see 
Annexure G as per attached) (7 participants). 
During interviews, sixteen (16) participants indicated that a positive perpetrator 
identification could be achieved by identifying points of fraudulent spend and placing 
them under surveillance. Surveillance activities should focus on identifying previously 
known fraudsters and suspects who act suspiciously. It has been proven that 
surveillance of a positively identified common point of fraudulent spend can be used 
as a method to identify perpetrators positively24 (also see Annexure F as per 
attached). It is, therefore, important that investigators should know how to identify 
points of fraudulent spend and common points of fraudulent spend.   
Heuker (2013:11) supports a collective analysis of fraudulent spend transaction data 
relating to different compromised cards to identify common points of fraudulent 
spend during investigation (also see Detica, 2010:1). In order to do this, fraudulent 
transactions should be identified by account holders from their bank statements, 
captured on a collective database or retrieved from the bank‟s existing database and 
analysed to identify common points of fraudulent spend. MasterCard International 
(2010a:1; 2010b:4) and 3VR Incorporated (2011:2) advocate the use of real-time 
transaction surveillance and analysis systems, supported by and integrated with 
camera surveillance, to identify points of fraudulent spend and perpetrators.  
Hill and Paynich (2014:9 & 220) contend that operational (tactical) crime information 
analysis and crime mapping can be used to solve cases by identifying clusters of 
criminal activity, crime threats, crime patterns and hotspots, suspects, investigative 
leads, and spatial relationships between crime incidents and geographic variables. 
This is done by examining recent criminal events in terms of relevant variables, 
including the method used (modus operandi), point of entry, instruments used, 
offender profile and description, day of the week, date, time and location of the crime 
incident.  
In this regard, Sabric produces a weekly report indicating the most common points of 
fraudulent spend in each province which, as pointed out by participants, is provided 
to SAPS and bank card fraud investigators on a weekly basis (SAPS, 2011b:1-16). 
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 Uitenhage CAS 426/01/2012, Queenstown CAS 29/11/2011 and Algoa Park CAS 154/08/2010. 
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Annexure G is an example of a Sabric Tactical Weekly Provincial Commercial Crime 
Risk Forecast in respect of Gauteng province for the period 23 June 2013 to 29 June 
2013.  
Investigators can use the Sabric weekly report to guide their investigations in 
identifying points of fraudulent spend and possible suspects. The Sabric Tactical 
Weekly Provincial Commercial Crime Risk Forecast provides investigators with 
detailed information relating to merchant venues and ATMs most targeted by card 
fraudsters for fraudulent purchases and cash withdrawals, in terms of geographical 
location, patterns and tendencies. From Annexure G the most prevalent day of the 
week, time of the day and most targeted ATMs can be seen.  
The SAPS also prescribes the use of a crime information analysis process, 
consisting of a crime threat analysis, crime pattern analysis and crime mapping using 
the Geographic Information System to identify crime hotspots (flashpoints) and link 
similar cases (SAPS, 2013d; 2011e; 2011f:4-7). Every police station must have a 
crime information official (CIO) who is responsible for the daily management, 
collection, analysis and interpretation of crime information in that area, and to brief 
investigating officers and patrol officers with regard to the findings of the crime 
information analysis. This includes a crime pattern analysis and mapping of 
counterfeit card fraud incidents. Based on this knowledge, resources should be 
applied more effectively during the investigation and prevention of crime. However, 
during interviews, only two of the SAPS participants were aware of the existence and 
role of station CIOs in identifying points of fraudulent spend in counterfeit card fraud 
cases.  
Various analytical tools are available in the SAPS to analyse negative spend and 
positive spend transaction data from victims‟ bank statements, and to analyse crime 
information from the Crime Administration System, relevant databases and systems 
(e.g. the Inkwazi system). These tools include computer spreadsheet applications 
(e.g. Microsoft Excel), IBM i2 Analyst‟s Notebook, i2 iXa and iXv Visualiser (SAPS, 
2006a:1-3; 2007:1-2; Schmitz & Cooper, 2015:336-338; Smith & Zinn, 2015:431-
432). Annexure H is an example of crime pattern analyses and crime maps, 
generated with the GIS of the SAPS, using CAS data which was exported to a 
spreadsheet and sorted alphabetically according to crime scene addresses. It relates 
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to fraud cases which were reported at the Daveyton police station between 1 June 
2013 and 30 June 2013, and between 23 June 2013 and 29 June 2013 respectively.  
A comparison of Annexure G and Annexure H as per attached shows that the 
fraudulent withdrawals reported by Sabric for the period 23 June 2013 to 29 June 
2013, relating only to the two ATM hotspots in Daveyton, were 66 compared with the 
seven (7) fraud cases reported to the SAPS for the entire Daveyton policing area. A 
possible explanation for the difference is that victims tend to report counterfeit card 
fraud to their banks, which in turn report it to Sabric. However, victims do not always 
report the matter to the SAPS. It is also possible that more than one fraudulent 
withdrawal (fraud incident) could have been made from the same complainant‟s 
account. Annexures G and H illustrate that both SAPS and Sabric crime pattern 
analyses and crime maps can be used to identify common points of fraudulent 
spend.  
In contrast to this, the docket analysis showed that a positive identification of the 
point of fraudulent spend, on a single case-by-case basis, was achieved in only 28 of 
the 100 cases analysed. In 14 of the 28 cases, the point of fraudulent spend was 
identified by SAPS investigators based on information obtained from the cardholder‟s 
bank statements. In the other fourteen (14) cases, the point of fraudulent spend was 
identified by the bank and relayed to the cardholder. There was no indication in the 
remaining 72 case dockets that a Sabric Tactical Weekly Provincial Commercial 
Crime Risk Forecast, a crime pattern analysis or crime map was used to identify 
points of fraudulent spend. None of the 100 dockets analysed were included in any 
collective analysis of negative spend transaction data in order to identify common 
points of fraudulent spend.  
(b) Identifying a common point of compromise     
The point of compromise is the merchant location or ATM where a victim‟s card is 
compromised, i.e. the point where the skimming and PIN capturing take place. In 
practice different cards can be compromised at the same point, which is referred to 
as a common point of compromise or common point of purchase (CPP) (Rowsell, 
2013:1-2; Divitt, 2013:1; Verafin, 2011:3-7). When asked how one could identify the 
point of compromise or a common point of compromise during counterfeit card fraud 
investigations, participants volunteered the following methods:  
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 An interview with the victim during which positive spend (legitimate 
transactions prior to fraudulent transactions) should be identified from 
relevant bank statements (18 participants). The process is similar to that of 
identifying the point of fraudulent spend; however, here positive spend data 
is used. During the interview, attempts should be made to identify possible 
points of compromise (see paragraph 3.2.1.1 (a)). 
 Surveillance of suspected points of compromise in order to identify 
suspects behaving suspiciously (e.g. performing card skimming and/or 
PIN-capturing activities, persistently offering unsolicited help to 
cardholders, obscuring their faces from surveillance cameras and/or 
loitering in the vicinity of an ATM) (16 participants). 
 A collective analysis of positive spend transaction data relating to different 
cards which have been compromised in the same geographical area over 
the same period, based on victims‟ bank statements. The same tools and 
aids which are used to identify common points of fraudulent spend, apply 
here (11 participants). 
 A thorough interview of suspects in custody in order to identify points of 
compromise (10 participants). 
Pillay (2011:3) and Verafin (2011:3-7) describe how a CPP can be identified by 
means of a collective analysis of positive spend transaction data of different 
compromised accounts (CPP analysis). They advocate the identification of CPPs in 
counterfeit card fraud investigations to enable investigators to focus their time and 
resources on identifying perpetrators who are active at CPPs (also see Visa 
International, 2012). Once a CPP has been identified, it should be placed under 
surveillance. The identification of CPPs enhances and improves efforts to identify 
perpetrators, helps to optimise police and bank resources, and prevents further card 
skimming and PIN-capturing activities.  
A CPP analysis is typically done using a tool such as a spreadsheet, a transaction 
monitoring and analysis system, Analyst‟s Notebook or similar application. It requires 
transaction data, which includes the primary account number, ATM identifiers (e.g. 
number, name and location), merchant identifiers, point-of-sale device identifiers, 
transaction type/code, reference number, date and time (Ablett, 2014:2; Forman, 
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2005:1; Zoldi, Wang, Sun & Wu, 2007:1). In addition, the PCI SSC (2013a:9 & 15) 
and Diebold Incorporated (2014a:1; 2014b) suggest frequent and thorough manual 
inspections of ATMs by bank or security personnel as a means of identifying points 
of compromise, by physically detecting skimming devices and PIN-capturing devices 
attached to the ATM. They also advise banks and ATM deployers to use technology-
based solutions to identify foreign objects being attached to an ATM (also see 3VR 
Incorporated, 2011:2). 
In various counterfeit card fraud cases a collective analysis of positive spend 
transaction data was used with success to identify CPPs25. However, during the 
docket analysis that was performed by the researcher, it was established that none 
of the 100 cases analysed was included in a collective CPP analysis.  
(c) Surveillance 
Once a point of fraudulent spend or point of compromise has been identified, the 
investigator should focus on identifying perpetrators by using real-time and recorded 
camera surveillance and physical surveillance, which can be performed by security 
personnel, the police or police agents, as proposed by Wendorff-Goerge (2007:2-3), 
Diebold Incorporated (2014a:1; 2014b:1) and the PCI SSC (2013a:16-17) (also see 
SAPS, 2011b:1-16). Pillay (2011:3) states that the use of real-time camera 
surveillance from an off-site operational centre and physical observation at ATMs 
and pay points are effective in identifying points of compromise, suspects and 
skimming devices by focusing on suspicious behaviour of persons.  
Various examples of counterfeit card fraud cases have been found during which 
police and bank investigators used real-time camera surveillance, recorded 
surveillance footage and physical observation effectively to identify ATMs and point-
of-sale terminals as points of compromise and to identify suspects positively26. 
However, the docket analysis showed that in 82 of the 100 cases studied, SAPS 
investigating officers did not establish whether any surveillance camera footage of 
                                            
25 Including Park Road CAS 880/10/2011, Middelburg MP CAS 309/10/2011, Volksrust CAS 
68/04/2013, Malelane CAS 20/09/2013, Crystal Park CAS 206/04/2013 and Sinoville CAS 
487/04/2013. In these cases, the accurate identification of common points of compromise was 
followed up by surveillance activities, which led to the positive identification of perpetrators who were 
active at the CPPs.  
26
 Including Humewood CAS 316/02/2012, Idutywa CAS 11/08/2012, Uitenhage CAS 426/01/2012, 
Witbank CAS 628/04/2012, Sasolburg CAS 185/08/2013 and Sea Point CAS 284/05/2013. 
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fraudulent transactions was available at the bank or merchant venue, while in 
another four (4) cases it was not possible to determine whether any attempts were 
made to obtain surveillance footage. Actual surveillance camera footage was not 
used in any of the 100 cases in an attempt to identify suspects.  
In terms of SAPS National Instruction 2 of 2013, photographs of all suspects charged 
for offences listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (which includes 
fraud) must be captured on the SAPS National Photographic Image System (NPIS) 
(SAPS, 2013a). Photographs of suspects captured on the NPIS are linked to 
personal identifying information which is captured on CAS when a suspect is 
charged. The Inkwazi database system can also be used to store and retrieve 
photographs of suspects (SAPS, 2006a:1-3; 2007:1-2). Hence, the NPIS and 
Inkwazi are sources which can aid counterfeit card fraud investigators to identify 
unknown suspects from surveillance footage, by comparing their images with 
photographs of known suspects which already exist on the databases. An 
investigator can also use photographs from NPIS to generate photo identification 
parades to identify unknown suspects.  
(d) Call data analysis 
The analysis of cellphone call data and handset usage profiles of suspects can also 
be used to identify perpetrators, based on cellphone communications. Schmitz and 
Cooper (2015:327-332, 336-338), as well as Smith and Zinn (2015:431-432), 
illustrate that an analysis of account holder information, cellphone and/or landline call 
data can be used to identify a suspect positively based on RICA information, and to 
identify a suspect‟s accomplices, based on outgoing and incoming messages and 
calls. A call data analysis can also provide evidence of collaboration between 
suspects and provide a basis to compile an association chart showing linkages 
between suspects and time lines, illustrating the sequence of events and 
chronological involvement of suspects in criminal activity. 
During investigation, call data, handset usage profiles and account holder 
information can be obtained from telecommunication service providers in terms of 
section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. In counterfeit card fraud cases, 
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cellphones and SIM27 cards are often seized (see Annexure F as per attached). 
These should be subjected to a digital forensic analysis, followed by a call data 
analysis28 and a handset usage profile analysis in order to identify and link suspects, 
and to present evidence of collaboration between suspects.  
(e) Fingerprint examination and analysis  
A fingerprint examination and an analysis of fingerprints retrieved from a counterfeit 
card, skimming device, PIN-capturing device, card writer or related equipment can 
be used to identify a suspect positively whose fingerprint profile is on record and/or 
to link the suspect to the exhibits (National Forensic Science Technology Center, 
2009:5-6; Gardner, 2005:26; Marais, 1992:176-181). In the case of Sandton CAS 
441/04/2013 it was demonstrated that suspects could be identified positively by 
means of latent fingerprints, which were recovered from ATM-mounted skimming 
devices and counterfeit cards (also see Annexure F as per attached). These cases 
show the importance of subjecting all relevant devices, equipment, components, 
materials and accessories used by perpetrators to a fingerprint examination.  
The transfer of fingerprints to physical objects is based on Locard‟s exchange 
principle, which states that with contact between two objects, there will be an 
exchange of physical evidence (Chisum & Turvey, 2000:3; Minor, 2013:1). 
Whenever a person comes into contact with an object, crime scene or another 
person, a cross-transfer of physical matter occurs. With this in mind, it is important to 
prevent contamination and destruction of latent fingerprints on ATMs, skimming 
devices, PIN-capturing devices and related equipment. Non-tangible evidence can 
also be transferred by means of digital (electronic) contact without any physical 
contact, for example data stored in digital format on a computer or digital storage 
device, cellphone call data, emails and digital messages (Van Graan & Budhram, 
2015:46). Appropriate procedures for the collection, documenting, packaging, 
preservation and analysis of non-tangible evidence and physical evidence are 
equally important.  
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 Subscriber Identity Module. 
28
 In the cases of Sea Point CAS 284/05/2013, Ermelo CAS 217/02/2012, Amersfoort CAS 
87/08/2012, Potchefstroom CAS 298/10/2013 and Beaufort West CAS 525/09/2013, suspects were 
identified positively and linked to one another by means of cellphone call data analyses. 
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(f) Profiling of suspects  
It has been shown in different counterfeit card fraud cases that the profiling of a 
known suspect can be used effectively as a method to identify suspects, who had 
been charged as a co-accused of the known suspect previously29. Profiling involves 
the collating of relevant personal, biographical and criminal information of a suspect 
(Van Niekerk et al, 2015:213-216), including the suspect‟s name, surname, date of 
birth, identity number, photograph, addresses, contact details, spouse, next-of-kin, 
criminal background, assets and financial information. These should be obtained 
from all available sources (including SAPS case dockets, investigators, the Crime 
Administration System, the Criminal Record and Identification System, the Electronic 
National Administration Traffic Information System (eNatis), the Population Register, 
Internet sources and credit bureaus). Based on the criminal background of a known 
suspect, the identity of other suspects can be established from previous criminal 
cases where they were charged together. A previous co-accused of a known suspect 
can be profiled and his/her photograph from the NPIS can be used to identify 
unknown suspects captured on surveillance camera footage.  
(g) DNA profiling 
DNA profiling (typing) is a process during which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
molecules are extracted from a specimen containing genetic material and 
scientifically analysed, resulting in a unique pattern called a DNA profile, which can 
be used to identify suspects in criminal cases positively and link them to a crime 
scene or object (Freckelton & Chambers, 1990:1; De Wet, Oosthuizen & Visser, 
2011:3-5). DNA contains a genetic blueprint, which is unique to each individual and 
can be found in the human body in blood, semen, saliva, soft tissue, bone and skin 
cells (Manamela et al, 2015:110-115). When the DNA profile originating from 
physical evidence matches that of a suspect, the latter can be linked positively to the 
evidence (Goulka, Matthies, Disley & Steinberg, 2010:14; De Wet et al, 2011:3). 
Different crimes can also be linked based on DNA profiles from evidence found at 
crime scenes.  
                                            
29
 Including Queenstown CAS 29/11/2011, Humewood CAS 470/01/2012, Idutywa CAS 11/08/2012, 
Algoa Park CAS 154/08/2010 and Villieria CAS 43/05/2013. 
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In South Africa, DNA profiling is recognised by courts as a method to identify a 
perpetrator positively30. DNA profiling has also been used with success in counterfeit 
card fraud cases to identify suspects positively by means of a positive match with 
DNA found on skimming devices, counterfeit cards and related equipment31.  
The Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act, 2013 (Act No. 37 of 2013) 
deals with DNA sampling and profiling, and maintaining a national forensic database 
in respect of certain offenders. In terms of this Act, trained police officials have the 
legal obligation to take a DNA sample from anyone who has been arrested or 
charged for an offence listed in Schedule 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. 
Fraud and contraventions of the ECT Act and RICA are not included in Schedule 8. 
However, the SAPS still have legal powers to take DNA samples in counterfeit card 
fraud and card skimming cases. In terms of the legislation a National Forensic DNA 
Database (NFDD) will be kept for DNA profiles, consisting of a crime scene index, an 
arrestee index, a convicted offender index, an investigative index, an elimination 
index, and an index for missing persons and unidentified human remains.  
Goulka et al (2010:15-16) point out that significant success has been achieved with 
matching crime scene DNA with DNA profiles of known suspects in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Odendaal (2014:1) argues that the same measure of 
success can be achieved in South Africa over time as the number of DNA profiles on 
the NFDD increases (also see Smith & Zinn, 2015:406). Therefore, a concerted 
effort should be made by all counterfeit card fraud investigators to collect and submit 
DNA samples taken from suspects, crime scenes, counterfeit cards, skimming 
devices, PIN-capturing devices and related equipment for analysis and capturing on 
the NFDD. This will contribute towards expanding the database and improve 
chances of future identification of suspects, based on DNA collected from crime 
scenes and exhibits. 
                                            
30
 In S v Nyembe 2014 (1) SACR 105 (GSJ) the court accepted the positive identification of the 
accused in three different cases based solely on DNA profiling and analysis. The accused was 
convicted of 14 counts, including rape, kidnapping, attempted murder and robbery, and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  
31
 Including the cases of Nelspruit CAS 206/11/2011, Bethal CAS 68/02/2013, Malelane CAS 
20/09/2013 and Witbank CAS 1045/10/2013. 
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 Imprint identification in counterfeit card fraud cases  3.2.1.4
When an object comes into contact with another object, distinctive marks or imprints 
can be made by one onto the other. Petraco (2011:xv) explains that imprints may 
depict an object‟s physical structure through distinctive characteristics, including 
class characteristics (design and morphological features), manufacturing patterns, 
wear patterns, damage patterns and microscopic striations. Van Graan and Budhram 
(2015:51) list various categories of impression evidence, including body prints 
(fingerprints, palm prints and foot prints), footwear prints, tyre imprints, bite marks, 
and marks made by power tools, hand tools and firearm mechanisms (also see 
Marais, 1992:151-186).  
Counterfeit cards possess digital impression evidence on a microscopic level in the 
form of skimmed data, which is encoded magnetically through changes in the 
alignment of particles in the magnetic strip, using a card writer, computer and 
appropriate software (Kamal, 2006:2-3). In Annexure F, various cases are cited 
where digital forensic analyses have been used to provide impression evidence to 
prove that cards were counterfeit. When an entire card is counterfeited, marks and 
imprints can be transferred from the equipment used to manufacture the card during 
the stamping, tipping and embossing processes (Iannacci & Morris, 2000:68-69). 
Should a counterfeit card be recovered together with the tipper machine and/or 
embossing machine, imprint identification can be used to positively link the card 
(and, therefore, the suspect in whose possession it was found) to the relevant 
equipment32.  
 Action identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 3.2.1.5
This category of identification relates to the individualising of human actions as that 
of a particular offender on the basis of evidence and/or specific methods used 
(modus operandi) when committing the offence or transgression (Gilbert, 1993:163; 
Van Graan & Budhram, 2015:52). Modus operandi (method of operating) refers to 
specific characteristic conduct by a person when committing a crime (Bennett & 
Hess, 2004:552). It includes aspects such as the behaviour and actions of the 
offender, the day of the week, the time of the day and location which are chosen to 
                                            
32
 This type of identification was achieved successfully in the cases of Pretoria West CAS 
165/02/2014 and Pretoria Central CAS 1054/02/2014. 
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commit the crime, the instrument, tool or equipment used, the type of victim and/or 
property targeted, the type and severity of violence used, unique trademarks and 
„signatures‟ left on a crime scene, and items/objects collected from the crime scene 
by the offender (also see Van Graan & Budhram, 2015:62 and Labuschagne, 
2015:277-279).  
Perpetrator identification and action identification are often closely related. A 
perpetrator can be identified by identifying his/her actions while committing the 
crime. In Annexure F, various cases have been listed where surveillance of the 
physical actions and modus operandi of a suspect using a skimming device to skim a 
card, shoulder surfing to obtain PINs and/or persistently offering unsolicited help to 
ATM users have led to the identification of the suspects (also see Banking 
Association of South Africa, 2013:1-2).  
Modus operandi in counterfeit card fraud cases also include the build and assembly 
method, materials, components/parts, accessories and equipment used to 
manufacture skimming devices and PIN-capturing devices, as well as the methods 
and equipment used to produce counterfeit cards (SAPS, 2009d:1-3; 2011a:1-5; 
2011b:1-12) (see paragraph 2.6). Skimming devices and PIN-capturing devices differ 
in operation and in levels of sophistication and technological advancement, ranging 
from very basic to highly advanced (e.g. computer-aided designs, three-dimensional 
[3-D] printing and transmitting data via cellphone networks, bluetooth or wi-fi) and 
can provide a good indication of the modus operandi and skills levels of the specific 
individuals involved (Coyne, 2013:1-3; Feinberg, 2014:1-5). Investigators should be 
aware of the potential which action identification and modus operandi have to identify 
perpetrators positively.  
 Cumulative identification in counterfeit card fraud cases  3.2.1.6
Cumulative identification refers to the collective value of all identification activities 
that have contributed to identify all relevant aspects positively in order to solve the 
crime (Lee & Harris, 2000:11). No crime can be solved on the basis of a single 
category of identification. In order to solve a crime any investigation, no matter how 
trivial or elementary, requires at least four categories of identification-related 
activities, being the identification of the crime, the victim, the perpetrator and relevant 
evidence (Marais, 1992:2-5).  
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Cumulative identification is illustrated in the appeal of Ntsele v S [1998] 3 ALL SA 
517 (A), where the trial court had convicted the appellant of several counts of 
robbery, murder and attempted murder33. In counterfeit card fraud cases, the totality 
of evidence required to establish a cumulative identification will depend on the 
circumstances of each case and the aspects that need to be identified34.  
3.3 THE SHARING OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE IN 
COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD CASES  
The South African Police Service has a legal obligation to investigate, combat and 
prevent counterfeit card fraud. To this end, the SAPS has been following an 
approach of information-sharing in the investigation of banking-related crimes, 
including counterfeit card fraud (SAPS, 2005:1-4; 2006a:1-3; 2006c:1-4). In terms of 
SAPS directives all operational information and intelligence relating to banking crime 
cases must be shared among investigating officers, including biographical profiles 
and photographs of suspects and accused, descriptions and photographs of 
skimming devices, PIN-capturing devices and related equipment, modus operandi, 
bank account numbers, telephone and cellphone numbers, vehicle-related 
information, addresses, surveillance footage, points of compromise and points of 
fraudulent spend.  
The advantages of information-sharing in counterfeit card fraud cases include the 
following (SAPS, 2006e:1-3; 2007:1-2; 2011f; Smith & Zinn, 2015:422-430):  
 The identification of suspects in a specific geographic area based on, inter 
alia, surveillance material, offender profiling and modus operandi. 
 The real-time availability of photographs, descriptions, profiles and 
fingerprints of offenders. 
 The linking of different offences (cases) committed by the same suspect(s), 
leading to more charges against suspects, and establishing additional 
grounds for opposing bail and improving sentences. 
                                            
33
 Considering the cumulative effect of all the evidence presented, the Supreme Court of Appeal found 
that it could make no finding other than that the appellant was responsible for committing all the 
crimes of which he was convicted and the appeal was dismissed. 
34
 In the cases of Winterton CAS 21/09/2013 and Malamulele CAS 144/08/2013 cumulative 
identification was achieved through a series of identification-related activities, including situation, 
victim, perpetrator, imprint and action identification (also see Annexure F as per attached). 
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 The solving of cases by positively linking unsolved cases to solved cases 
on the basis of operational information, thereby improving the detection 
rate of cases. 
 The identification of criminal associates/accomplices and assets of a 
suspect. 
 The identification of crime hotspots through crime pattern and crime threat 
analyses, and the effective, focused use of personnel, resources and time. 
 It promotes a coordinated approach in centralising cases across 
jurisdictions and contributes towards expediting the finalisation of cases.  
The SAPS and Sabric have established and maintained a partnership based on 
cooperation and mutual assistance in banking crime investigations (SAPS, 2006b:1-
3; 2011a; 2011b; 2014:1-6). Sabric (2013c:27; 2015:30) views joint industry and law 
enforcement investigations as an important tool in the fight against counterfeit card 
fraud. The foundation for this is the mutual sharing of information and intelligence 
relating to counterfeit card fraud patterns, tendencies, suspects, crime scenes, 
hotspots, devices/equipment used and modus operandi. Information-sharing and 
joint ownership of banking crime databases are among the strategic deliverables of 
the SAPS(s)abric partnership (SAPS, 2014:2).  
Pillay (2011:3) also highlights a close working relationship between Sabric, the 
SAPS and bank investigators, information-sharing and a central incidence 
intelligence database as key to investigate counterfeit card fraud effectively. The two 
Sabric participants mentioned that Sabric provides various information-sharing 
platforms and tools to enable investigators to identify suspects, points of 
compromise, points of fraudulent spend, skimming devices, PIN-capturing devices 
and related equipment. These include a suspect persona database, which contains 
incidence intelligence, profiles and photographs of suspects, and the dissemination 
of suspect profiles and case linkage analyses to investigators. Furthermore, Sabric 
distributes a weekly provincial crime pattern and hotspot analysis (the Tactical 
Weekly Provincial Commercial Crime Risk Forecast) (see paragraph 3.2.1.3 (a)) and 
maintains a database for telephone numbers, cellphone numbers and call data. 
Sabric also provides an online portal where investigators can share information, and 
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a real-time closed group network (Blue Goose), which is used to inform investigators 
about arrests and banking crime incidents by means of cellphone messages.  
During interviews, participants were asked how Sabric could assist investigators to 
identify points of compromise, points of fraudulent spend, and patterns and 
tendencies in respect of counterfeit card fraud. The following responses were 
received: 
 By coordinating investigations between the SAPS and bank investigators, 
and promoting cooperation, assistance and support from banks (25 
participants). 
 By providing linkages between cases and suspects (23 participants).  
 By maintaining centralised databases, which are accessible for 
investigators, pertaining to counterfeit card fraud incidents, suspect 
profiles, devices and equipment used, organised criminal groups, cellphone 
numbers and call data of perpetrators (19 participants).  
 Through assistance to the SAPS in identifying and prioritising perpetrator 
targets and threats (12 participants). 
 By lending support in providing bank transaction analyses to investigators 
for specific investigations to determine common points of compromise and 
common points of fraudulent spend (11 participants). 
 Through continued support in providing investigators with regular crime 
information analyses relating to counterfeit card fraud patterns, hotspots 
and common points of fraudulent spend (10 participants).  
It is, therefore, evident that participants in general recognise and agree on the need 
for the supportive role played by Sabric. Examples of information-sharing and joint 
investigations involving the SAPS, bank investigators and Sabric, which have led to 
the positive identification, arrest and conviction of suspects, recovery of counterfeit 
cards, card skimming and counterfeiting equipment, are listed below35.   
                                            
35
 Akasia CAS 500/07/2013, Dunnottar CAS 44/07/2013, Douglasdale CAS 816/05/2013, Sinoville 
CAS 487/04/2013 and Crystal Park CAS 153/03/2013 (also see Annexure F as per attached). 
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3.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the different categories of identification and specific aspects that 
require positive identification during counterfeit card fraud investigations were 
discussed. These aspects include the victim, the negative spend (fraudulent 
transactions), the positive spend (transactions prior to the fraud), the perpetrators, 
counterfeit card, skimming device, PIN-capturing device, the point of compromise of 
the original card (CPP) and point(s) of fraudulent spend (merchant venue(s) and/or 
ATM(s)).  
It was established that counterfeit card fraud cases manifest as different situations 
and that the aspects which need to be identified, depended on the specific case 
situation with which the investigator is dealing. An accurate situation identification is, 
therefore, important in counterfeit card fraud cases.  
Different methods to identify the various aspects that need to be identified were 
examined and it was determined whether these were effective in practice. 
Perpetrator identification is one of the main pillars upon which a counterfeit card 
fraud investigation rests. The researcher established that direct and indirect methods 
could be used to identify perpetrators positively. Different methods of perpetrator 
identification were discussed. The role and importance of information-sharing and 
cooperation between SAPS investigators, bank investigators and Sabric, specific to 
identification in banking-related cases, were also examined.  
In the next chapter, the important findings of the study are reported, followed by 
relevant recommendations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The incidence of counterfeit card fraud in South Africa is high (Sabric, 2014:1-23; 
2015:1-24). However, the identification of offenders who commit these crimes is a 
serious concern, as police and bank investigators find it difficult to achieve. The 
result is that the majority of counterfeit card fraud cases reported to the SAPS 
remain unsolved. One of the reasons for conducting research is the desire to solve a 
real-life problem. The problem in this study relates to the challenge of identifying the 
perpetrators of counterfeit card fraud during the investigation of cases.  
The aim of this study was to evaluate identification methods used to investigate 
counterfeit card fraud. The purpose of the study was to explore the topic and the 
research problem in depth, to examine and evaluate the use of identification 
methods in counterfeit card fraud investigations, and to empower investigating 
officers with knowledge on the use of effective identification methods. In order to 
achieve the research aim and purpose, the following research questions were asked: 
 What are the objectives of forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud 
investigations? 
 What identification methods can be used to investigate counterfeit card 
fraud? 
The research rationale, research problem and research questions were evaluated 
with the view to make findings and recommendations.  
4.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The following findings relate to the research questions, and are based on information 
obtained from the participants as well as relevant national and international sources. 
Where applicable, the number of participants who have provided specific responses 
is indicated in brackets. 
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 Research Question One 4.2.1
What are the objectives of forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud 
investigations? 
The findings in respect of this research question are outlined below. 
 Forensic investigation 4.2.1.1
Forensic investigation is a process of inquiry into criminal conduct, a civil or 
administrative matter and involves an in-depth, meticulous search for the truth 
through the use of specialised skills, expert knowledge, and scientific methods and 
techniques. Its purpose is to investigate evidence in a scientific manner to establish 
who committed a crime or transgression and to bring the perpetrator before a court 
of law or other presiding authority. The main task of a forensic investigator is to 
identify, collect and present all relevant evidence to enable a presiding officer to 
establish the truth in respect of an alleged offence or issue under dispute.  
Participants in general had a good understanding of what forensic investigation is.  
 Objectives of forensic investigation 4.2.1.2
The main objectives of forensic investigation are the following: 
 The identification of the crime. 
 The identification of the perpetrator(s).  
 The individualisation of the crime. 
 The collecting and processing of evidence and information. 
 The evaluation of evidence and information. 
 Tracing of the suspect(s) and ensuring court appearances. 
 Recovery of property and restitution. 
 Support and involvement during the prosecution/litigation phase. 
 Victim empowerment. 
Participants were generally not able to list all the objectives of forensic investigation. 
 Counterfeit card fraud 4.2.1.3
Counterfeit card fraud is a specific type of fraud where specific modus operandi and 
equipment are used to commit the crime. There are three stages in counterfeit card 
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fraud, collectively referred to as its lifecycle, namely the compromising of a valid 
bank-issued card at a point of compromise, the manufacturing of a counterfeit card 
by encoding another card with the skimmed card data, and the actual commission of 
fraud when the counterfeit card and cardholder‟s PIN are used to withdraw cash 
and/or make purchases at a point of fraudulent spend (ATM or merchant venue). 
All participants interviewed were able to explain what fraud is and what the elements 
of fraud are. Participants in general had an understanding of how counterfeit card 
fraud is committed, as well as the different types of card skimming and PIN 
capturing. However, nine (9) participants did not know how POS skimming was 
committed. Fourteen (14) investigators indicated that they have investigated all three 
types of skimming. Ten (10) investigators have investigated only handheld skimming 
and ATM skimming, while three (3) have investigated only handheld skimming.  
 Card skimming 4.2.1.4
Card skimming is performed by using any of three methods, namely handheld 
skimming, ATM skimming or point-of-sale skimming. PIN capturing is done with a 
miniature (pinhole) camera, a pinpad overlay, an altered POS device or by 
surreptitiously observing the cardholder when entering the PIN on a pinpad (shoulder 
surfing). 
 SAPS training with regard to counterfeit card fraud 4.2.1.5
Investigation-related courses presented to SAPS investigators include the Basic 
Crime Investigation Course, Resolving of Crime Course and the Commercial Crime 
Forensic Learning Programme Levels I, II and III. However, none of these address 
the objectives of identification and individualisation in counterfeit card fraud. SAPS 
investigators are not formally trained on how to use effective identification methods 
in the investigation of counterfeit card fraud. 
 Research Question Two  4.2.2
What identification methods can be used to investigate counterfeit card fraud? 
The following findings were made in respect of this research question: 
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 Identification 4.2.2.1
Identification is a process of classification by which an entity, person or object is 
placed in a predefined class or category, based on shared or similar features or 
characteristics (class characteristics). Identification forms the basis for 
individualisation, which relates to a unique (positive) identification.  
 Categories of identification 4.2.2.2
Identification can be divided into seven (7) primary categories, namely: 
 Victim identification.  
 Witness identification. 
 Perpetrator (culprit) identification. 
 Imprint identification. 
 Origin identification. 
 Action identification. 
 Cumulative identification. 
 Aspects for identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 4.2.2.3
Depending on the specific circumstances of a case, there are several aspects which 
require positive identification during counterfeit card fraud investigations. These 
aspects include the following: 
 The modus operandi, type of skimming, skimming device and PIN-
capturing device used (26 participants).  
 The person who used the skimming device and PIN-capturing device to 
illegally obtain the card and PIN data (25 participants). 
 The person(s) who performed the fraudulent transactions (25 participants). 
 The point(s) of fraudulent spend (merchant(s) and/or ATM(s)) (24 
participants). 
 The point of compromise of the original card or a common point of 
compromise of various compromised cards (common point of purchase) 
(23 participants). 
 The person who manufactured the counterfeit card(s) (22 participants). 
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 The place where the counterfeit card(s) was/were produced (19 
participants). 
 The equipment used to manufacture the counterfeit card(s), including the 
card encoder, computer equipment and, where applicable, card embosser 
and tipper (18 participants). 
 The counterfeit card(s) which was/were used (18 participants). 
 The fraudulent (disputed) transactions (fraudulent/negative spend) (18 
participants). 
 The specific point-of-sale terminal and cashier at a merchant venue where 
the counterfeit card was presented (16 participants). 
 The person who supplied or manufactured the skimming device and PIN-
capturing device (16 participants).  
 The cellphone numbers of perpetrators and their communications with 
each other (16 participants).  
 The equipment and materials used to manufacture the skimming device 
and PIN-capturing device (14 participants). 
 The place where the skimming device and PIN-capturing device were 
manufactured (14 participants). 
 The prior to fraud transaction history (positive spend) (12 participants). 
 The crime (identifying the crime as counterfeit card fraud) (10 participants). 
 Any other person who colluded to commit the crime, including those who 
shared in the proceeds (6 participants). 
 Victim identification  4.2.2.4
In order to identify unknown victims in counterfeit card fraud cases, an investigator 
can make use of the following methods: 
 A digital forensic analysis of counterfeit cards, skimming devices and/or 
related equipment which are recovered (20 participants). 
 With information and the assistance of the bank (18 participants). 
 An analysis of merchant transaction vouchers and/or the ATM electronic 
transaction journal (8 participants).  
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 Perpetrator identification  4.2.2.5
It was established that the following methods can be used to identify perpetrators in 
counterfeit card fraud cases positively: 
 Identifying common points of fraudulent spend, supported by surveillance 
to identify previously known fraudsters and suspects acting suspiciously 
(e.g. making multiple withdrawals using different cards, withdrawing money 
around midnight or obscuring their faces from surveillance cameras) (16 
participants).  
 Identifying a common point of compromise of different cards, which have 
been compromised in the same geographical area over the same period, 
supported by surveillance to identify previously known suspects and 
suspects behaving suspiciously (including card skimming, shoulder surfing, 
loitering in the vicinity of an ATM or persistently offering unsolicited help to 
others) (16 participants). 
 The purposeful surveillance of popular and frequently used ATMs and 
merchant venues in order to identify previously known suspects, as well as 
suspicious actions related to card skimming and PIN capturing (15 
participants). 
 A thorough interview of all suspects arrested and obtaining information in 
order to identify other suspects (15 participants). 
 Call data and cellphone handset usage analysis of suspects in order to 
identify accomplices by means of contact details and communications (13 
participants). 
 Fingerprint examination and analysis in respect of recovered counterfeit 
cards, skimming and PIN-capturing devices, false panels and overlays, 
components and related equipment in order to identify suspects from 
existing criminal databases (10 participants). 
 DNA profiling (3 participants). 
 Profiling of suspects (2 participants). 
 Identifying points of fraudulent spend  4.2.2.6
The following methods to identify points of fraudulent spend were established during 
research:  
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 An interview with the victim during which negative spend (fraudulent 
transactions) should be identified from relevant bank statements. 
Information identifying the specific point(s) of fraudulent spend (merchant 
or ATM) should be obtained from the bank statements. Should the bank 
statements be inadequate to identify the point(s), additional information 
must be obtained from the bank (19 participants). 
 Surveillance of suspected points of fraudulent spend in order to identify 
suspects behaving suspiciously (e.g. making multiple withdrawals using 
different cards at the same ATM, making withdrawals at midnight or 
obscuring their faces from surveillance cameras) (16 participants). 
 A collective analysis of negative (fraudulent) spend transaction data 
relating to different cards which have been compromised in the same 
geographical area over the same period (12 participants). Sources, tools 
and aids which can be used to perform such an analysis, include bank 
statements, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, i2 Analyst‟s Notebook and 
Sabric analysts. 
 The thorough interviewing of suspects in custody in order to identify points 
of fraudulent spend (10 participants). 
 Identifying common points of fraudulent spend (fraud hotspots) from the 
Tactical Weekly Provincial Commercial Crime Risk Forecast, which is 
compiled by Sabric and distributed to SAPS and bank investigators (see 
Annexure G) (7 participants). 
 A crime information analysis in respect of counterfeit card fraud cases 
reported to the SAPS (which should include a crime pattern analysis, an 
analysis of modus operandi, identifying and mapping hotspots), using data 
sources, tools and techniques available in the SAPS (Crime Administration 
System, Geographic Information System, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, i2 
Analyst‟s Notebook, i2 iXa and iXv Visualiser). Crime information analyses 
could also be obtained from the station crime information official (2 
participants). 
The docket analysis which was performed during research, showed that in only 28 of 
the 100 cases analysed the point of fraudulent spend was identified positively. This 
meant that in 72 cases SAPS investigators never established where the criminals 
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had used the counterfeit cards. This could be a contributing factor as to why, in the 
majority of counterfeit card fraud cases, perpetrators are not identified positively and 
the crimes are never individualised. 
 Identifying common points of compromise  4.2.2.7
The following methods to identify common points of compromise (CPPs) effectively 
can be used:  
 An interview with the victim during which positive spend (legitimate 
transactions prior to fraudulent transactions) should be identified from 
relevant bank statements (18 participants). The process is similar to that of 
identifying the point of fraudulent spend; however, here positive spend data 
is used. During the interview, attempts should be made to identify possible 
points of compromise. 
 Surveillance of suspected points of compromise in order to identify 
suspects behaving suspiciously (e.g. performing card skimming and/or 
PIN-capturing activities, persistently offering unsolicited help to 
cardholders, obscuring their faces from surveillance cameras and/or 
loitering in the vicinity of an ATM) (16 participants). 
 A collective analysis of positive spend transaction data relating to different 
cards which have been compromised in the same geographical area over 
the same period, based on victims‟ bank statements. The same tools and 
aids which are used to identify common points of fraudulent spend, apply 
here (11 participants). 
 A thorough interview of suspects in custody in order to identify points of 
compromise (10 participants). 
The docket analysis showed that in none of the 100 cases analysed a CPP analysis 
was done. 
 Surveillance 4.2.2.8
Surveillance of points of fraudulent spend and points of compromise offer 
investigators the opportunity to identify perpetrators of counterfeit card fraud. 
Surveillance should include real-time and recorded camera surveillance as well as 
physical surveillance, which can be performed by security personnel, the police or 
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police agents. Photographs of known fraudsters can be obtained from the National 
Photographic Image System and Inkwazi System of the SAPS. These can be used 
to identify unknown suspects who have been captured on surveillance footage. 
During the docket analysis it was found that in 82 of the 100 SAPS cases, 
investigating officers did not establish whether any surveillance footage of the 
fraudulent transactions was available. Surveillance footage was not used in any of 
the cases in attempt to identify suspects. This may also be a factor which has 
contributed to the low rate of identifying perpetrators of counterfeit card fraud 
positively. 
 Imprint identification  4.2.2.9
Imprint identification in counterfeit card fraud cases can be achieved by subjecting 
recovered counterfeit cards, skimming devices, PIN-capturing devices and related 
equipment to a digital forensic analysis in order obtain evidence of, and to retrieve 
skimmed card and PIN data. Physical marks made onto a counterfeit card by a 
tipping machine or embossing machine can also be identified by an appropriate 
forensic expert. Hence, based on physical impression evidence, a counterfeit card 
can be positively linked to the specific equipment which was used to manufacture it. 
 Action identification  4.2.2.10
Action identification in counterfeit card fraud cases can be achieved by identifying 
suspicious behaviour of perpetrators, including card skimming and PIN-capturing 
activities, the use of a counterfeit card, ATM withdrawals made at midnight, 
obscuring his/her face from surveillance cameras, loitering at an ATM and/or 
persistently offering unsolicited help to ATM users. Modus operandi, in particular the 
build and assembly method and technological sophistication of skimming devices 
and PIN-capturing devices, can also guide an investigator to identify the correct 
perpetrator.  
 The sharing of information and intelligence  4.2.2.11
The sharing of incidence information and intelligence and a coordinated approach by 
relevant role players, including the SAPS, banks and Sabric, create an environment 
which enable investigators to identify perpetrators of counterfeit card fraud. 
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4.3 SECONDARY FINDINGS  
The researcher also made a number of secondary findings with regard to relevant 
points during the research. 
 Debit card 4.3.1
A debit card is a payment instrument which is issued by a financial institution and 
linked to a deposit account (e.g. a cheque, savings or transmission account) which, 
generally, is pre-funded and has a lower credit risk exposure than a credit card.  
 Credit card 4.3.2
A credit card is a payment instrument which is issued by a financial institution and 
linked to a credit card account with a pre-approved credit limit, which enables the 
cardholder to purchase goods and services from merchants who have agreed to 
accept the card.  
 Responsibility, mandate and powers to investigate 4.3.3
In South Africa, investigators can be divided into two categories, namely SAPS 
investigators and non-SAPS investigators. Non-SAPS investigators include 
government departments and agencies, as well as private entities with investigative 
capacity, including bank, corporate and private investigators. In terms of legislation 
the South African Police Service is the primary institution responsible for the 
investigation of crime. 
 Evidence 4.3.4
Evidence is anything with evidential (probative) or exculpatory value that is relevant 
to a case. It can be used to prove or refute (disprove) a fact or allegation and 
includes, but is not limited to, physical objects, documents, information and witness 
testimony.  
 Locard’s exchange principle  4.3.5
Locard‟s exchange principle holds that, whenever two objects come into contact, 
there will be a cross-transfer of physical matter between them. A perpetrator who 
physically touches an object on a crime scene will leave traces of physical evidence, 
which may include fingerprints and/or DNA material. Non-tangible evidence can also 
be transferred by means of digital (electronic) contact without any physical contact; 
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for example, data stored on a computer, cellphone call data, e-mails and digital 
messages. 
 Manifestations of counterfeit card fraud 4.3.6
Counterfeit card fraud cases manifest as any of the following situations or a 
combination of two or more:  
 A complaint from a cardholder who has suffered a loss on his/her bank 
account has been received by the bank or SAPS (in these cases the 
suspect, the method of skimming and point of compromise of the card are 
usually unknown). 
 Information relating to card skimming and/or counterfeit card fraud activities 
has been received or collected by the bank or SAPS. 
 A counterfeit card, skimming device and/or PIN-capturing device has/have 
been recovered. 
 A suspect has been arrested on suspicion of card skimming and/or 
counterfeit card fraud.  
During interviews, 26 of the 29 participants (who included both Sabric participants) 
mentioned complaints from cardholders who suffered losses on their accounts, 
where the perpetrator(s), method of skimming and point of compromise are 
unknown, as the most common manifestation of counterfeit card fraud. 
 Situation identification 4.3.7
Situation identification involves an evaluation of the circumstances and evidence 
found by the investigator in a specific situation. Based on the investigator‟s 
observations, investigative knowledge and experience, an inference can be made as 
to whether an incident has taken place or a crime has been committed. An accurate 
situation identification is only possible if the investigator has a sound knowledge of 
the crime and the required elements of the crime, supported by practical experience 
of crime scenes and situations. In order to achieve an accurate situation 
identification in counterfeit card fraud cases, the investigator should conduct a 
thorough interview with the victim.  
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4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research has focused on the subject of identification methods in the 
investigation of counterfeit card fraud cases. A number of the findings from the 
docket analysis and interviews with investigators clearly reflect the absence of 
effective identification methods during investigations. The research has been an 
attempt to find out what good practices exist for effectively identifying the various 
aspects that need to be identified during counterfeit card fraud investigations and, in 
addition, to equip investigators with new knowledge in that respect. Without 
recommendations on how to improve the identification efforts of investigators, the 
research would be fruitless and of no meaning. Keeping in mind the salient findings 
of the research, the researcher makes the following recommendations: 
 Research Question One 4.4.1
It is recommended that: 
 The objectives of forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud cases 
specific to identification and individualisation be included in the formal 
training curricula for SAPS investigators. The existing training material 
should be revised to address these objectives.  
 SAPS and bank investigators be trained in respect of point-of-sale 
skimming and how to investigate it. 
 Research Question Two 4.4.2
The following recommendations are made: 
 A training manual should be developed by relevant role players, including 
the SAPS, the banks and Sabric, relating to the most effective identification 
methods which can be used to positively identify different aspects in 
different case settings in counterfeit card fraud cases. It is also 
recommended that training be expedited by means of workshops, joint 
forums, mentorship programmes and on-the-job training. 
 Sabric and bank investigators should be used as resources by SAPS 
investigators on a regular basis to assist with identification during 
counterfeit card fraud investigations, in particular to identify common points 
of fraudulent spend, common points of compromise and perpetrators.  
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 The Tactical Weekly Provincial Commercial Crime Forecast issued by 
Sabric should be used by SAPS and bank investigators as a guideline to 
identify common points of fraudulent spend. Investigators should place 
these points under surveillance or use available surveillance footage and 
incidence intelligence. SAPS and bank investigators should focus their 
resources, time and efforts towards identifying perpetrators active at 
identified points.  
 Counterfeit card fraud investigators should analyse positive spend and 
negative spend transaction data to identify points of compromise and 
points of fraudulent spend, respectively, by using available sources, tools 
and techniques, including CAS, GIS, case dockets, bank statements, 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and Analyst‟s Notebook software.  
 SAPS counterfeit card fraud investigators should use station-level crime 
information officials to assist with crime information analyses, crime 
patterns and crime mapping in respect of counterfeit card fraud incidents 
reported to the SAPS.  
 Counterfeit card fraud investigators should employ perpetrator identification 
methods which are underutilised, including recorded surveillance footage, 
fingerprint examination and analysis, and DNA examination and analysis.  
 A fingerprint examination and analysis should be compulsory in all cases 
where counterfeit card fraud-related devices, equipment and/or materials 
are seized. 
 SAPS counterfeit card fraud investigators should be trained to take DNA 
samples. The taking of DNA samples from suspects who have been 
arrested for counterfeit card fraud and/or card skimming, and submission 
thereof to the National Forensic DNA Database, should be compulsory. 
 In order to promote effective identification-related activities during 
investigations, a check-list should be introduced for use in counterfeit card 
fraud dockets as a guide to investigators. The completion of the check-list, 
with specific details of identification-related activities performed by the 
investigator, should be compulsory.  
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 The SAPS should take appropriate preventive action in respect of 
counterfeit card fraud and card skimming, which should include regular 
awareness campaigns involving the banks and the public. 
In addition, it is recommended that further research be conducted on the topic of 
identification methods in counterfeit card fraud investigations. The researcher 
believes that it is necessary to study international methods and practices in this 
regard in more depth. It is important to improve and enhance identification methods 
used in South Africa with effective international practices.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Technological advancement has created whole new worlds of opportunity for 
criminals. Digital and computer technology have changed the lives of modern man 
forever. The skimming and counterfeiting of bank cards is a worldwide phenomenon, 
which has a huge impact on economies. It is a committed with the aid of advanced 
technology and offers anonymity, low risk and a high return to criminals. 
Furthermore, it is complex and difficult to investigate. Investigators are not always 
skilled and equipped to investigate this type of technologically sophisticated crime. 
Banks are sometimes not in a position to provide information needed by the 
investigator or analyst for identification purposes. The reality is that investigators 
dealing with counterfeit card fraud face serious challenges.  
The research has shown that, although effective identification methods exist, 
investigators often do not apply them and, therefore, offenders are seldom identified 
during investigation. This is especially true in cases where a victim has reported a 
loss on his/her bank account, but the suspect, type of skimming and the point of 
compromise are unknown. Suspects often remain unidentified and cases are closed 
as undetected. Investigators should realise that there are identification methods that 
can be used effectively and that they should apply them.  
It is a misconception to think that counterfeit card fraud will disappear once chip-and-
pin technology has been fully implemented. South Africa is largely chip-and-pin 
(EMV) compliant but still experiences high levels of counterfeit card fraud (Sabric, 
2015:1-5). As there are still large parts of the world which are not EMV compliant 
(including the United States and parts of Asia), banks and payment card providers 
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have retained magnetic stripes on cards (EMVCo, 2015). Magnetic stripe-based 
authentication is still allowed in many EMV compliant countries (Diebold 
Incorporated, 2011:3). Furthermore, a chip-and-pin card will use magnetic stripe-
based authentication if the chip is not functioning. For these reasons card skimming 
and counterfeit card fraud will continue for years to come.  
It can be argued that effective identification and the prevention of counterfeit card 
fraud go hand-in-hand. Every arrest and conviction has to be preceded by a positive 
perpetrator identification. Every time a perpetrator is arrested, a skimming device or 
counterfeit card is seized, a potential fraud is prevented. Counterfeit card fraud 
typically takes place in an environment which offers opportunities for identification to 
the investigator, including the security features of cards, bank and card processing 
systems, the ATM and point-of-sale terminal, the people, procedures and 
technologies involved. Investigators must look for these opportunities and use them 
to solve cases.  
The researcher believes that this research will empower SAPS investigators with 
knowledge in respect of identification methods which can be used in counterfeit card 
fraud investigations, and that it will open up avenues for further research to address 
the research problem.  
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LIST OF SAPS DOCKETS ANALYSED 
No SAPS Station CAS no 
1 Booysens 540/12/2012 
2 Booysens 296/02/2013 
3 Booysens 353/02/2013 
4 Bramley  78/12/2012 
5 Bramley  342/02/2013 
6 Bramley  158/03/2013 
7 Bramley  228/03/2013 
8 Brixton 497/01/2013 
9 Brixton 249/03/2013 
10 Carletonville  19/12/2012 
11 Carletonville  50/12/2012 
12 Carletonville  73/12/2012 
13 Carletonville  86/12/2012 
14 Carletonville  87/12/2012 
15 Carletonville  88/12/2012 
16 Carletonville  282/12/2012 
17 Carletonville  309/12/2012 
18 Carletonville  313/12/2012 
19 Carletonville  647/12/2012 
20 Carletonville  518/02/2013 
21 Carletonville  537/02/2013 
22 Carletonville  188/03/2013 
23 Carletonville  275/03/2013 
24 Carletonville  536/03/2013 
25 Douglasdale 926/11/2012 
26 Douglasdale 172/12/2012 
27 Douglasdale 285/12/2012 
28 Douglasdale 496/12/2012 
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No SAPS Station CAS no 
29 Douglasdale 761/12/2012 
30 Douglasdale 531/01/2013 
31 Douglasdale 612/01/2013 
32 Douglasdale 803/01/2013 
33 Douglasdale 180/02/2013 
34 Hillbrow 299/12/2012 
35 Hillbrow 300/12/2012 
36 Hillbrow 449/12/2012 
37 Hillbrow 450/12/2012 
38 Hillbrow 456/12/2012 
39 Hillbrow 659/12/2012 
40 Hillbrow 662/12/2012 
41 Hillbrow 913/01/2013 
42 Hillbrow 212/02/2013 
43 Hillbrow 525/02/2013 
44 Hillbrow 325/03/2013 
45 Jeppe 57/12/2012 
46 Jeppe 703/12/2012 
47 Jeppe 876/12/2012 
48 Jeppe 211/01/2013 
49 Johannesburg Central 194/12/2012 
50 Johannesburg Central 252/12/2012 
51 Johannesburg Central 256/12/2012 
52 Johannesburg Central 520/12/2012 
53 Johannesburg Central 1007/12/2012 
54 Johannesburg Central 1033/12/2012 
55 Johannesburg Central 219/01/2013 
56 Johannesburg Central 274/01/2013 
57 Johannesburg Central 674/01/2013 
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No SAPS Station CAS no 
58 Johannesburg Central 1085/01/2013 
59 Johannesburg Central 1359/01/2013 
60 Johannesburg Central 1307/02/2013 
61 Johannesburg Central 1096/03/2013 
62 Linden 283/01/2013 
63 Linden 670/01/2013 
64 Linden 545/03/2013 
65 Norwood 33/12/2012 
66 Norwood 415/12/2012 
67 Norwood 147/03/2013 
68 Norwood 202/03/2013 
69 Randburg 96/12/2012 
70 Randburg 101/12/2012 
71 Randburg 216/12/2012 
72 Randburg 799/02/2013 
73 Randburg 259/03/2013 
74 Randburg 329/03/2013 
75 Rosebank 163/01/2013 
76 Rosebank 31/02/2013 
77 Rosebank 163/02/2013 
78 Rosebank 179/02/2013 
79 Sandton 622/12/2012 
80 Sandton 693/12/2012 
81 Sandton 183/01/2013 
82 Sandton 560/01/2013 
83 Sandton 571/01/2013 
84 Sandton 734/01/2013 
85 Sandton 762/01/2013 
86 Sandton 885/02/2013 
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No SAPS Station CAS no 
87 Sandton 820/03/2013 
88 Westonaria 50/12/2012 
89 Westonaria 179/12/2012 
90 Westonaria 272/12/2012 
91 Westonaria 273/12/2012 
92 Westonaria 48/01/2013 
93 Westonaria 281/01/2013 
94 Yeoville 199/12/2012 
95 Yeoville 467/12/2012 
96 Yeoville 26/01/2013 
97 Yeoville 33/01/2013 
98 Yeoville 59/02/2013 
99 Yeoville 175/02/2013 
100 Yeoville 275/02/2013 
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OTHER SAPS DOCKETS  
No SAPS Station CAS no 
1 Akasia 500/07/2013 
2 Algoa Park 154/08/2010 
3 Amersfoort 87/08/2012 
4 Beaufort West 525/09/2013 
5 Bedfordview 334/09/2013 
6 Bethal 68/02/2013 
7 Crystal Park 206/04/2013 
8 Crystal Park 153/03/2013 
9 Delmas 43/01/2012 
10 Douglasdale 816/05/2013 
11 Dunnotar 44/07/2013 
12 Edenvale 27/09/2013 
13 Garsfontein 527/08/2013 
14 Hendrina 68/04/2012 
15 Humewood 64/11/2014 
16 Humewood 316/02/2012 
17 Humewood 470/01/2012 
18 ldutywa 11/08/2012 
19 Kareedouw 49/08/2011 
20 Kwazekele 569/08/2010 
21 Kliptown 348/03/2014 
22 Malamulele 144/08/2013 
23 Malelane 20/09/2013 
24 Middlelburg MP 309/10/2011 
25 Milnerton 733/03/2013 
26 Mount Road 387/04/2011 
27 Nelspruit 206/11/2011 
28 Norwood 383/07/2012 
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No SAPS Station CAS no 
29 Park Road 880/10/2011 
30 Parkview 84/10/2013 
31 Potchefstroom 298/10/2013 
32 Pretoria Central 1054/02/2014 
33 Pretoria Central 847/11/2013 
34 Pretoria Central 886/11/2013 
35 Pretoria West 165/02/2014 
36 Queenstown 29/11/2011 
37 Sandton 441/04/2013 
38 Sasolburg 185/08/2013 
39 Seapoint 284/05/2013 
40 Sunnyside 490/11/2013 
41 Sinoville 487/04/2013 
42 Uitenhage 426/01/2012 
43 Villieria 43/05/2013 
44 Volksrust 68/04/2013 
45 Wierdabrug 205/03/2013 
46 Wierdabrug 644/10/2013 
47 Witbank 1045/10/2013 
48 Winterton 21/09/2013 
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ANNEXURE A: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITHIN THE SAPS 
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ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD 
INVESTIGATORS 
 
Interview schedule     Participant No. .............. 
(Counterfeit card fraud investigators) 
 
An evaluation of identification methods used in the investigation of counterfeit 
card fraud 
 
Section 1: Historical information 
1. Are you a crime investigator? 
2. If not, please state the field or environment in which you work. 
3. For which company or organisation do you work? 
4. For how many years (years of experience in the field)? 
5. In which age group are you? (20-25 years; 26-30 years; 31-35 years; 36-40 
years; 41-45 years; 46-50 years; 51-55 years; 56-60 years)    
6. Please give a broad outline of your job functions. 
7. In what type of crime investigation do you specialise (if any)? 
8. Please specify your tertiary qualifications. 
9. Give a summary of all formal and on-the-job training you have received in the 
field in which you are working. 
 
Section 2: Forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud cases  
10. What is forensic investigation? 
11. What is the purpose of forensic investigation? 
12. What are the objectives of forensic investigation? 
13. Have you investigated counterfeit card fraud cases? 
14. What is the purpose of forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud cases? 
15. What is your understanding of fraud and the elements of fraud?   
16. Have you investigated counterfeit card fraud resulting from the skimming of 
cards using the following methods?: 
 (a) An automated teller machine (ATM) mounted skimming device 
 (b) A handheld skimming device 
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 (c) A point-of-sale (POS) device 
17. Describe how counterfeit card fraud resulting from different methods/types of 
card skimming is committed. 
18. What security feature(s) of bank cards is/are compromised when skimming of 
card data takes place?  
19. Describe the different types of skimming devices, what they look like and how 
they work. 
20. Describe what a PIN-capturing device is, what it looks like and how it works.  
21. Have you been trained to investigate counterfeit card fraud?  If so, elaborate.  
 
Section 3: Identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 
22. Are you familiar with the concept of „identification‟ in forensic investigation? 
23. If yes, explain the concept. 
24. Are you familiar with the different types (categories) of identification in forensic 
investigation? 
25. If yes, list them. 
26. Do you use identification to investigate counterfeit card fraud? 
27. If yes, how do you use identification to investigate counterfeit card fraud?  
28. What is your understanding of the concept of „individualisation‟? 
29. Do you use individualisation to investigate counterfeit card fraud cases? 
30. If yes, how do you use individualisation to investigate counterfeit card fraud 
cases?   
31. During the investigation of counterfeit card fraud cases resulting from card 
skimming, how would you identify and individualise the following?: 
(a) Fraudulent spend transactions (also known as negative spend or 
disputed transactions) on bank statements 
(b) The point of compromise or a common point of compromise (i.e. a 
common point of purchase) (CPP) of the original card(s) (the specific 
merchant, ATM or POS device and the location where the skimming 
and PIN capturing took place) 
 (c) The skimming device and PIN-capturing device used 
(d) The person(s) who manufactured and/or supplied the skimming device 
and PIN-capturing device  
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(e) The person(s) who mounted the skimming device and PIN-capturing 
device onto the ATM, or used the handheld skimming device or POS 
device to skim the card(s) 
 (f) The person(s) who manufactured the counterfeit card(s) 
 (g) The equipment used to manufacture the counterfeit card(s) 
(h) The merchant(s) and/or ATM(s) where the fraudulent spend took place 
using the counterfeit card(s) (i.e. point(s) of fraudulent/negative spend) 
 (i) The person(s) responsible for the fraudulent/negative spend 
 (j) The counterfeit card(s)   
32. How would you, during investigation, identify and individualise the 
cardholder(s) whose card(s) had been compromised and counterfeited if a 
counterfeit card, skimming device, computer or other digital storage device 
(e.g. a memory stick, cellphone or compact disc) is seized/recovered and the 
cardholder(s) is/are unknown? 
33. How can the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (Sabric) support 
or assist SAPS and bank investigators to do the following?: 
(a) Identify and individualise points of card compromise  
(b) Identify and individualise points of fraudulent spend  
(c)   Determine patterns, trends and tendencies in respect of counterfeit 
card fraud  
34. How do you propose that SAPS and bank investigators approach single, 
unrelated counterfeit card fraud cases where the suspect, method of 
skimming, type of skimming device used and point of compromise are 
unknown, in order to improve the capabilities of investigators to effectively 
identify and individualise the following?: 
 (a) The points of card compromise 
 (b) The points of fraudulent spend takes place 
(c) The person(s) responsible for the card skimming, PIN capturing and 
use of the counterfeit cards.  
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ANNEXURE C: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING RISK 
INFORMATION CENTRE 
 
Interview schedule             Participant No. .............. 
(South African Banking Risk Information Centre)      
 
An evaluation of identification methods used in the investigation of counterfeit 
card fraud 
 
Section 1: Historical information 
1. Are you a crime investigator?  
2. If not, please state the field or environment in which you work.  
3. For which company or organisation do you work? 
4. For how many years (years of experience in the field)? 
5. In which age group are you? (20-25 years; 26-30 years; 31-35 years; 36-40 
years; 41-45 years; 46-50 years; 51-55 years; 56-60 years)    
6. Please give a broad outline of your job functions. 
7. In what type of crime investigation do you specialise (if any).   
8. Please specify your tertiary qualifications.  
9. Give a summary of all formal and on-the-job training you have received in the 
field in which you are working. 
 
Section 2: Forensic investigation in counterfeit card fraud cases 
10. What is your understanding of fraud and the elements of fraud? 
11. Describe how counterfeit card fraud resulting from different methods/types of 
card skimming is committed.  
12. What security feature(s) of bank cards is/are compromised when skimming of 
card data takes place?  
13. Describe the different types of skimming devices, what they look like and how 
they work. 
14. Describe what a PIN-capturing device is, what it looks like and how it works 
(PIN refers to the personal identification number of the card holder). 
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Section 3: Identification in counterfeit card fraud cases 
15. Explain the concept of „identification‟. 
16. Explain the concept of „individualisation‟. 
17. During the investigation of a counterfeit card fraud case resulting from card 
skimming, how do you propose that the investigator identify and individualise 
the following?: 
(a) Fraudulent spend transactions (also known as negative spend or 
disputed transactions) on bank statements 
(b) The point of compromise or a common point of compromise (i.e. a 
common point of purchase) (CPP) of the original card(s) (the specific 
merchant, ATM or POS device and the location where the skimming 
and PIN capturing took place) 
 (c) The skimming device and PIN-capturing device used 
(d) The person(s) who manufactured and/or supplied the skimming device 
and PIN-capturing device  
(e) The person(s) who mounted the skimming device and PIN-capturing 
device onto the ATM, or used the handheld skimming device or POS 
device to skim the card(s) 
 (f) The person(s) who manufactured the counterfeit card(s) 
 (g) The equipment used to manufacture the counterfeit card(s) 
(h) The merchant(s) and/or ATM(s) where the fraudulent spend took place 
using the counterfeit card(s) (i.e. point(s) of fraudulent/negative spend) 
(i) The person(s) responsible for the fraudulent/negative spend 
 (j) The counterfeit card(s)  
18. How can the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (Sabric) support 
or assist SAPS and bank investigators to do the following?: 
(a) Identify and individualise points of card compromise  
(b) Identify and individualise points of fraudulent spend  
(c)   Determine patterns, trends and tendencies in respect of counterfeit 
card fraud  
19. How do you propose that SAPS and bank investigators approach single, 
unrelated counterfeit card fraud cases where the suspect, method of 
skimming, type of skimming device used and point of compromise are 
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unknown, in order to improve the capabilities of investigators to effectively 
identify and individualise the following?: 
 (a) The points of card compromise 
 (b) The points of fraudulent spend takes place 
(c) The person(s) responsible for the card skimming, PIN capturing and 
use of the counterfeit cards.  
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ANNEXURE D: CARD SECURITY FEATURES: VISA AND MASTERCARD 
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White plastic cards 
(“white plastics”) 
Magnetic stripe 
Microchip 
ANNEXURE E: IMAGES OF CARDS, CARD SKIMMING, PIN-CAPTURING AND 
CARD COUNTERFEITING DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT  
 
 
Figure 1: A magnetic stripe card and white plastic cards used to manufacture 
counterfeit cards 
  
 
 
 
 
(Source: www.made-in-china.com, accessed on: 2 November 2013)   
 
 
Figure 2: Chip-and-pin cards (also called smart cards, integrated circuit (IC) cards) 
 
   
 
 
 
(Sources: www.standardbank.co.za and www.pcmag.com, accessed on: 2 
November 2013)   
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Figure 3: Handheld skimming devices 
 
 
  
 
(Sources: www.made-in-china.com; www.sabric.co.za, accessed on: 2 November 
2013; SABRIC, 2014a:21; 2015:22) 
 
Figure 4: ATM skimming device (false card slot overlay) 
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(Source: www.krebsonsecurity.com, accessed on: 2 November 2013) 
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Figure 5: ATM skimming devices and PIN-capturing devices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Magnetic head which reads 
card data from the magnetic 
strip of a card 
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Pinhole for micro-camera in false fascia segment 
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(Sources: www.krebsonsecurity.com, accessed on: 2 November 2013; European 
ATM Security Team, emails dated 2014/02/04 and 2014/04/04; Norwood CAS 
383/07/2012; SABRIC, 2014a:23) 
 
Figure 6: PIN-capturing devices used on ATMs 
   
 
  
(Sources: www.spytechs.com; www.krebsonsecurity.com, accessed on: 2 November 
2013) 
  
Magnetic head (card reader) 
(reads data from magnetic stripe of 
card) 
Card slot 
Batteries 
Battery wire 
Circuitry and 
memory chip 
Wire from card reader Pinhole 
camera 
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(Source: Norwood CAS 383/07/2012) 
 
Figure 7: Interface of a point-of-sale device, as advertised online, that can be used 
for card skimming 
 
(Source: http:/(s)zlikes.en.made-in-china.com, accessed on: 2 November 2013) 
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Figure 8: The bottom of a point-of-sale device which was adapted to skim and record 
card data and PIN numbers (photo on the left), and cash register skimmers  
 
 
(Source: www.krebsonsecurity.com, accessed on: 2 November 2013) 
 
Figure 9: Card reader/writer (encoder) combinations for sale on the Internet 
  
(Sources: www.made-in-china.com and www.magstripe.com, accessed on: 2 
November 2013) 
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Figure 10: Counterfeit cards with handwritten notes of PIN numbers 
 
  
 
(Source: Norwood CAS 383/07/2012) 
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ANNEXURE F: SUMMARY OF SAPS COUNTERFEIT CARD FRAUD DOCKETS IN RESPECT OF WHICH OFFICIAL REPORTS WERE 
PERUSED, WHERE SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED POSITIVELY AND THE CRIME HAS BEEN INDIVIDUALISED  
No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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u
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m
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1 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Butterworth 233/01/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * * *   
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit card(s). 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit card(s). 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
2 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Butterworth 178/06/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * * *   
*Direct arrest made by 
complainant (victim of card 
skimming) who is a police 
official. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit card(s). 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit card(s). 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
3 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Cofimvaba 32/08/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * *     
*Alert bank official(s) 
identified 
suspect as a known card 
skimmer and counterfeit card 
fraudster and informed 
police. Other SAPS official(s) 
followed up the information. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
4 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Cofimvaba 131/10/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * *     
*Information re card 
skimming received from 
member 
of public and followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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skimming device. 
5 
Eastern Cape 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Humewood 454/06/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users). ** **   **   
**Surveillance camera 
footage 
at ATMs. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of counterfeit cards. 
**Arrests, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of encoded, 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
found on counterfeit 
cards during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
6 
Eastern Cape 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Humewood 
Humewood 
316/02/2012 
170/02/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users). 
** **       
**Physical undercover 
surveillance of ATM. 
**Surveillance camera 
footage. 
**Arrest and search. 
**Suspect positively 
identified. **Y **Y **Y **Y **N **N **Y **Y 
7 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Idutywa 11/08/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
** *       
**Camera surveillance 
footage of card skimming 
activities at ATM. 
**Suspects linked to an 
existing case previously 
reported (in which they 
have been charged) and 
positively identified by 
means of camera 
surveillance footage. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
8 
Eastern Cape 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Kareedouw 49/08/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users). 
** **       
**Surveillance camera 
footage 
at ATMs. 
**Analysis of ATM electronic 
transaction journals. 
**Arrests. 
**Victims identified by 
means of ATM 
transaction journals 
where camera footage 
of skimming activities 
and fraudulent 
withdrawals 
corresponded with 
transaction time stamps 
done at ATMs. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
9 
Eastern Cape 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Kwazakele 
East 
London 
Kwadwesi 
Adelaide 
Kwanobuhl
e 
569/08/2010 
925/08/2010 
138/11/2010 
41/12/2010 
205/09/2010 
13/02/2011 
631/11/2010 
ATM skimming. 
ATM mounted 
skimming devices. 
ATMs in different areas 
in Eastern Cape. 
** **   **   
**Surveillance camera 
footage 
gathered at ATMs by security 
firm appointed by the bank. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of counterfeit cards. 
**Analysis of electronic ATM 
**Suspects positively 
identified from 
surveillance camera 
footage and linked with 
fraudulent withdrawals 
from ATMs. 
**Arrests, search and 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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t 
Kwazakhel
e 
Walmer 
journals. seizure of counterfeit 
cards. 
**Victims identified by 
means of encoded 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
found on counterfeit 
cards.  
**Additional victims 
identified whose cards 
have been 
compromised using 
ATM transaction 
journals. 
10 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Maclear 80/09/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * *     
*Information (complaint) re 
card skimming received from 
victim and followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Additional victims 
identified by means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
11 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Matatiele 43/03/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  
* *     
*Suspects offering 
unsolicited help to customers 
and skimming cards 
identified at ATM through 
real-time camera surveillance 
of ATM by security firm 
appointed by bank. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s) made by other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
12 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Matatiele 108/03/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s).  
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victim identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account number) 
downloaded from 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
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Province 
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SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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skimming device. 
13 
Eastern Cape 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Mount 
Road 
387/04/2011 
ATM skimming. 
ATM mounted 
skimming device. 
ATM close to a shop in 
Port Elizabeth. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Physical identification of 
skimming device and PIN-
capturing device (pinhole 
camera). 
**Physical surveillance of 
ATM. 
**Suspects' addresses 
identified from GPS found in 
vehicle. 
**Search of vehicle and 
residential address. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device, 
counterfeit cards, computer 
harddrives, memory cards 
and memory chips. 
**Arrests, search and 
seizure of 
skimming device, micro 
camera and a large 
amount of skimming 
related equipment and 
tools. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
found during digital 
forensic examination of 
skimming device, 
counterfeit cards and 
digital storage devices 
(skimmed card data of 1 
490 cards found). 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
14 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Mqanduli 38/07/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * *     
*Information (complaints) re 
card skimming from card 
holders who were targeted 
received and followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure made by other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Additional victims 
identified by means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device.  
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
15 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Mqanduli 95/01/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * * *   
*Information re card 
skimming received and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
16 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Mthatha 591/10/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
* ** ** ** ** 
**Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by investigating officer. 
**Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by investigating 
officer. 
**Victims identified by 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device, 
counterfeit card(s) and cell 
phone of suspect. 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit card(s).  
**Additional suspect 
identified through digital 
forensic examination of 
cell phone. 
17 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Mthatha 574/04/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
18 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Mthatha 963/12/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * *     
*Suspects targeting ATM 
customers identified by 
security guard at ATM, made 
the arrests and handed 
suspects over to other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Additional victims 
identified by means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
19 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Mthatha 181/09/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * * *   
*Information re card 
skimming received and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
20 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Ngangelizw
e 
85/02/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
  * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
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Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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of skimming device. skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
21 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Ngangelizw
e 
49/05/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * * * * 
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
22 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Qumbu 149/12/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM).   * *   * 
*Information (complaint) re 
card skimming received from 
victim by security officer at 
ATM who arrested and 
handed suspect over to other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Additional victims 
identified by means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
23 
Eastern Cape 
26/18/2 dated 8 
April 2014 
Tsolo 200/10/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * *     
*Information re card 
skimming received and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
24 
Eastern Cape 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Uitenhage 
Queenstow
n 
Algoa Park 
426/01/2012 
29/11/2011 
154/08/2010 
Unknown 
** **     
  
 
 
 
**Point of fraudulent spend 
(ATM 
where fraudulent withdrawals 
were made) identified by 
means of collective analysis 
of negative spend on 
compromised accounts). 
**Surveillance cameras 
placed by SAPS at identified 
point. 
**Arrest and search. 
**Victims identified by 
means of ATM 
transaction journal (date 
and time stamp of 
fraudulent transactions 
linked to known suspect 
identified from camera 
surveillance footage). 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **N **N **Y **Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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 **Suspect known to SAPS 
investigators and identified 
from surveillance footage. 
**ATM transaction journal 
used to identify fraudulent 
transactions. 
25 
Free State 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Park Road 99/10/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
  * *     
*Suspect arrested by other 
SAPS official(s) following 
card skimming activities at 
ATM. 
**Search of suspect's home. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
suspect's cell phone. 
*Arrest, search of 
suspect and seizure of 
skimming device by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Search of home 
yielded no result. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
**Examination of cell 
phone did not yield 
positive results. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
26 
Free State 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Park Road 880/10/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
** ** **     
**Common point of 
compromise (i.e. common 
point of purchase) (CPP) 
(ATM) positively identified by 
means of a collective 
analysis of positive spend 
transaction history of 
different compromised 
accounts. 
**Suspect arrested skimming 
cards at identified CPP.  
**Search of suspect's home. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
suspect's cell phone. 
**A specific ATM 
positively identified as a 
CPP. 
**Arrest, search of 
suspect and seizure of 
skimming device. 
**Search of home did 
not yield positive results. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
**Cell phone analysis 
did not yield positive 
results. 
**Y **Y **y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
27 
Free State 
Email dated 14 
May 2014 
Sasolburg 185/08/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM. 
* * * *   
*Real-time camera 
surveillance by bank's 
security company. 
**Digital forensic examination 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device and counterfeit 
cards. 
28 
Free State 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Sasolburg 178/06/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
** ** **     
**Surveillance of ATM. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search of 
suspect(s) and seizure 
of skimming device. 
**Victim(s) identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
29 
Free State 
Email dated 14 
May 2014 
Thabong 171/08/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Information received of 
suspects 
and their address followed 
up. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
skimming device, laptop, 
card writer, memory stick and 
cell phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device, laptop and card 
writer. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
30 
Free State 
Email dated 15 
October 2012 
Virginia 60/09/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). * * *     
*Suspect arrested by other 
SAPS official(s) following 
card skimming activities at 
ATM. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search of 
suspect and seizure of 
skimming device by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
31 
Free State 
Email dated 14 
May 2014 
Zamdela 261/04/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM located inside 
shop. 
* * *     
*Information of suspect 
skimming 
cards received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
32 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Bedfordvie
w 
29/09/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
** ** **   ** 
**Physical undercover 
surveillance of ATMs. 
**Digital forensic examination 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
re
ce
iv
ed
/c
o
lle
ct
ed
 r
e 
ca
rd
 s
ki
m
m
in
g
/ 
co
u
n
te
rf
ei
t 
ca
rd
 f
ra
u
d
 
S
u
sp
ec
t(
s)
 a
rr
es
te
d
/ i
n
 
cu
st
o
d
y 
Exhibits seized 
Identification related 
activities and methods 
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At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users) in Eastgate 
Mall. 
of skimming device. whose cards had been 
compromised by means 
of card data (account 
numbers) retrieved from 
skimming device during 
digital forensic 
examination. 
33 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Dunnottar 44/07/2013 
Unknown (no skimming 
device was seized) 
** **   ** ** 
**Positive identification of 
suspects by name (as per 
information received. 
**Interrogation of suspects. 
**Search of suspect and 
addresses. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of counterfeit cards. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed 
encoded card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from 
counterfeit cards during 
digital forensic 
examination.  
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
34 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Kempton 
Park 
869/05/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting ATM 
users. 
* * *     
*Physical surveillance of 
ATM by bank's security 
company. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
35 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Moffatview 297/05/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Petrol station (pump 
attendants). 
** ** ** **   
**Search of suspects. 
**Interrogation of suspects. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**A third suspect (who 
supplied 
skimming device) 
identified and arrested 
from information 
obtained during 
interrogation of first two 
suspects. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
36 
Gauteng 
Report dated 27 
July 2012 
Norwood 383/07/2012 
ATM skimming. 
ATM mounted 
skimming device. 
ATM at a petrol station 
in Norwood. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up. 
**Search of suspect's vehicle 
and house. 
**Arrest(s), search and 
seizure. 
**Computers and other 
equipment seized in 
suspect's vehicle and 
house. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
re
ce
iv
ed
/c
o
lle
ct
ed
 r
e 
ca
rd
 s
ki
m
m
in
g
/ 
co
u
n
te
rf
ei
t 
ca
rd
 f
ra
u
d
 
S
u
sp
ec
t(
s)
 a
rr
es
te
d
/ i
n
 
cu
st
o
d
y 
Exhibits seized 
Identification related 
activities and methods 
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**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device, 
counterfeit cards, computers 
and cell phones . 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming devices 
and counterfeit cards. 
37 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Pretoria 
West 
591/05/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
POC unknown. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Vehicle matching 
description and 
registration number traced 
with suspect. 
**Interrogation of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards, laptops 
and cell phones. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**A further suspect 
arrested based on 
information obtained 
through interrogation. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
obtained during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
38 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Randburg 466/04/2013 
ATM skimming. 
ATM mounted 
skimming devices. 
ATMs in Gauteng. 
** ** ** **   
**Physical surveillance of 
relevant 
ATM. 
**Searching of vehicles and 
residential addresses of 
suspects. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards and cell 
phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
found on skimming 
devices and counterfeit 
cards during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
39 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Randburg 407/06/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At petrol station (petrol 
attendant). 
** ** **     
**Interrogation of suspect. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data downloaded during 
digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
40 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Sandton 441/04/2013 
ATM skimming. 
ATM mounted 
skimming devices. 
ATMs in Gauteng. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Sharing of intelligence and 
deploying a joint investigation 
team consisting of bank 
investigators, security 
companies and SAPS 
**ATM mounted 
skimming device on 
ATM identified. 
**Suspect mounting 
skimming device to ATM 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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Commercial Crime Unit. 
**Surveillance camera 
footage at ATM. 
**Physical surveillance of 
relevant ATM (point of 
compromise). 
**Searching of vehicles and 
residential addresses of 
suspects. 
**Interrogation of suspects 
and extracting information. 
**Fingerprint examination of 
skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards and related 
equipment. 
**DNA examination of 
skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards and related 
equipment. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards, digital 
storage devices and cell 
phones. 
**Modus operandi 
(construction method of ATM 
skimming devices and 
materials used). 
identified from camera 
surveillance footage. 
**Suspect removing 
skimming device 
identified during 
physical surveillance of 
ATM, arrested and 
skimming device seized. 
**Further suspects 
arrested, skimming 
devices, counterfeit 
cards and related 
equipment seized as a 
result of searching 
vehicles and 
residences, and 
information obtained 
during interrogation. 
**Suspects linked to 
skimming devices and 
counterfeit cards by 
means of fingerprints. 
**Skimmed card data of 
2 364 compromised 
cards obtained by 
means of digital foernsic 
analysis of skimming 
devices, and victims 
identified with account 
numbers. 
**Case linked to cases 
in Durban on the basis 
of similar construction 
method of skimming 
devices (modus 
operandi).  
41 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Sharpeville 993/06/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
ATMs in Sharpeville, 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Collective/joint analysis of 
positive spend transaction 
data of different 
compromised accounts. 
**Specific ATM 
positively identified as a 
common point of 
compromise. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
Case situation/background, identification related activities and identification methods used in the case 
 
(Prior to investigation indicated with * and during investigation indicated with ** 
Below 'other SAPS official(s)' means not the investigating officer) 
      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
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Vereeniging, Sasolburg, 
Dube) (targeting ATM 
users). 
 **Recorded surveillance 
camera 
footage of suspects 
skimming cards. 
**Photographs of suspects. 
**Sharing of intelligence 
between role players of a 
joint investigation team 
comprising bank 
investigators, security firmas 
and police investigators. 
**Physical surveillance of 
ATM (POC).  
**Real-time camera 
surveillance of ATM (POC). 
**Interrogation of arrested 
suspect and follow-up of 
extracted information. 
**Search of residential 
address of suspect and 
seizure of exhibits. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards and cell 
phones. 
**Suspects responsible 
for card skimming 
identified. 
**Arrest, search and 
seziure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data downloaded during 
digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming devices, 
counterfeit cards and 
cell phones.  
 
42 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Sinoville 487/04/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At a merchant in 
Pretoria. 
** ** ** **   
**Joint analysis of positive 
spend 
transaction history of 
different compromised 
accounts.  
**Sharing of intelligence and 
deploying a joint investigation 
team consisting of bank 
investigators and SAPS 
Commercial Crime Unit.  
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Joint data analysis led 
to merchant being 
identified as a common 
point of purchase 
(common point of 
compromise). 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
43 Gauteng Sunnyside 850/07/2013 Handheld skimming & * * * * * *Information received re card *Arrest, search and *Y *N *N *Y *N *N *Y *N 
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No 
Province 
& 
SAPS report 
reference 
number 
and date 
Station CAS no 
Method of skimming, 
Type of skimming 
device 
& 
Point of compromise 
(POC)  
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Email dated 13 
May 2014 
ATM mounted 
skimming. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users). 
** ** ** skimming activities and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
*Search of suspects and their 
vehicle. 
**Interrogation of suspects 
and following up of 
information extracted. 
**Search of suspects' 
residences. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices, laptops, 
personal computer, memory 
sticks, counterfeit cards and 
cell phones. 
seizure. 
**Additional seizures. 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming devices, 
computers and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Computer software 
retrieved during digital 
forensic examination 
used to encode cards 
and drive card writers. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
44 
Gauteng 
Email dated 13 
May 2014 
Wierdabrug 644/10/2013 
POS skimming. 
Portable POS skimming 
device. 
Petrol station in 
Centurion, Gauteng. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card 
skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
45 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
Email dated 15 
May 2014 
Gingindlovu 325/10/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM. 
** ** **     
*Direct observation by 
security guard of card 
skimming activities by 
suspect. 
**Information received by 
SAPS card fraud 
investigators and followed 
up. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
46 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
Email dated 15 
May 2014 
Tongaat 67/02/2014 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At toll booth (Tongaat 
Plaza). 
** ** **     
**Common point of 
compromise (CPP) positively 
identified by bank 
investigator by means of a 
collective analysis of positive 
spend transaction history of 
different compromised 
accounts. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure.  
**94 Victims identified 
by means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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**Sharing of information 
between bank investigators 
and SAPS investigators. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
47 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
Email dated 15 
May 2014 
Winterton 21/09/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
* * * *   
*Information received re 
suspects 
and followed up by other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
skimming device, counterfeit 
cards and cell phone. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device and counterfeit 
cards. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
48 
Limpopo 
Email dated 16 
May 2014  
Groblersdal 88/07/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At petrol station. ** ** **     
**Information of suspect 
skimming 
cards followed up. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
49 
Limpopo 
Email dated 16 
May 2014  
Malamulele 144/08/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting ATM 
users). 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
50 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Amersfoort 87/08/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting ATM 
users).  
* * * * * 
*Information received re card 
skimming activities received 
and followed up by other 
SAPS official(s). 
*Search of suspects and their 
vehicle. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device, 
counterfeit cards and cell 
phones. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
51 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Delmas 
137/04/2012 
138/04/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Information received re 
card skimming/counterfeit 
card fraud activities. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure by joint 
investigation team 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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Pump attendants at 
petrol station.  
**Search of suspects and 
their homes. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices and 
counterfeit cards. 
consisting of two bank 
investigators from two 
different banks and 
SAPS CCU 
investigators. 
**Search of suspects 
vehicle and homes 
yielded laptops, 
counterfeit cards and 
cash. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
52 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Delmas 43/01/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Bank official working in 
bank.  
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities of 
clients' cards. 
**Collective analysis of 
transaction data of 
compromised accounts of 
clients assisted by suspect. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure by joint 
investigation team 
consisting of bank 
investigators and SAPS 
CCU investigators. 
**Suspect identified as 
probable common point 
of compromise. 
**No card data found on 
skimming device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **N **Y **Y **Y 
53 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Ermelo 9/05/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Pump attendant at 
petrol station.  
** ** ** ** ** 
**Information received re 
card skimming/counterfeit 
card fraud activities. 
**Search of suspect and his 
home. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure by joint 
investigation team 
consisting of two bank 
investigators from two 
different banks and a 
SAPS CCU investigator. 
**Search of suspect's 
home yielded more 
counterfeit cards, 
another skimming 
device, a card encoder 
and laptop. 
**Victims identified by 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
54 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Ermelo 
Amersfoort 
217/02/2012 
87/08/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting ATM 
users).  
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming 
activities received and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
*Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Call data analysis of 
suspects' cell phone call 
data. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
**Suspects positively 
linked to another case 
(Amersfoort CAS 
87/08/2012) by SABRIC 
using call data analysis. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
55 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Hendrina 68/04/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting ATM 
users) & inside bank 
(bank official).  
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming 
activities received and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
*Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
**Bank official identified 
as additional point of 
compromise by means 
of collective analysis of 
account opening 
documents and 
transaction history of 
compromised accounts. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
56 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Kabokweni 138/08/2012 
Unknown (no skimming 
device was seized) 
** **   ** ** 
**Information received re 
card skimming/counterfeiting 
activities. 
**Search of suspect's home. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of card encoder, computer, 
flash drives and counterfeit 
cards. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
counterfeit cards 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
57 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
Mbuzini 
Nelspruit 
13/01/2012 
309/03/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
* *   *   
*Information re card 
skimming activities, suspect's 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure of a stolen bank 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
**Y 
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2012-10-15 device. 
At ATM (targeting ATM 
user).  
vehicle registration number 
and fraudulent withdrawals 
received and followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
*Victim identified point of 
fraudulent spend from sms 
received from bank re 
fraudulent withdrawal. 
*Search of suspect's vehicle.  
**DNA analysis of stolen 
card. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of stolen bank card found in 
vehicle. 
**Camera surveillance 
footage. 
**Cell phone call data 
analysis. 
card by other SAPS 
official(s). 
*Stolen bank card linked 
to theft case. 
**Card holder (victim) of 
stolen card identified. 
**Suspect positively 
linked to stolen card by 
means of DNA analysis. 
**153 Fraudulent spend 
transactions (payments 
at toll booths) by 
different suspects 
identified from an 
anlysis of negative 
spend transaction data 
on bank statement. 
**Additional suspects 
identified by means of 
camera surveillance 
footage recorded at toll 
booths. 
**Positive links between 
suspects based on cell 
phone call data 
analysis.  
58 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Middelburg 309/10/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Cashiers in coffee 
shop. 
** ** ** **   
**Information received re 
card skimming activities. 
**Common point of 
compromise (CPP) positively 
identified by means of a 
collective analysis of positive 
spend transaction history of 
different compromised 
accounts. 
**Search of cashiers. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit card(s). 
**Search of suspects' homes. 
**Arrests, search and 
seizure by joint 
investigation team 
consisting of 3 bank 
investigators from two 
banks and SAPS CCU 
investigators. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Search of homes did 
not yield any results. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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59 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Middelburg 391/12/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Pump attendant at 
petrol station.  
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities. 
**Search of suspect's locker. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
**PIN numbers identified 
on documents in locker. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
60 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Ogies 126/03/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Bank official working in 
bank.  
* * * *   
*Information re card 
skimming 
activities received and 
followed up by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of 
skimmed card data 
(account numbers) 
found on skimming 
device during digital 
forensic examination of 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
61 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2014-05-15 
Secunda 195/06/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At petrol station in 
Secunda. 
** ** ** **   
**Information shared by bank 
investigator with SAPS 
investigators. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device, 
counterfeit cards and cell 
phones. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure by joint 
SAPS/bank 
investigation team. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device and counterfeit 
cards. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
62 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2014-05-15 
Volksrust 68/04/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At point of sale inside 
shop (Volksrust). 
** ** ** **   
**Common point of 
compromise (CPP) positively 
identified by bank 
investigator by means of a 
collective analysis of positive 
spend transaction history of 
different compromised 
accounts. 
**Sharing of information 
between bank investigator 
and SAPS investigators. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure by joint 
SAPS/bank 
investigation team.  
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device and counterfeit 
cards. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
63 
Mpumalanga 
26/18/2 dated 
2012-10-15 
Witbank 628/04/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Cashier in casino.   * *     
*Real-time camera 
surveillance by casino 
personnel. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other 
SAPS official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
64 
Mpumalanga 
Witbank CAS 
361/11/2012 
dated 
2012-11-13 
Witbank 361/11/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATM (targeting card 
holders using ATM). 
** ** ** **   
**Common point of 
compromise (CPP) (ATM) 
positively identified by means 
of a collective analysis of 
positive spend transaction 
history of different 
compromised accounts. 
**CPP verified by means of 
information re unsolicited 
help offered to clients at 
ATM. 
**Surveillance of identified 
ATMs 
**Digital forensic examination 
of counterfeit cards. 
**Arrests, search and 
seizure by joint 
investigation team 
consisting of 3 bank 
investigators from two 
banks, a secutiy 
company and SAPS 
CCU investigator. 
**Victims identified by 
means of digital forensic 
examination of 
counterfeit cards. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
65 
North West 
Email dated 19 
May 2014 
Coligny 84/05/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At petrol station in 
Coligny. 
* * *     
*Information received re card 
skimming activities and 
followed up by other SAPS 
officials. 
*Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
66 
North West 
Email dated 19 
May 2014 
Jouberton 84/08/2013 
Unknown 
** **   ** ** 
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
card encoder, laptop and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card 
data (account numbers) 
retrieved 
from counterfeit cards 
during digital forensic 
examination.  
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
67 North West Jouberton 69/04/2012 Handheld skimming. * * *     *Information re card *Arrest, search and *Y *N *N *Y *N *N *Y *N 
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Email dated 9 
October 2012 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
skimming followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
68 
North West 
Email dated 9 
October 2012 
Klerksdorp 632/03/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users). 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
69 
North West 
Email dated 19 
May 2014 
Potchefstro
om 
298/10/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users) in 
Potchefstroom. 
** ** ** ** ** 
**Physical undercover 
surveillance of ATM. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
skimming devices and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of cell phones and call data 
analysis. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
devices and counterfeit 
cards during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Positive links made 
between suspects 
based on call data 
analysis. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
70 
North West 
Email dated 19 
May 2014 
Rustenburg 824/05/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At ATMs (targeting 
ATM users) in 
Rustenburg. ** ** ** **   
**Physical undercover 
surveillance of ATM. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and 
counterfeit cards. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified 
whose cards had been 
compromised by means 
of card data (account 
numbers) retrieved from 
skimming device and 
counterfeit cards during 
digital forensic 
examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
71 
North West 
Email dated 19 
May 2014 
Tlhabane 34/10/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
** ** **     
**Digital forensic examination 
of 
skimming device. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card 
data (account numbers) 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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POC unknown. retrieved from skimming 
device during digital 
forensic examination. 
72 
Northern Cape 
Report dated 15 
October 2012 
Pampierstat 05/11/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. * * *     
*Information followed up by 
other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of card data 
(account numbers) 
retrieved from skimming 
device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
73 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Atlantis 132/08/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
* * * *   
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victim(s) identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming 
device(s). 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
74 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Cape Town 
Central 
85/02/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At a pub in Cape Town. 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victim(s) identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming 
device(s). 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
75 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Cape Town 
Central 
219/06/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
At restaurant in Cape 
Town. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card 
skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspects. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming devices. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
devices. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
76 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Cape Town 
Central 
1995/01/2014 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
At restaurant in Cape 
Town. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
device during digital 
forensic examination. 
77 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Cape Town 
Central 
833/03/2014 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
At restaurant in Cape 
Town. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
device during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
78 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Claremont 215/03/2014 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
At restaurant in 
Claremont. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
device during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
79 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Milnerton 138/10/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
Coffee shop in Cape 
Town. 
* * * * ** 
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Search of suspect's house. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device, 
counterfeit cards, computer 
and cell phones . 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Computer seized in 
suspect's house. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
80 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Parow 100/07/2011 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
At petrol station 
(targeting card holders 
paying for fuel). 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest, search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming device. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
81 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Somerset 
West 
211/07/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victim(s) identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
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      Were the objectives of identification and   
individualisation achieved? 
 
(Yes = Y; No = N; Prior to investigation indicated with 
* and during investigation indicated with **)   
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
re
ce
iv
ed
/c
o
lle
ct
ed
 r
e 
ca
rd
 s
ki
m
m
in
g
/ 
co
u
n
te
rf
ei
t 
ca
rd
 f
ra
u
d
 
S
u
sp
ec
t(
s)
 a
rr
es
te
d
/ i
n
 
cu
st
o
d
y 
Exhibits seized 
Identification related 
activities and methods 
used 
Outcome 
S
it
u
at
io
n
 
V
ic
ti
m
 
W
it
n
es
s 
P
er
p
et
ra
to
r 
(c
u
lp
ri
t)
  
Im
p
ri
n
t 
O
ri
g
in
 
A
ct
io
n
 
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 
S
ki
m
m
in
g
 
d
ev
ic
e(
s)
 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
ei
t 
ca
rd
(s
) 
O
th
er
 r
el
ev
an
t 
eq
u
ip
m
en
t 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming 
device(s). 
82 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Table Bay 
Harbour 
53/12/2013 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
POC unknown. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect and his 
residence. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on 
counterfeit cards during 
digital forensic 
examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
83 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Table Bay 
Harbour 
198/01/2014 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
At restaurant in Table 
Bay. 
** ** **   ** 
**Information received re 
card skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect and his 
residence. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
device during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Positive links with 
other suspects 
established by means of 
cell phone call data 
analysis. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
84 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Woodstock 515/05/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account numbers) 
downloaded from 
skimming devices. 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
85 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 16 
October 2012 
Woodstock 621/06/2012 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
device. 
POC unknown. 
* * *     
*Information re card 
skimming/ counterfeit card 
fraud received and followed 
up by other SAPS official(s). 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device. 
*Arrest(s), search and 
seizure by other SAPS 
official(s). 
**Victim(s) identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data (account 
number(s)) downloaded 
from skimming 
device(s). 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
*Y 
**Y 
*N 
**Y 
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86 
Western 
Cape 
Email dated 20 
May 2014 
Woodstock 342/02/2014 
Handheld skimming. 
Handheld skimming 
devices. 
At petrol station in 
Woodstock. 
** ** **     
**Information received re 
card skimming activities and 
followed up. 
**Search of suspect. 
**Digital forensic examination 
of skimming device and cell 
phone. 
**Arrest, search and 
seizure. 
**Victims identified by 
means of skimmed card 
data found on skimming 
device during digital 
forensic examination. 
**Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y **Y 
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